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ABSTRACT 
WHY DO POLITICAL PARTIES SPLIT? UNDERSTANDING PARTY 
SPLITS AND FORMATION OF SPLINTER PARTIES IN TURKEY 
Demirkol, Özhan 
PhD, Department of Political Science 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Zeki Sarıgil 
December 2013 
 
The process of splinter party formation has been understudied. This is 
related with the difficulties in studying the intraparty realm of politics and the 
inability of the splinter parties to turn into successful competitors. Employing an 
actor-oriented approach, this study traces the reasons behind splits in mainstream 
parties and formation of splinter parties. It intends to develop a theoretical model 
for explaining party splits in Turkey. It is asserted that party split is one of the 
possible outcomes of the competition between the dissenting faction and the 
dominant faction supporting the party leader. This outcome is preceded by two 
stages: dissent, and intraparty conflict. Strategies developed by dissenting faction 
and the party leader’s response are conditioned by a number of endogenous and 
exogenous factors. Endogenous factors include the nature of disagreement, relative 
iv 
power of competing factions across the different layers of party organization and 
leadership autonomy. Exogenous factors include the costs of forming a new party 
and the perceived viability for a new party. Splinter party is formed in case the 
dissident faction that departs from the parent organization chooses to invest on a 
new party rather than switching to an established party.  
The model proposed in this dissertation is illustrated by a comparative 
analysis of five cases of party splits in Turkish party system since the transition to 
democracy in 1946. The political parties that are analyzed within the scope of this 
study include the Democrat Party, the Republican People’s Party, the Justice Party, 
the True Path Party and the Democratic Left Party. The analysis reveals that 
endogenous factors are more influential over party splits compared to the 
exogenous factors. Moreover, in case the dissidents are unlikely to voice within the 
party platforms, they might simply resign without voice.  
Key words: Party Split, Splinter Party Formation, Turkish Politics, Political Parties. 
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ÖZET 
SİYASİ PARTİLER NEDEN BÖLÜNÜR? TÜRKİYE’DE PARTİ 
BÖLÜNMELERİNİ VE BÖLÜNEREK OLUŞAN PARTİLERİ ANLAMAK 
Demirkol, Özhan 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yar. Doç. Dr. Zeki Sarıgil 
Aralık 2013 
 
Parti bölünmeleri ve bölünerek oluşan partiler üzerine fazla çalışma 
bulunmamaktadır. Bu durum parti içi dinamikleri çalışmanın zorluğundan ve 
bölünerek oluşan partilerin çoğunlukla tercih edilir partilere dönüşmemiş 
olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışma aktör odaklı bir yaklaşım izleyerek ana 
partilerde bölünmelerin ve bölünerek parti oluşumlarının altında yatan sebeplere 
değinmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle Türkiye’de yaşanmış parti bölünmelerini 
açıklamaya yönelik teorik bir model ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışmada temel olarak 
parti bölünmesinin lideri destekleyen hizip ile muhalif hizip arasındaki çatışmada 
izlenebilecek yollardan birisi olduğu ortaya koyulmaktadır. Bu yolun tercih 
edilmesi üç aşamalı bir süreç sonunda gerçekleşmektedir: rahatsızlık, parti içi 
çatışma ve ayrılık. Muhalif hizip ve parti lideri tarafından tercih edilen stratejiler 
vi 
parti içi ve parti dışı faktörler tarafından belirlenmektedir. Parti içi faktörler 
anlaşmazlığın niteliği, çatışan hiziplerin partinin değişik katmanlarındaki gücü ve 
lider otonomisinden oluşmakta iken parti dışı faktörler ise yeni parti kurma maliyeti 
ve yeni partiye olan ihtiyaç algısından oluşmaktadır.  
Yazar tarafından sunulan model 1946’da demokrasiye geçişten bu yana 
yaşanmış beş örnek olay üzerinde karşılaştırılmalı olarak uygulanmıştır. Çalışma 
kapsamında incelenen partiler Demokrat Parti, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Adalet 
Partisi, Doğru Yol Partisi ve Demokratik Sol Partiden oluşmaktadır. Parti dışı 
faktörlerin zaman içinde değişmiş olmasından kaynaklı olarak incelenen zaman 
dilimi üç parçaya bölünmüştür. Bahsi geçen parti bölünmelerinin incelenmesi 
sonucunda parti içi faktörlerin parti dışı faktörlere kıyasla parti bölünmelerinde 
daha belirleyici olduğu bulunmuştur. Ayrıca muhalif hizbe mensup üyelerin parti 
içinde rahatsızlıklarını dile getirme imkânı olmadığı durumlarda partiden direk 
ayrılmayı tercih ettikleri gözlemlenmiştir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Parti Bölünmeleri, Bölünerek Oluşan Partiler, Türk Siyasi 
Tarihi, Siyasi Partiler 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Turkish political history has been populated with the frequent emergence of 
new parties. Since the 1946 elections, various splinter and genuinely new parties 
have emerged to compete with the established parties for wining office. When they 
were outlawed, established parties were re-organized under new party labels or 
genuinely new parties were formed to compete for the votes of the outlawed parties; 
conversely established parties merged under new party labels in order to enhance 
their competitiveness. Finally, conflicts within host parties resulted in the entrance 
of splinter parties as new competitors.  
A brief review of Turkish history reveals that legislators elected from the 
list of the established parties switched to newly formed splinter parties nearly in 
every legislative term (Table 1). From 1946 to 1960, all new parties that gained 
representation in the assembly were splinter parties. Indeed, the Democrat Party 
(Demokrat Parti-DP), the ruling party from 1950 until 1960, had split from the 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP). During the 1950s, the 
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DP gave birth to three splinter parties, the Nation Party (Millet Partisi-MP), the 
Peasants’ Party (Köylü Partisi-KP) and the Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi-HP).  
Table 1: Splinter Parties Represented in the Turkish Parliament (1946-2011) 
Legislative Term Splinter Party Split from Date of Formation Seats Held 
1943-1946 DP CHP 1946 4 
1946-1950 MP (1) DP 1948 19 
1950-1954 KP DP 1952 6 
1954-1957 HP DP 1955 36 
1961-1965 MP (2) CKMP 1962 14 
1965-1969 GP CHP 1967 32 
1969-1973 DkP AP 1970 38 
1969-1973 CP CHP 1972 12 
1987-1991 HEP SHP 1990 12 
1987-1991 SBP SHP 1991 4 
1991-1995 YP ANAP 1993 6 
1991-1995 BBP MHP 1993 5 
1991-1995 YDH SHP 1994 3 
1995-1999 DTP DYP 1997 33 
1995-1999 DEPAR DSP 1998 1 
1999-2002 AKP FP 2001 60 
1999-2002 YTP (2) DSP 2002 65 
2007-2011 TP AKP 2009 1 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Kaynar et al. (2007); TBMM (2010); TÜİK (2008). Numbers 
in parentheses are used to distinguish two parties with the same party labels. Splinter parties that 
were not represented in the parliament are excluded. 
 
The 1960 intervention changed the dynamics of party system development. 
Local branches of the outlawed DP united around the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-
AP) whereas some of the former DP deputies formed the New Turkey Party (Yeni 
Türkiye Partisi-YTP). Conflicts in the Republican Peasants’ Nation Party 
(Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi-CKMP) led the former MP leader to re-
establish the MP (2). After the infiltration of radical officers to the CKMP, the party 
adopted a more nationalist stance and changed its name to Nationalist Action Party 
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP). Starting with the second half of the 1960s, the 
CHP gave birth to two splinter parties, the Reliance Party (Güven Partisi-GP) and 
the Republican Party (Cumhuriyetçi Parti-CP), and these two parties merged under 
the banner of the Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi-CGP) in 
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1973. Finally, conflict in the ruling AP ended up with the formation of the 
Democratic Party (Demokratik Parti-DkP).  From the 1973 election until the 1980 
military intervention, no parties were prone to split despite the prevalence of a 
permissive institutional design and party authoritarianism both of which are 
commonly cited as reasons behind party splits.   
The military, which conducted another intervention in 1980, completely 
changed the dynamics of party system development through the measures it 
enacted, including, the purge of political parties and their leadership, ban on party 
switching and veto over successors of the outlawed parties. Following the 
permission of political activities in 1983, the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-
ANAP), the Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi-MDP) and 
the Populist Party (Halkçı Parti-HP) arose as the genuinely new parties that the 
military permitted to run in the initial elections. During the same period, outlawed 
parties were re-established under different names. These successor parties included 
the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP), the Conservative Party (Muhafazakâr 
Parti) and the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP). Additionally, some of the 
members of the outlawed CHP formed the Social Democracy Party (Sosyal 
Demokrasi Partisi-SODEP) whereas the former leader of the CHP formed the 
Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP) as a genuinely new party. 
Within a short time, the HP and the SODEP merged under the banner of the Social 
Democrat Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti-SHP). The return of the 
purged politicians with the constitutional referendum in 1987 and the removal of 
the ban over outlawed parties in 1992 further fragmented the party system. After 
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the repeal of the ban, the CHP was re-established in 1992 by the dissident members 
of the SHP.  
By the 1990s, political parties on all sides of the political spectrum were 
prone to divisions. Some of the members of the SHP switched to the Socialist Unity 
Party (Sosyalist Birlik Partisi-SBP), the New Democracy Movement (Yeni 
Demokrasi Hareketi-YDH) and the pro-Kurdish People’s Labor Party (Halkın 
Emek Partisi-HEP). Following the death of the President and former ANAP chair 
Turgut Özal, his brother Yusuf Bozkurt Özal, formed the New Party (Yeni Parti-
YP). Conflict in the MHP on the issue of secularism paved the way for the formation 
of the Great Union Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi-BBP).  
The rise of political Islam as an important political actor and the so-called 
‘28 February Process’ facilitated party splits and merges. After the 1994 local 
elections, the SHP merged with the CHP in order to maintain unity on the left 
against the rising political Islam. Intra-party conflict due to the DYP chair’s 
decision to form a coalition with the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP) 
ended up with the formation of the Democrat Turkey Party (Demokrat Türkiye 
Partisi-DTP) in 1997. The DSP also faced splits; in addition to the Changing 
Turkey Party (Değişen Türkiye Partisi-DEPAR), conflict over leadership 
succession resulted in the formation of the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi-
YTP). Finally, following the dissolution of the Virtue Party, (Fazilet Partisi-FP), 
conflict within the National View Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi) ended up with 
the formation of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-
AKP) in 2002. Since then, party fissions have been replaced with party fusions, 
with the minor exception of the formation of the Turkey Parti (Türkiye Partisi-TP) 
5 
by a former minister to the AK Parti government. During this period, the ANAP 
merged into the DYP whose name changed to the Democrat Party (3), and the YTP 
(2) merged into the CHP. On the other hand, the DTP, which changed its name to 
Freedom and Change Party (Hürriyet ve Değişim Partisi-HÜR PARTI), merged 
with the People’s Ascendancy Party (Halkın Yükselişi Partisi-HYP). 
Table 2: Host Party Status and Party Splits 
Host 
Party 
Splinter 
Party 
Year of 
Split 
Host Party 
Status 
Votes in Previous Elections 
(%) 
CHP DP 1946 Governing  - 
DP MP (1) 1948 Major opposition - 
DP KP 1952 Governing 55.2 
DP HP 1955 Governing 58.4 
CKMP MP (2) 1962 Opposition 14.0 
CHP GP 1967 Major opposition 28.7 
AP DkP 1970 Governing 46.6 
CHP CP 1972 Coalition Partner 27.4 
SHP HEP 1990 Major 
Opposition 
24.8 
SHP SBP 1991 Major 
Opposition 
24.8 
ANAP YP 1993 Major 
Opposition 
24.0 
MHP BBP 1993 Opposition - 
SHP YDH 1994 Coalition Partner 20.8 
DYP DTP 1997 Coalition Partner 19.2 
DSP DEPAR 1998 Opposition 14.6 
FP/SP AKP 2001 Major 
Opposition 
15.4 
DSP YTP (2) 2002 Formateur 
partner 
22.2 
AKP TP 2009 Governing 46.6 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Kaynar et al. (2007); TBMM (2010). Numbers in parentheses 
are used to differentiate different parties with the same names. 
 
Party splits are expected to be occur when the parent organization is in 
opposition. This is due to high costs of being out of government under a highly 
centralized administrative structure that allocates vast amounts of resources to be 
distributed to the clients in the hands of the government (Danielson and Keleş 1980; 
Özbudun 1988, 40). However, Table 2 reveals that the governing parties were also 
prone to split. The KP, HP, DkP, CP, YDH, DTP, YTP (2) and the TP constitute 
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examples of splinter parties that were formed during the time when the parent 
organizations were in government. An interesting fact is that the HP, SBP, HEP, 
YDH, YTP (2) and the TP were founded even though their parent organizations had 
received the highest votes in their histories in previous elections.   
Table 3: Host Parties, Splinter Parties and Elections (1946-2011) 
Host Party Splinter Party First Elections Votes (%)  Seats 
Host Splinter Host Splinter 
CHP DP 1946 - - 397 61 
DP MP 1950 55.2 4.6 416 1 
DP KP 1954 58.4 0.6 503 0 
DP HP 1957 48.6 3.5 424 4 
CKMP MP (2) 1965 2.2 6.3 11 31 
CHP GP 1969 27.4 6.6 143 15 
CHP CP1 1973 33.3 5.3 185 13 
AP DkP 1973 29.8 11.9 149 45 
SHP HEP2 1991 24.8 - 88 18 
ANAP YeniP 1995 19.6 0.1 132 0 
SHP SBP3 1991 20.8 - 88 - 
SHP (CHP)4 YDH 1995 10.7 0.5 49 0 
MHP BBP5 1995 8.2 - 0 8 
DYP DTP 1999 12.0 0.6 85 0 
DSP DEPAR 1999 22.2 0.1 136 0 
FP/SP AKP 2002 2.5 34.3 0 363 
DSP YTP (2) 2002 1.2% 1.2% 0 0 
AKP TP6 (2011) 49.8 - 327 - 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from TBMM (2010); TÜİK (2008). Numbers in parentheses are 
used to differentiate different parties with the same names. First elections refer to the first general 
elections in which a splinter party participated.  
1. CP merged with the GP before the 1973 elections. 
2. HEP formed electoral coalition with the SHP in 1991 elections. 
3. SBP did not participate in any general elections. It received 0.3% of the votes in 1994 local 
elections.   
4. SHP merged with the CHP before 1995 elections.   
5. BBP formed electoral coalition with ANAP in 1995 elections. 
6. TP did not participate in the 2011 elections but TP leader Abdüllatif Şener ran as independent 
candidate from Sivas. 
 
Table 3 shows that the splinter parties were mostly unsuccessful in 
achieving electoral support. It was only the MP (2) and the AKP that could receive 
more votes than the host party. The others have been defeated in consecutive 
elections, or they have merged with other splinter parties or other established 
parties. Among the splinter parties, only the DP and the AKP won a majority. 
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Probably, due to this, much attention has been paid to the DP and the AKP. Others 
have been studied as a part of the history of the host parties or they have been 
studied in relation to intraparty democracy in host parties1. A few numbers of 
studies focusing on single cases of splinter parties have not brought a 
comprehensive analysis of the reasons behind the party splits2. The formation of 
splinter parties despite the low levels of electoral support, especially in the 1990s, 
remains a puzzle to be solved. 
Neither splinter parties nor the underdevelopment of the literature on these 
parties are unique to Turkey3. Although there has been a growing concern with the 
issues of intraparty democracy, factionalism, legislative party switching, party 
cohesion and new party formation, comparative studies specifically focusing on 
splinter party formation are few. With the exception of Mair (1990) and Ceron 
(2011), studies on party splits have focused on explaining single cases4. 
                                                 
 
1 For more on intraparty democracy within Turkish parties and party authoritarianism, see Anadolu 
Stratejik Araştırmalar Vakfı (1997); Ankara Barosu (2006); Bektaş (1993); Bosuter (1969); Çancı 
(2001); Çarkoğlu et al. (2000); Kabasakal (1991); Özbudun (1968); Perinçek (1968); TESEV 
(1995); Tuncay (1996); Yanık (2002). For factionalism within Turkish parties, see Türsan (1995). 
For party switching in the Turkish Assembly, see Duran and Aksu (2009); Turan, İba, and Zarakol 
(2005); Turan (1985).  
2 For studies on individual splinter parties in Turkey, see Bozkır (2007); Çakmak (2008); Dağcı 
(2005); Özçetin (2004); Pancaroğlu (2006). 
3 Harmel and Robertson (1985, 509) found 85 splits in Anglo-American and Western European 
countries from 1960 to 1980. Mair (1990, 133) found 34 splits in Western countries (excluding 
France, Greece, Spain and Portugal) between 1945 and 1987. Hug (2001, 83) states that 130 splinter 
parties competed in elections in 22 Western democracies between the period of 1950 and 1990. 
Ceron (2011, 201) notes 29 instances of party fissions in Italy between 1946 and 2009.  
4 For the studies on individual party splits, see Charney (1984); Cole (1989); Fell (2006); Katrak 
(1961); Nuvunga and Adalima (2011); Sharma (1976). 
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Additionally, the splinter parties have been studied together with the genuinely new 
parties in the literature on the new party formation. However, the literature on the 
new party formation does not take the differences between genuinely new parties 
and splinter parties into consideration. That is, they remain silent on intraparty 
conflicts but mostly focus on factors exogenous to the host party where the conflict 
occurred. Hence, a detailed examination of the splinter party formation has 
remained absent. 
1.1.Defining the Research Subject and Problems 
This study deals with a particular type of new party, the splinter party. The 
definition of a splinter party first requires a definition of the political party. Whilst 
we acknowledge the variety of definitions of political parties, we define political 
parties as any political organization seeking to elect governmental officeholders 
under a given label (which may or may not be on the ballot) (Epstein 1993, 9)5. This 
definition enables us to differentiate political parties from not only factions but also 
interest groups, political movements and political associations (Sartori 2005, 54). 
Additionally, this definition draws our attention to the registration process, which 
might bear an important cost for new party formation.  
                                                 
 
5 For more on the definition of political parties, see Graham (1993, 3–16); Maor (1997, 3–14); 
Sartori (2005, 3–12); Ware (1996, 1–6). 
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The definition of a splinter party secondly requires a definition of the new 
party. Acknowledging that newness of a phenomenon varies in extent and nature, 
Barnea and Rahat (2010) state eight criteria used in the literature to assess the 
newness of a party (Table 4). Among them, the seven criteria are non-dichotomous 
whereas the formal status is the only dichotomous criterion. This study adopts the 
criterion of formal status to assess the newness of a party and takes political 
organizations registered as a political party for the first time as a new party. Unlike 
other criteria, the formal status is practically dichotomous and operationally 
straightforward (Barnea and Rahat 2010, 5); this helps us to distinguish new parties 
that adopt labels of the former parties from the old parties. However, this constitutes 
a problem, especially in Turkey where new parties adopt the names of outlawed 
parties with the aim of signaling to the voters that the new party inherits the legacy 
of the old party. 
Table 4: The Analytical Framework for Measurement of Party ‘Newness’ 
Criterion Operational Definition 
Party Label Is the name genuinely new or does it contain an old party name? 
Ideology How different is the new party platform from the old party/ies 
platform/s? 
Voters How different is the ‘new’ party electoral base from the old one 
Formal/Legal 
Status 
Is the party registered as new? 
Institutions Were the party institutions separated and differentiated from those of the 
old party/ies? 
Activists Does the ‘new’ party have activists or did they immigrate to it from the 
old party/ies? 
Representativeness Ate the top candidates new (non-incumbents)? Did most or all of them 
come from a single party? 
Policies How different are the ‘new’ party’s policies from the old party/ies’ 
policies? 
 
Source: Barnea and Rahat (2010, 4).  
 
As Barnea and Rahat (2010, 7–8) state, the adjective ‘new’ might be defined 
either in chronological terms (as something that has recently come into existence), 
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or, in relative terms (as being other than the former). Scholars defining new parties 
in relative terms categorize them according to the novelty of the issues that they 
represent. ‘Protest parties’ (Powel, 1982, cited in Harmel and Robertson 1985, 518); 
‘prolocutor’ (Lucardie 2000) or the ‘promoter’ parties (Harmel and Robertson 
1985, 517) which refer to parties that were formed to represent new issues and have 
been categorized into subcategories of ‘left-libertarian’ (Kitschelt 1988), ‘Green’ 
(Deschouwer 2004), ‘new right’ (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987) or ‘extreme right-
wing’ parties (Ignazi 1992). On the other hand, scholars defining the new party in 
chronological terms focus on their origins. Based on the origins, parties have been 
classified into ‘mergers’, ‘splits’ (Laver and Shepsle 1996, 257; Mair 1990), ‘start-
up parties’ (Heller and Mershon 2009, 8), ‘electoral coalitions’ and ‘genuinely new’ 
parties (Harmel 1985; Hug 2001; Tavits 2006).  
This study defines newness in chronological terms and classifies new parties 
based on their origins. Similar to Hug (2001, 79) and Tavits (2006, 106), it omits 
the party mergers and electoral coalitions from the scope of analysis since they are, 
in fact, a reorganization of the established parties to enhance their competitiveness 
within the electoral market (Bolin 2007, 8). Following Hug (2001, 14) this study 
positions a new party as “a genuinely new organization that appoints, for the first 
time, candidates at a general election to the system’s representative assembly”.  
Employing this definition leads us to exclude parties that were officially recognized 
but did not participate in elections.  The advantage of defining a new party based 
on appearing on the ballot is that it expands the universe of cases and may provide 
generalizable theories of new party formation.  
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This study defines splinter parties as a new party that has been formed by 
dissident faction or factions of an existing political party. Acknowledging the 
variety of definitions and typologies of factions, it underlines the importance of the 
fact that factionalism is a dynamic process (Boucek 2009) and defines factions as 
“any intraparty combination, clique or grouping whose members share a sense of 
common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively –as a 
distinct block within the party – to achieve their goals” (Zariski 1960, 33). Although 
factionalism is a prerequisite for a party split and the splinter party formation, not 
all factionalized parties split.  
Finally, this dissertation defines party split as a multi-staged process of 
intra-party conflict within an established party, which ends with the exit of 
dissenting faction, usually to join their own parties.  
Keeping this in mind, this research aims to provide an insight into both 
intraparty dynamics and the exogenous factors that influence the decision of a 
dissident faction within an established party to form a splinter party. Specifically, 
we attempt to provide an answer to the questions of “what are the factors that lead 
dissenting factions to invest their resources in splinter parties?” The answer to this 
question is closely related with the answers to following questions:  
1. Why does intraparty conflict occur? 
2. What are the strategies employed by dissidents and established party 
leadership? 
3. Why do the resigned dissenting party members form a new party? 
12 
Whilst defining the splinter parties and selecting the cases to be analyzed in 
this work, we are faced with three problems. Firstly, in certain cases, splinter parties 
resemble fresh start-up parties in the sense that deputies from more than one party 
might switch to a new party in both types of new parties. However, unlike the fresh 
start-up parties, splinter parties occur mostly after a series of intra-party conflicts.  
The second problem in studying the splinter parties in the post-1980 Turkey 
is the constitutional article banning party switching. The 84th article of the 1982 
constitution called for the expulsion of party changers from the parliament and 
stipulated that such persons could not be designated as a candidate by another party 
during the elections immediately following the term during which they changed 
their party (Turan, İba, and Zarakol 2005, 8). Until the removal of the restriction in 
1995, deputies that demanded a switch to other parties circumvented the 
constitutional provision in two ways. Firstly they formed ‘pretend marriage parties’ 
(Hülle Partileri) that decided to merge with a political party to which the deputies 
wanted to move in the first instance. Secondly, pretend marriage or established 
parties dissolved themselves so that deputies that became independent could freely 
join the other parties (Turan, İba, and Zarakol 2005, 8)6. Although pretend marriage 
parties resemble party splits, the criterion of appearance on the ballot helps us to 
                                                 
 
6 Gençer (2004) found 22 pretend marriage parties until the constitutional amendment in 1995.   
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distinguish these parties from splinter parties. Since none of the pretend parties have 
contested national elections, they are eliminated from the scope of our research.  
The third problem in defining splinter parties in Turkey is created by the 
dissolution of the political parties by military governments or constitutional courts. 
As in most new democracies, the distinction between the established and new 
parties in Turkey is blurred due to the fact that parties are short-lived, party 
switching is frequent and the number of new participants is high (Bolin 2007, 7). 
The picture is further complicated by the interruption of the natural evolution of the 
electoral market by military interventions and frequent closure of political parties, 
especially after the 1980 military intervention. Barnea and Rahat (2010, 4) suggest 
that new parties can be distinguished from the established ones according to the 
newness of their representatives. However, ban on leadership and deputies of the 
outlawed parties disable us to use this criterion. Given the fact that democratic 
regime was interrupted in nearly every decade, we define parties that have 
participated in at least two consecutive elections as established parties. On the other 
hand, given the fact that political parties and their leaders have been outlawed, we 
consider parties formed by the caretakers as continuation of established parties. 
Finally, as stated before, we omit parties that have merged with other parties or that 
have changed their names since they are reorganization of the established parties.   
For narrowing the cases, we adopt Sartori’s criteria of relevance (Sartori 
2005, 108).  Accordingly, relevant splinter parties are those that have coalition 
potential or blackmail potential. Splinter parties that have had coalition potential 
after they split from the established parties are the MP (2), CGP, DkP, DTP, AKP 
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and YTP (2)7. On the other hand, the splinter parties who had altered the direction 
of competition were the HEP and the AKP. However, this study focuses on the 
splits in mainstream parties so that it excludes the HEP and the AKP from the scope 
of analysis. On the other hand, although the criterion of relevance leaves the HP out 
of scope of analysis, this study finds the analysis of the HP valuable due to two 
reasons. Firstly, the HP became the major opposition party, albeit for a limited 
period (Özçetin 2004, 89). Secondly, and more importantly, the party was born into 
an institutional context that was the least favorable for new party entrance.  Hence, 
including the HP into the scope of analysis enables us to evaluate the influence of 
different institutional contexts over party splits. As such, this work deals with the 
breakdown of the DP, CHP, AP, DYP and the DSP which ended with the formation 
of the HP, GP, DkP, DTP and YTP respectively. 
1.1.Justification 
Whether political parties are worth to be studied is a point of debate in the 
political party literature. Cynicism about politicians and political parties, decreasing 
level of affiliation with political parties, declining political party membership, the 
challenge posed by interest groups for the articulation of interests, the rise of new 
middle class voters with predominantly post-materialist values, and technological 
                                                 
 
7 The name of the GP was changed to the CGP after its merge with the CP. Although the party did 
not have coalition potential on the day it was formed, it turned to be a relevant party during the 12 
March period and after the 1973 elections.  
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developments have led some scholars to conclude that ‘the golden age of party 
literature may now have passed’ (Daalder 2001; Diamond and Gunther 2001; 
Montero and Gunther 2001). Nevertheless, political parties matter. As 
Schattschneider (1942; cited in Montero and Gunther 2001, 3) stated long ago, 
“Modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties”. In the words 
of Mair (1997, 90) “the old parties which were around well  before Rokkan 
elaborated his freezing propositions are still around today, and, despite the 
challenges from new parties, and new social movements,  most of them still remain 
in powerful, dominant positions”. The situation is not different in Turkey. Although 
voters are highly skeptical of politicians and political parties and although mass 
membership does not prevail with some exceptions, Turkish politics is 
characterized as party politics (Frey 1965, 301; Özbudun 2000, 81). Both the 1961 
(Article 56) and 1982 constitutions (Article 68) regarded political parties, whether 
in power or in opposition, as indispensable elements of political life. In this sense, 
political parties are important for the consolidation of Turkish democracy.  
Although splinter parties have not turned into viable electoral competitors 
in Turkey, they are worth studying due to two reasons. Firstly, participation of the 
splinter parties in the electoral competition influences the terms of competition even 
though they might not evolve into significant political actors (Hug 2001, 1). For 
example, together with the MSP, the rise of the DkP fragmented the votes of the 
center right in the 1973 elections (Özbudun and Tachau 1975, 475) and paved the 
way for the change of the party system from predominant to moderate 
multipartysim (Sayarı 1978, 46–47) or limited pluralism (Özbudun 1981, 231).   
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Secondly, splinter parties, as examples of new parties have important 
consequences for the consolidation of democracy, especially in new democracies. 
The influence of factionalism on party performance contributes to the legitimation 
or delegitimation of democratic institutions and practices (Türsan 1995, 170). A 
frequent increase in the number of parties because of party splits hinders the 
development of stable political identities and leads to electoral volatility. In return, 
parties are less likely to develop long-term policy commitments and are less 
accountable to voters. On the other hand, since dissident deputies who switch to 
splinter parties are not answerable to their voters, the principle of accountability is 
undermined (Janda 2007, 5). The decrease in the quality of representation and the 
predictability of parties challenges the stable development of a polity, which in turn 
hinders the consolidation of democracy (Tavits 2007, 113).  
1.2.Methods and Data Collection 
This study is a single country case study that encompasses several splits, 
which occurred under different social and institutional settings in Turkey. This 
diachronic analysis (Gerring 2007, 27) starts with the introduction of multiparty 
regime in 1946 and ends in 2002. Since the military interventions in 1960 and 1980 
have altered the institutional structure, the chapters are divided into three time 
periods in order to keep institutional factors constant. The first period starts with 
the 1950 elections and ends with the 1960 military intervention. The second period 
starts with the introduction of a new constitution and a new electoral law in 1961 
and ends with the 1980 military intervention. The final period starts in 1983 and 
ends with the 2002 elections. In this sense, the study uses Mill’s most different 
17 
system design for case selection. Since no significant party splits occurred after the 
2002 elections, the post-2002 period is excluded from the scope of analysis. Hence, 
this case study consists of five observations. These observations include the splits 
within the Democrat Party (1955), Republican People’s Party (1967), Justice Party 
(1970), True Path Party (1997) and Democratic Left Party (2002).  
The advantage of conducting case study is that it can help us to shed light 
into a large class of cases (Gerring 2007, 20). Case study research provides an 
explanation for the emergence of the new parties and allows the researcher to “peer 
into the box of causality to locate causal mechanisms between some structural case 
and its purported effect” (Lago and Martinez 2011, 9). Besides, case studies are 
fruitful for the analysis of 'the political' in a more comprehensive way than 'the few 
variables many cases' approach (Pennings, Keman, and Kleinnijenhuis 2006, 41). 
As a part of intra-variation studies, case studies provide explanations for variables 
explaining new party formation in the medium to long term, such as the 
transformation of social cleavages and the process of political modernization, in 
cases where observed variables in inter-variation studies, including institutional 
system, remain unchanged (Lago and Martinez 2011, 5–6). Given the lack of 
parsimonious models for explaining splinter party formation, case studies are 
appropriate for hypothesis generating and identifying causal mechanisms behind 
party splits (Gerring 2007, 39). Finally, case studies provide comparable and 
judgmental data necessary to conduct systematic cross-national analysis if it is 
planned with eventual comparison in mind (Harmel 1985, 415; Landman 2008, 4).  
Both theoretical preferences and practical considerations have influenced 
the choice of the topic and the method of this research. In data collection, this work 
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primarily relies on secondary data. For identification of the factions and changes in 
relations of the factions, we use multiple resources, including general period 
political history of Turkey, general histories of the host parties, biographies of 
major factional leaders, party programs and bylaws, speeches, congressional and 
parliamentary votes and newspapers.  
In order to identify the reasons behind party splits in post-1980 period, we 
supplement our research with primary data to be obtained by semi-structured elite 
interviews.  Elite interviews are fruitful for interpreting the secondary data that we 
gathered and is more productive if carried out at the latter stages of the research 
(Harrison 2001, 95). The reason behind using semi-structured elite interview is the 
fact that the politicians we interview are experts in their areas; hence standardized 
questions might lead us to miss crucial points (Harrison 2001, 98). Besides, semi-
structured elite interviews help us to gain insightful information that might not be 
gathered in other ways (McNeill and Chapman 2005, 58). Given the negative 
attitude towards factionalism, semi-structured elite interview seems promising to 
uncover the reasons behind party splits. However, the greatest problem in 
conducting elite interview is accessibility. For this reason, our interviews have been 
conducted mainly with the members of the DSP and the YTP. The gap has been 
filled with interviews made with journalists and academicians. Especially, the 
documentaries prepared by Mehmet Ali Birand (2007; 1994), the interviews of 
Abdi İpekçi (1969), Cılızoğlu (1987), Simav (1975), Akar (2002), Dündar (2008) 
Akar and Dündar (2008) assisted the research in understanding party splits.  
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1.3.Tentative Arguments and Findings 
This work mainly argues that splinter party formation is only one of the 
possible outcomes of the strategic interaction between the dissident faction and the 
dominant faction supporting the party leader. This outcome is preceded by two 
stages: dissent, and intraparty conflict. During the dissent phase, discontent is 
voiced behind doors. It is in the second stage, the intraparty conflict phase, that 
minority faction manifests its dissent in various forms and party leadership 
responses. This interaction is conditioned by a number of endogenous and 
exogenous factors. Endogenous factors include leadership autonomy, the nature of 
disagreement and the relative power of competing factions across the different 
layers of the party organization. Exogenous factors include entry costs and the 
perceived viability of a new party. Once the party leader refuses to accommodate 
dissident faction’s demands, the third phase starts. The dissident faction might 
chose to remain loyal, switch to an established party or form a new party. Splinter 
party formation is the last and the most likely of these paths once they depart.   
The next chapter deals with the approaches and variables that have been 
used in explaining party splits. This chapter starts with locating the splinter parties 
within the studies on party switching, party cohesion, factionalism, new party 
formation and party system fragmentation. Next, the advantages and disadvantages 
of the three approaches to the study of party split, namely sociological, institutional 
and rational-choice, are analyzed in detail. This part also deals with the variables 
used in the studies listed before that are fruitful for understanding party splits.  
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The model proposed above is presented in detail in the third chapter. This 
chapter starts with an organizational definition of political parties. Besides, since 
party splits are initiated by factions, it provides a definition of faction. This is 
followed by the demonstration of the three stages of party split: dissent, intraparty 
conflict and departure. It is mainly asserted that dissent can be manifested in various 
ways and that a party leader has various options in case of dissent. It is also stated 
that party split occurs when dissidents do not retreat from voicing their dissent in a 
challenging way and when the party leader chooses not to accommodate the 
demands of the dissidents. This outcome is conditioned by a number of endogenous 
and exogenous factors.   
The rest of the thesis gives a detailed analysis of the analytical narrative of 
the splits within established parties and tests the hypotheses constructed in the third 
part. The fourth chapter deals with the rise of dissent in the DP, strategies employed 
by the competing factions and the factors conditioning the outcome of splinter party 
formation. The fifth chapter deals with the splits in the governing and main 
opposition parties in the second half of the 1960s. The chapter starts with the 
analysis of the exogenous facilitators of party splits and then examines the splits in 
the CHP and the DP in detail. In a similar vein, the sixth chapter deals with the 
exogenous factors facilitating new party entrance during the 1990s and the early 
2000s and present the analysis of the split in the DYP and the DSP. The conclusion 
chapter provides a general summary of the findings of the research, identifies the 
weaknesses and strengths of the research and proposes new research questions for 
further empirical research.  
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CHAPTER II 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Splinter party formation has remained understudied. This is closely related 
with the nature of the subject. Party splits are on the borders of within party and 
inter-party relations (Cotta 1996, 70). Splinter parties influence institutionalization 
of party systems but the proto-party elite that form the splinter parties takes the 
degree of party system institutionalization into consideration before forming their 
parties. Factionalism is a prerequisite for party splits but not all factionalized parties 
split. Legislators might switch to established parties but not all dissatisfied 
legislators form splinter parties. Finally, splinter parties constitute examples to new 
parties, but unlike the genuinely new parties, formation of the splinter parties is 
influenced not only by the exogenous factors but also by endogenous factors.   
With the exception of Mair (1990) and recently Ceron (2011), splinter 
parties have been studied together with the new parties. Briefly, there are two types 
of studies on explaining new party formation: inter-variation and intra-variation 
studies (Lago and Martinez 2011, 4). Inter-variation studies, such as those by 
Harmel and Robertson (1985), Hug (2001), Tavits (2006, 2007), and Bolin (2007) 
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analyze the formation of new parties across countries and examine the effects of 
electoral institutions, cleavages and other social, political and structural factors. 
Others, such as Kitschelt (1986, 1988), Ignazi (1992), Inglehart and Flagan (1987) 
explain the formation of a particular class of new parties across countries, with 
reference to transformations in cleavage structures. These inter-variation studies are 
powerful in inferring valid generalizations that explain new party formation but fail 
to explain the rise of the new parties in the cases where institutional settings remain 
the same or in the case s where social cleavages are not significantly influential. On 
the other hand, intra-variation studies of Berrington (1985), Chhibber and Kollman 
(1988), Agh (2000), Selb and Pituctin (2010), and Lago and Martinez (2011) deal 
with the formation of new parties within a single-country. These studies are 
powerful for explaining the rise of new competitors in the long, but not in the short 
run (Lago and Martinez 2011, 5). Both the inter-variation and intra-variation studies 
underline the importance of factors exogenous to established parties but undermine 
the intraparty dimension of party politics as well as the importance of the 
differences between genuinely new and splinter parties. 
Works of Cotta (1996), Olson (1998), Roberts and Wibbels (1999), 
Bielasiak (2002), Bochsler (2005), Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) and Mainwaring 
and Zoco (2007) on party system institutionalization in new democracies also note 
the frequent splits, merges and new party formation and explain these developments 
with reference to the institutional factors, past legacies and the contingencies of 
transition phase. Bielasiak (2002), Tavits (2007) and Lago and Martinez (2011) 
argue that uninstitutionalized party systems provide the fertile ground for party 
splits and new party formations. Accordingly, party system institutionalization, 
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measured by the effective number of political and legislative parties and electoral 
volatility conditions the calculations of the proto-party elite regarding the electoral 
viability of a new party. Party fissions and fusions are expected to be more frequent 
in countries without institutionalized party systems. However, similar to the 
literature on new party formation, the party system institutionalization literature 
does not deal with the intraparty conflicts which pave the way for party splits.  
Whilst the literature on new party formation and party system, especially in 
new democracies, sheds light into exogenous factors influencing party splits, the 
literature on party cohesion provides us clues for understanding the inner dynamics 
of political parties. Institutional factors such as the type of government (i.e. 
parliamentarism versus presidentialism) (Maor 1997, 162; Özbudun 1968; Yanık 
2002), changes in the size of parliament (Bolin 2007, 12), procedural advantages 
that parties enjoy in determining legislative program and in shaping the composition 
of the legislative committees (Chaisty 2005, 311), anti-defection laws (Janda 2007; 
Miskin 2003), market reforms (Hagopian, Gervasoni, and Moraes 2009), the locus 
of discretionary control over resources (Desposato and Scheiner 2008) and closed-
list ballots (Carey and Shugart 1995; Desposato 1997, 2) are found to increase the 
degree of party cohesiveness. Studies on candidate selection procedures note that 
parties with more centralized candidate selection procedures are more cohesive 
(Field and Siavelis 2008, 626) and that primary elections decrease cohesiveness by 
encouraging the development of internal factions (Duverger 1970, 381; Zariski 
1960, 37).  
The relevance of party cohesion for understanding party splits comes from 
the fact that a decrease in party cohesion of an established party is a prerequisite for 
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party splits. However, as the case studies on factionalism indicate, decrease in 
cohesiveness of the parent organization is not sufficient for party splits. While 
factionalism threatens party unity, strategies developed by the party leadership to 
manage intraparty conflicts also matters. The neutrality of German Nazi Party 
leader Hitler in the factional strife in 1925 and the identification of the idea of 
National Socialism with the charismatic leader (Nyomarkay 1965), and the 
Australian Labor Party’s leadership’s ability to absorb and manage intraparty 
conflicts by permitting organized factions (McAllister 1991) show the importance 
of party leadership’s response to intraparty conflict in avoiding party splits. This 
leads us to question to what extent factional conflict is manageable. For Boucek 
(2009), party unity is easier to be sustained under cooperative factionalism than 
competitive and degenerative factionalism. This is easier in the cases where factions 
agree on their own party’s major goals (McAllister 1991, 217). While this 
agreement is easier in ideological parties, it will be harder in patronage-based 
parties (Owens 2003, 23; Reiter 2004, 268). Besides, maintaining harmony among 
factions will be harder as the size of the parties increase (Reiter 2004, 268). 
However, although individual cases of party splits demonstrated in the studies on 
factionalism sheds light into the dynamics of intraparty competition, they do not 
infer a theoretical model for understanding party splits. 
2.1.Approaches to the Study of Splinter Parties 
The study of new party formation revolves around three main approaches: 
sociological, institutional and rational-choice (Bolin 2010, 3; Krouwel and Bosch 
2004, 2). Studies on new party formation that employ the sociological approach 
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consider changes in the party systems and formation of new parties as reflections 
of the transformations in the underlying social structure. Hence, splinter parties are 
expected to rise when new social forces come into the scene. Institutional 
approaches draw attention to institutional facilitators and inhibitors of new party 
formation, including the electoral system, locus of discretionary control over 
resources, executive-legislative relations and laws governing political parties. 
Splinter parties are expected to arise when the institutional factors are permissive 
or when the institutional design is changed to a more permissive one. Finally, 
studies employing a rational-choice perspective underline the importance of the 
intraparty actors (i.e. proto-party elite) for splinter party formation. Accordingly, 
political entrepreneurs operating under uncertain electoral markets develop 
strategies in order to increase their chance of winning seats. Splinter party formation 
is considered as the result of the interplay between the proto-party elite and the host 
party’s ruling elite whose decisions are conditioned by the signals sent by the 
electoral market.  
Studies employing sociological and institutional approach focus on factors 
exogenous to host parties to explain new party formation but neglect the role of the 
proto-party elite in party splits. On the other hand, the rational choice perspective 
grants agency to intraparty actors in understanding new party entrance without 
undermining the importance of institutional facilitators or socio-economic changes 
on political parties. The following part will deal with the premises of each approach, 
factors in explaining party splits and splinter party formations and the weaknesses 
and strengths of each approach and factors. 
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2.1.1. Sociological Approach and Theory of Structural Change 
The sociological approach to the study of political parties employs a 
functionalist definition of political parties and regards them as reflections of social 
cleavages. Earlier sociological works on political parties have been dominated by 
the interest theory of political behavior which can be traced back to the Marxian 
theory of class consciousness (Duverger 1970, v). Accordingly, parties are 
instruments of class interests that represent democratic translations of class 
struggles (Lipset, 1960; cited in Sartori 1990, 151). They are considered as 
projections of underlying social groups into the political arena so that their activities 
are attributed to the demands of social groups (Graham 1993, 28; Panebianco 1988, 
3). In their seminal work, Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 5) stated that parties have two 
main functions. Firstly, they have the expressive function. That is, they act as 
alliances in conflicts over policies and value commitments within the larger body 
of politics, which develop a rhetoric for translation of contrasts in the social and 
cultural structure into demands and pressures for action or inaction. Secondly, they 
are instrumental in that they force the spokesmen for the many contrasting interests 
and outlooks to strike bargains, to stagger demands and to aggregate pressures. 
For Lipset and Rokkan (1967, 50), European party systems in the 1960s 
reflected the cleavage structures of the 1920s. These cleavages were frozen as a 
result of four critical stages: “first the formal incorporation of strata and categories 
of residents kept out of the system under the original criteria; second the 
mobilization of those enfranchised citizens in electoral contests; third their 
activation into direct participation in public life; and fourth the breakdown of the 
traditional systems of local rule through the entry of nationally organized parties 
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into municipal elections, what we call the process of politicization” (Mair 1997, 
179–180). However, increasing volatility and the rise of third parties in Europe in 
the 1970s led the political scientists to question the validity of Lipset and Rokkan’s 
frozen cleavage hypothesis. Although Rose and Urwin (1990) found support for the 
hypothesis, others have argued that the increase of party fragmentation, electoral 
volatility, decreasing turnout rates, declining class voting and the rise of the New 
Left, New Right, new extreme right, left-libertarian, ecology, and separatist parties 
reflected the process of voter re-alignment in European politics (Flanagan and 
Dalton 1990; Ignazi 1992; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Inglehart 1971; Kitschelt 
1988; Wolinetz 1990).  
In 1971, Inglehart proposed a theory based on the scarcity and socialization 
hypotheses in order to explain the changes in European party systems. According 
to Inglehart, economic factors play a decisive rule under conditions of economic 
scarcity (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, 1289). Once scarcity diminishes, other 
factors start to shape voter preferences. For Inglehart, since older generations faced 
economic difficulties, they placed higher value on acquisitive values. With the 
increasing economic prosperity and decreasing income inequality in post-war 
Europe, a new generation that valued post-bourgeoisie values arose (Inglehart 1971, 
997). Through intergenerational replacement, this new generation formed the new 
class for the environmental and antinuclear movements and gradually moved into 
positions of influence and authority in early 1980s (Inglehart 1981, 892). With the 
rise of this class with sociotropic concern, class-based polarization was replaced by 
value-based polarization among the materialist and post-materialists (Inglehart 
1981, 879). The change of the cleavage structure forced the existing parties of the 
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Left to redefine their positions towards the new demands.  Non-incorporation of the 
post-materialist values resulted with the split of the Social Democratic Party from 
the Labor Party in the UK, and the split of the Green Party from the Social 
Democratic Party in West Germany (Inglehart and Flanagan 1987, 1297).   
Inglehart’s argument on the influence of a sense of security on voting 
behavior has been shared by Kitschelt (1988), Flagan (1987) and Ignazi (1992) to 
explain the rise of left-libertarian, new right and extreme new-right wing parties. 
While Kitschelt agreed with Inglehart that the safety net and subjective sense of 
security led to a change in voter’s agenda and ended with the formation of left 
libertarian parties, Flagan and Ignazi argued that the rise of post-materialist values 
found its echo on the right and resulted with a new voter profile with authoritarian 
value orientation which was the voter base for new right and extreme new-right 
wing parties.  
Accounts on the transformation of the cleavage structure are based on the 
Schumpeterian view that “the success of the capitalist institutions and values will 
ultimately bring about the demise of capitalism’s organizational and moral 
foundations” (Kitschelt 1988, 204). Accordingly, the legitimacy of political parties, 
will fade away as they perform their functions (Kitschelt 1988, 196). While political 
parties as institutions satisfy some demands, their success in performing the 
functions attributed by the voters will, in the long run, challenge the basis of their 
legitimation due to the structural changes which are the very results of these 
institutions. When existing parties are unresponsive to the representational needs of 
the society, new parties are expected to be formed to fill the gap.  
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2.1.1.1.Bringing the Political Back 
Structural change theories propose the salience of new cleavages as the 
potential factor for the rise of new parties to the extent that established parties are 
unresponsive to meet the new demands. They place heavy emphasis on what Rudig 
(1990; cited in Hug 2001, 37) calls the problem push (i.e. the presence of a 
neglected demand or a new issue that triggers new party formation). However, as 
Kitschelt (1986) demonstrated, they fail to explain the variations in the expression 
of the new demands across countries. That is, although theories of post-industrialist 
society and values can account for the change in individual orientations, preferences 
and capabilities to engage in collective action, they do not provide an explanation 
for the conditions and opportunities under which these values and preferences are 
transformed into new political parties (Kitschelt 1988, 208). In this sense, 
transformation in the cleavage structure does not automatically correspond to 
transformations in the party system.  
Lipset and Rokkan’s approach to the study of political parties, called by 
Panebianco (1988) as ‘sociological prejudice’, underestimates the importance of 
institutional factors and intraparty politics. Perception of political parties as 
products of social cleavages leads us to the conclusion that intraparty conflicts are 
the results of conflicts between the representatives of different social classes 
(Panebianco 1988, 3–4). As a matter of fact, it is common to explain party splits in 
Turkey with reference to rise of new social classes or the conflicts between social 
classes that were represented once in the same political party. However, such an 
approach to the study of intraparty conflicts neglects the fact that the party as an 
organization is a producer of inequalities within its own structure. As Panebianco 
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(1988, 4) states, “Qua organization, the political party is a system which is at least 
partly autonomous vis-à-vis social inequalities, and the tensions that often persist 
within it are primarily the product of such a system”.  
Sociological determinism proposed by the sociological approach is also a 
matter of debate. Sartori (1990), Mair (1997, 65) and Cott (2005, 27) agree on the 
point that there is no simple one-to-one correspondence between an individual party 
and presence of a cleavage, for some cleavages might be expressed by two or more 
parties competing for more or less the same constituency. Besides, as Cott (2005) 
and Birnir (2004) demonstrate social cleavages are not translated into political 
parties unless the institutional designs are permissive. In a similar vein, Kitschelt 
(1986) demonstrates the importance of the political opportunity structure in 
explaining the variance of strategies adopted by the anti-nuclear movements in 
different institutional settings. Kitschelt’s (1988, 209) words regarding the 
relationship between the institutional factors and the social cleavages are worth 
quoting:  
Forming new parties in order to press for new political demands 
requires more effort than using existing political channels, such as 
established parties and interest groups. Rational actors will attempt 
to build new vehicles of interest representation only if traditional 
organizations fail to respond to postindustrial demands. Moreover, 
these actors must be able to take advantage of opportunities and 
acquire resources to build a new party. Thus, new political parties 
will form only when the unresponsiveness of existing political 
institutions coincides with favorable political opportunities to 
displace existing parties.  
 
Another problem with the sociological approach is that it is less explanatory 
in explaining new party splits and intraparty conflicts in new democracies. In these 
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cases, cleavage structures are less salient compared to other factors such as electoral 
(Agh 2000; Olson 1998) or economic performances (Manning 2005, 708). As 
Manning (2005, 718) states, new parties in late democratizers largely arise as a 
response to political, rather than socio-economic change. In a similar vein, 
McAllister and White (2007) found that political parties in new democracies are 
less effective in representing social cleavages. Due to these, the sociological 
approach is less explanatory in new democracies.  
Nevertheless, changes in social classes and the rise of new classes are not 
completely irrelevant for new party formation, especially in a country such as 
Turkey that transitioned to democracy in 1950. The modernization process has 
definitely impacts on the formation of splintering groups or genuinely new parties. 
Scholars explain the success of the splinter DP with reference to the center-
periphery cleavage (Mardin 1973, 184; Tachau 2002) or the rise of a new middle 
class (Karpat 1962, 1973). In a similar vein, the fragmentation of the party system 
in the early 1970s is explained with reference to the replacement of the center-
periphery cleavage with functional cleavages (Özbudun 1976, 221). What, is 
ignored, however is that structural transformations pave the way for new parties if 
three conditions are met. Firstly, existing social cleavages or the transformation in 
the cleavage structure should be politicized.  Hence, long-standing religious, 
sectarian or ethnic cleavages were not translated into new political parties in Turkey 
until they were politicized in the second half of the 1960s (Özbudun 1981, 233; 
Sayarı 1978, 51). Secondly, established parties have to be reluctant to articulate the 
new demands. When the party leadership adapts the demands of the new groups, 
they are less likely to split since the costs of split outweigh the benefits to be 
32 
obtained by forming a new party. However, when established parties are 
unresponsive to new demands, those advocating change in party position might 
calculate that they will attract the supports of newly rising groups. Finally, 
permissive institutional contexts, such as proportional electoral systems and 
absence of legal barriers are crucial for the formation of new parties to articulate 
new demands (Özbudun 1981, 231; Sayarı 1978, 43).  
2.1.2. Institutional Approach and Institutional Factors 
The absence of frozen cleavages in new democracies and variations in 
strategies developed by dissident groups in established democracies led scholars to 
underline the role of institutional factors in explaining new party entrance. 
According to the institutional approach, the institutional context and the historical 
setting within which the actors operate conditions the strategies and decisions of 
political actors (Biezen 2003, 15–16). Inter-variation studies on formation of new 
parties deal with the importance of institutional factors for the formation of new 
parties under certain institutional settings, whereas intra-variation studies show the 
effects of institutional changes on new party formation within single countries. 
Studies on party cohesion and party switching also underline the importance of 
institutional factors for the cohesiveness of party organizations, costs of dissent and 
for the frequency and direction of party switching.  
Electoral systems are perhaps the most cited institutional factor in 
explaining party cohesion, party system change and new party formation. Scholars 
analyzing the effects of the electoral systems underline the importance of electoral 
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laws, and the set of rules concerning legal aspects of elections (Baldini and 
Pappalardo 2009, 16). Electoral laws have six dimensions, including the right to 
vote, right to candidacy, electoral register, agency in charge of elections, procedures 
for casting votes and procedures for sorting out the winners and losers (Baldini and 
Pappalardo 2009, 16). Although most scholars have paid attention to the last two 
dimensions, works on new party formation introduced the legal regulations on 
political parties, registration procedures for ballot, nomination procedures and 
campaign stage as relevant for analysis. Other cited institutional factors are the type 
of government (parliamentarism versus presidentialism) and the locus of 
discretionary control over resources.  
2.1.2.1. Formation Costs 
An important factor that influences the calculations of the proto-party elite 
before forming a new party is the legal requirements to form new parties and to 
appear on the ballot. Political parties are mostly required to submit a written 
declaration of the principles and the party constitution, statute, statements about 
party organization structure, rule book, a list of party officers and the names of a 
certain minimum number of party members or signatures in order to register 
officially (Norris 2005, 7). Once they register, parties are expected to fulfill certain 
requirements in order to appear on the ballot. These include monetary deposit, 
petition requirements and spatial requirements. Monetary deposit is the amount of 
deposit for registering in elections whereas petition requirement refers to the 
number of signatures required to access the ballot. Spatial requirements refer to the 
obtainment of signatures from certain parts of the population or the state (Birnir 
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2004, 5). These requirements might deter the nomination of frivolous candidates or 
parties with regional concentration of support (Birnir 2004; Norris 2005, 8).  
The extent to which these requirements discourage new competitors is far 
from certain. Hug (2001) and Tavits (2006; 2007) found that petition requirements 
actually increase rather than decrease the number of new parties. While Tavits 
(2006; 2007) found that the monetary deposit deters new comers in established and 
new democracies, Hugh (2001) found a weak relationship between monetary 
deposit and new party formation in established democracies.  
Monetary deposit and petition requirements might be significant factors in 
cross-national studies, but are less explanatory in case studies. If spatial registration 
requirements are not permissive for parties with regionally concentrated support, 
such as the ethnic parties in Latin America, the proto-party elite might refrain from 
forming new parties (Birnir, 2004; Cott, 2005). However, as the example of the pro-
Kurdish HEP and its successor parties in Turkey demonstrate, ethnic parties might 
overcome spatial registration requirements to appear on the ballot through electoral 
alliance with other established parties or through running independent candidates. 
Due to this, while dealing with the influence of formation costs on party splits, the 
dynamic nature of party politics should be acknowledged.  
2.1.2.2. Public Funding and Media Access 
Political parties require resources in order to conduct public pooling, 
electoral campaigns and their daily affairs. They may finance their activities by 
membership dues, contributions paid by elected office-holders, donations from 
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natural or legal persons, income from business activities or other assets, grants 
received from party branches and public funding. With the introduction of public 
funding, parties have become more dependent on state subsidies (Biezen and 
Kopecky 2007).  
Political parties might increase their visibility to voters not only through 
electoral campaigns but also through media exposure. As Bolin (2010, 8) states, 
parties have to pass through the ‘visibility filter’ in order to attract voter’s support. 
While earlier party organizations relied on voluntary labor for communicating with 
voters, modern political parties can communicate their messages directly to the 
electorate via newspapers, radio or television (Biezen 2003, 42). Similar to public 
subsidies, developments in communication technologies, especially the 
pervasiveness of television, enhanced the position of the party in public office vis-
à-vis the party on the ground (Katz and Mair 2001, 125–126) and led to a further 
concentration of power in the hands the party leader (Webb and Poguntke 2005a, 
349). 
The greater reliance of political parties on public subsidies and 
developments in communication technology has led some scholars to conclude that 
a new type of party called ‘electoral-professional’ (Panebianco, 1988) or ‘cartel 
party’ (Katz and Mair, 2001) has emerged. The professionalization of political 
parties has coincided with the process of ‘presidentialization of politics’, which is 
characterized by the greater autonomy of the party leader vis-à-vis party activists 
and the personalization of the electoral process (Webb and Poguntke 2005b, 5). The 
relevance of organizational changes for new party formation is indirect and twofold. 
Firstly, the usage of mass media discourages party leaders and candidates from 
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building mass party organizations (Biezen 2003, 40). The absence of stable links 
between political parties and electorates to be sustained by solid party organizations 
contributes to electoral volatility, which in turn decreases barriers for new 
participants (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 156–157). Secondly, public funding and 
developments in communication technologies contribute to greater autonomy of 
party leaders and the party in public office from the pressures of party activists on 
the ground (Biezen 2003, 40; Katz and Mair 2001, 123). The increasing 
centralization of power might create intraparty conflict and disillusionment of the 
party activists. However, whether increasing centralization of power will lead to 
splinter party formation is an outcome of the interplay between the dissenting 
faction and the party leadership. Besides, the extent to which public funding and 
media access provide room for new party entrance through leading to centralized 
party organizations is far from certain in the Turkish case. This is due to the fact 
that mainstream political parties have always been highly disciplined and 
centralized from the beginning (Özbudun 1968). Moreover, with the exceptions of 
the RP, and recently the AKP, Turkish parties have never had mass party 
organizational characteristics, so that the influence of public funding and media 
access on change of organizational characteristics of established parties is hard to 
assess (Özbudun 2000, 68). Due to this, influence of public subsidies and media 
access on party splits should be dealt with caution. 
2.1.2.3. Electoral system and Disproportionality 
The electoral system is the set of legal regulations on transformation of 
preferences into votes and of the votes into the seats (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009, 
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17). Four dimensions of the electoral system, namely, electoral formula, district 
magnitude, electoral and legal thresholds and ballot structure are the most cited 
factors in analyzing party cohesion, party system variance across countries and new 
party formation.  
Electoral formula is the mechanism by which the votes are transformed into 
seats (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009, 23). Briefly, there are two main types of 
electoral formulae: majoritarian and proportional. Seats are allocated to the 
candidate or political party that gets most of the votes, either with simple or 
qualified majority in majoritarian electoral formula. In the case of proportional 
representation, there are two common characteristics: firstly there are multiple 
winners, and secondly, seats are distributed according to the proportion of votes 
that candidates or parties win (Amy, 2000, 1–2).  
A majoritarian electoral formula is expected to deter new comers through 
decreasing voter support for third parties. According to Duverger (1970), voters 
prefer to vote for parties that have a chance of winning a share of political power. 
Since there is only one winner in single-member district winner-take-all systems, 
the number of viable candidates or parties are two. As such, third parties, including 
the new comers, are unlikely to be voted unless they have regionally concentrated 
support (Chhibber and Kollman 1988; Lucardie 2000; Norris 1997). Besides, the 
majoritarian formula leads to more disproportional voter-seat allocation, which in 
turn, increases entry costs (Tavits, 2006; 2007). On the other hand, the proportional 
formula is expected to decrease the costs of new party formation since a smaller 
proportion of vote is necessary in order to win seats (Tavits, 2006). Due to this, 
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Sartori (2005, 87) hypothesized that winner-take-all electoral systems encourage 
fusion, whereas proportional systems produce fission.  
Whether majoritarian systems lead to two party systems is a matter of 
debate. Even Duverger (1990, 290–292) acknowledged that two-partyism could be 
maintained as long as extremist tendencies in both poles are limited in effect. Once 
tendencies among the same pole cannot meet on the same ground, two-partyism 
might give way to multi-partyism through party splits.  In Duverger’s words (1990, 
292): 
It was in this way that the split in Switzerland between Radicals and 
Liberals breached the original 1848 two-party system (Conservative 
v. Liberal) and created a three-party system that the Socialists later 
transformed into four-party system. The same is true of France: the 
gradual formation of the Radical party split the Republicans, with the 
result that by the end of the nineteenth century there were three basic 
tendencies visible: Conservatives, Moderate Republicans 
(Opportunists) and Radicals. In Denmark and Holland, the birth of 
the Radical Party was the product of an identical tendency: a split 
over the options common to moderates and extremists. About 1920, 
there were many cases in Europe of an increase in the number of 
parties due to splits between Communists (Revolutionaries) and 
Socialists (Reformers). 
 
There are conflicting findings on the relationship between electoral 
formulas and new party entrance. Tavits (2006; 2007) and Bolin (2007) found that 
proportional electoral systems provide more opportunities for new party entrance. 
Ceron (2011, 210) found that party breakdown is lower in disproportional electoral 
systems. Kitschelt (1988, 224) found that majoritarian systems are less conductive 
for the formation of left-libertarian parties. Norris (2005, 13) found that the 
effective number of parties in countries using majoritarian formulas is lower 
compared to those with proportional formulas. On the other hand, Mair (1990, 137–
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138) found no significant relationship between disproportionality and party 
breakdown. Cott (2005, 29) found no correlation between the formation of ethnic 
parties and proportionality. Harmel and Robertson (1985, 517) found that 
proportional systems contribute to new party success rather than the formation of 
new parties. Krouwel and Bosch (2004, 5–6) found that new party entrance is more 
likely in disproportional systems that decrease party distinctiveness.  
The reason behind the conflicting findings is closely related with the fact 
that seat allocation formulas work with the thresholds and district magnitudes in 
determining the ratio of votes to seats for each party (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009, 
23). The electoral threshold is the number of minimum votes necessary to earn a 
seat. There are two types of electoral thresholds: legal threshold and effective 
threshold. Legal threshold is the minimum percentage of votes and seats to be 
received by a party in order to gain representation in Parliament. It might be applied 
at the constituent level, as in Spain, or at national level, as in Germany, or at both 
levels, as in Sweden (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009, 32). On the other hand, the 
effective threshold is the median value between the ‘threshold of inclusion’ and 
‘threshold of exclusion’, where threshold of inclusion refers to the level necessary 
to have a chance of winning seats and the threshold of exclusion is the value which 
in any case is sufficient to win the seat (Baldini and Pappalardo 2009, 33).  
Effective threshold works with the district magnitude, average number of 
seats allocated to a constituency in determining the distribution of seats.  In fact, 
district magnitude and effective threshold are the two sides of the same coin since 
a low district magnitude has the effect of high electoral threshold (Lijphart 1999, 
153). Together with the electoral formula, effective threshold and district 
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magnitude determine the difference between the percentage of votes received and 
percentage of seats a party gets in the resulting legislature, the disproportionality. 
Smaller district magnitude, majoritarian electoral formula and higher effective and 
national thresholds increase the disproportionality of an electoral system (Cott 
2005, 30).  
The relevance of disproportionality for new party formation is that it 
increases the votes required to gain representation in Parliament. As such, 
disproportional electoral systems are expected to discourage new party entrance 
(Tavits 2007, 128). As Cott (2005, 30) states, the extent to which small parties are 
helped by a given seat allocation formula depends on the district magnitude and the 
size of divisor and remainders used in the allocation formula. They are expected to 
win seats more easily under larger district magnitude, large assemblies, larger 
quotas or larger gaps in formulas for allocation of seats, such as the urban areas that 
are more populous compared to rural areas (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005, 7; 
Taagepera 2007, 83). These electoral systems that produce more proportional vote-
to-seat distribution decrease entry costs and hence, encourage new party formation.  
With the exception of Krouwel and Bosch (2004, 4) who found no 
significant relationship between electoral threshold and new party entrance, studies 
on new party formation reveal that higher effective threshold and lower district 
magnitude deter new comers. Willey (1998, 245) found that new parties operating 
under small district magnitude are less successful than new parties operating under 
larger district magnitude. Tavits (2006) found that district magnitude is positively 
and significantly correlated with the predicted number of new parties. Hug (2001, 
112–13) found that an increase in the threshold of representation decreased the 
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number of new parties significantly. Similarly, Selb and Pituctin (2010, 154) found 
that the threshold of representation reduced the propensity of the Green Party of 
Switzerland to enter the race. Taagepera (1999) found that the effective number of 
parties competing in a party system was dependent on not only the social 
heterogeneity but also the effective magnitude of electoral systems. Mainwaring 
(1991, 26) found that a low threshold and high district magnitude facilitated the 
representation of a high number of parties in the Brazilian Congress.  
District magnitude and electoral thresholds might influence not only new 
party entrance but the cohesiveness of party organizations. For example, in a single-
member district, deputies might direct their attention to local constituencies rather 
than the party in central office since the deputies’ chances of re-election depend on 
their recognition in the district. This might lead the deputies to come into conflict 
with the party in central office (Duverger 1970, 60). Under multimember district 
plurality voting, since all candidates nominated at the party list are elected if the 
party receives the plurality of votes in a constituency, they will have more 
incentives to increase party rather than personal reputation (Araslı 1972, 69). In the 
case of multimember district proportional representation, candidates might compete 
for realistic positions in the party list, which in turn challenges party cohesiveness. 
On the other hand, the legal threshold might indirectly lead to intraparty conflict 
through forcing less viable parties to form electoral coalitions. For example, the 
decision of the pro-Islamist RP to form an electoral coalition with the nationalist 
MHP before the 1991 elections triggered discontent among the RP members with 
Kurdish background (Sakallıoğlu 1998).  
42 
2.1.2.4. Candidate Selection: Nomination and Ballot Structure 
Another factor that influences the cohesiveness of an established party is the 
candidate selection methods. Candidate selection is “a predominantly extralegal 
process by which a political party decided which of the persons legally eligible to 
hold an elective public office will be designated on the ballot and in election 
communications as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates” 
(Ranney, 1981; cited in Field and Siavelis 2008, 621). The process of candidate 
selection is an outcome of three successive processes: “certification, involving 
electoral laws, party rules, and informal social norms that define the criteria for 
eligible candidacy; nomination, involving the supply of eligible seeking office and 
the demand from selectors when deciding who is nominated, and election, the final 
step determining which nominees win legislative office” (Norris 2006, 89). The 
first two processes, eligibility and nomination, are mostly analyzed together in 
studies on candidate selection, whereas the selection part is analyzed with reference 
to ballot structure. Each process is structured by the electoral regulations and party 
laws but the candidate selection is basically a private affair (Duverger 1970, v; 
Hazan and Rahat 2010, 3)8. 
The analysis of nomination sheds light into intraparty politics in two ways. 
Firstly, nomination is an indicator of power configuration within the established 
                                                 
 
8 For more on the dimension of candidate selection, see Rahat and Hazan (2010), Field and Siavelis 
(2008, 623–624), Norris (2006), Lundell (2004, 29–30).  
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parties (Norris 2006, 92).  As Schattschneider (1942; cited in Yavuz 2009, 99) states 
“the nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of party; he who can 
make nominations is the owner of the party”. It is due to this that most vital factional 
disputes in any party revolve around the choice of candidates (Hazan and Rahat 
2010, 8). Secondly, candidate selection is crucial for the career advancement of 
politicians. Studies on party switching underline the importance of re-election goals 
in motivating deputies to change their party affiliations (Desposato 1997, 1; Heller 
and Mershon 2003, 2; Janda 2009, 7; Miskin 2003, 15). Besides, deputies are not 
only interested in re-election but also in winning higher offices and serving as 
deputy is mostly a prerequisite for upward mobility. To the extent that re-election 
and upward mobility is channeled through political parties, party leaders can use 
nominations for achieving cohesive blocks (Field and Siavelis 2008, 625; Strom 
and Müller 2009, 30; Zariski 1960, 38). Therefore, parties with centralized 
nominations and restricted selectorate are expected to be more cohesive than parties 
with decentralized nominations and open primaries.  
Nomination works together with the ballot structure in shaping party 
cohesion. Despite various categorizations, ballot structures can be grouped into 
three main categories: nominal, dividual and ordinal. Categorical ballots which are 
also known as nominal ballots enable voters to vote for only one candidate, 
candidate of a party or party list, whereas in ordinal papers, voters can rank-and-
order the parties or candidates. Finally, dividual ballots enable the voters to split 
their votes among more than one party (Gallagher and Mitchell 2005, 7–10). In this 
sense, ordinal and dividual ballots provide the voters relative with freedom to 
choose among candidates compared to nominal ballots. 
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The ballot structure influences the cohesiveness of party organizations 
together with the nominations and the district magnitude. Firstly, the ballot structure 
determines the extent to which the party leadership can control electoral prospects 
of nominated candidates. If the voters can only vote for party lists (closed-list), 
nomination procedures gain importance. If the party leadership has the control or 
veto power over nomination processes, it can use the nominations under closed-list 
ballot structure to discipline the party members (Strom and Müller 2009, 37). Under 
such institutional contexts, it is highly costly for dissenting factions to revolt against 
the party leadership since dissenting will decrease their nomination or re-
nomination chances. For this reason, closed-list ballot structures pave the way for 
more cohesive parties (Desposato 2005, 17). On the other hand, if voters can rank-
and-order candidates over the other within the party list (preferential voting) or if 
the voters can directly vote for a candidate (candidate-list), candidates will be more 
likely to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995; Mainwaring 1991, 30; 
Norris 2006, 104–105).  
Ballot structures other than the closed-list are likely to increase competition 
among the candidates of the same party. In order to enhance their electoral chance, 
they will develop personal networks at constituencies to distinguish themselves 
from co-partisans (Carey and Shugart 1995, 431; Hine 1982, 45). Besides, in ballots 
other than closed-list, parties are more likely to nominate influential and locally 
well-known candidates in order to attract the attention of the voters (Lundell 2004, 
34). Once elected, these representatives who do not owe their mandate to their 
parties are less likely to be sanctioned if they act independent of party programs 
(Mainwaring 1991, 27–28). Party cohesion and discipline, in turn, decrease. 
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However, while party cohesion might decrease, party unity can be sustained under 
open lists. For example, Lakeman (1981, 15) argued that if a single transferable 
vote and multi-member plurality electoral system had been employed in the UK, 
the Labor Party could have prevented its social democrats to defect from the party 
line.  
Nomination and ballot structures condition the future electoral fortune of 
the dissident deputies and enable us to gain an insight to dispersion of power within 
the established party organization. It is also plausible to expect an absence of party 
splits in established parties, where the party leadership controls the nomination of 
candidates. However, the Finnish and Chilean party systems, which are marked by 
deep ideological divisions, reveal that parties might be highly cohesive even though 
open-list ballot structures are used (Mainwaring 1991, 29). Additionally, although 
the nomination process was highly centralized in post-1980 Turkish parties, all 
major parties faced disunity. Hence, while the analysis of the nomination 
procedures and ballot structure helps us to gain an understanding of the intraparty 
affairs and to reveal the viable offices that factions compete for, nomination 
procedures and ballot structure should not be taken as the main factor conditioning 
the intraparty discipline (Özbudun 1968, 244).  
2.1.2.5.Type of Government: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism 
The type of government is argued to influence intraparty conflicts by 
enhancing the potential cohesiveness of party organizations. Parties that operate 
under parliamentary systems are expected to be more disciplined and cohesive than 
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their counterparts in presidential systems since building and sustaining 
governments in parliamentary systems depend on the continuous support of the 
deputies (Giannetti and Benoit 2009, 22; Maor 1997, 162; Özbudun 1968, 137; 
Yanık 2002, 62). Hence, in order to sustain cohesion, party leaders will be more 
likely to nominate like-minded candidates that will vote in line with the party 
leaders’ preferences (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999, 9). Besides, party leaders are 
more likely to build well-disciplined voting blocs through their control over 
ministerial assignments, patronage, access to media and committee assignments 
(Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999, 10; Özbudun 1968, 139). This depends on the size 
of parties in Parliament, the rules of procedures and the nomination procedures 
stated in party bylaws. The hypothesis that parliamentary systems foster party 
cohesion has been confirmed by a number of studies. Epstein (1993, 321) and 
Özbudun (1970; cited in Maor 1997, 143) found that party unity is the greatest in 
parliamentary systems with two party systems.  
Although parliamentarism might be an explanatory factor for party cohesion 
in inter-variation studies, it cannot explain the changing cohesiveness of an 
individual time across time or different degree of cohesiveness of different parties 
at a certain time if the type of regime stays constant over time. Chaisty (2005, 303) 
found that Russian parties operating within the Duma Council became more 
cohesive in time despite the presidential system in Russia. Hagopian, Gervasoni 
and Moraes (2009) found that party discipline and party-oriented legislators 
increased in number after the market reforms that diminished the resource base for 
patronage. Owens (2003, 23) notes that ideological parties such as the Brazilian 
Workers Party and the Fujimoristas in the Peruvian Congress are more cohesive 
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despite the presidential system . Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (1997) observed that 
leftist parties in the Brazilian Congress were highly disciplined compared to catch-
all parties. In a similar vein, Heller and Mershon (2003, 13) found that party 
switching was less common in ideological parties. Reed (1988) found high 
frequency of splits and party switching in Japan between 1949 and 1955 despite the 
parliamentary regime. The case was no different for Italy, which faced a frequent 
rise of splinter parties and party switching under a political context of high 
uncertainty between 1996 and 2001 (Heller and Mershon 2003). Thames (2007) 
found that it was the party system institutionalization rather than the type of 
government that led to undisciplined parties in the Russian Duma and Ukrainian 
Rada. Finally, highly disciplined administration of Turkish parties (Özbudun, 1968) 
did not lead to cohesive blocks; rather party switching was highly common among 
the deputies (Turan 1985, 2003).    
Whether parliamentarism fosters new party formation is also a matter of 
debate. Lucardie (2000, 180) argued that presidential regimes are less conducive to 
new party formation since they promote polarization and concentration of parties. 
Similarly, Willey (1998, 239) argued that since any presidential office is by 
definition a nation-wide single-member district and since lower district magnitude 
increases disproportionality, new parties are less likely to be successful in 
presidential systems. Against this, Tavits (2007, 116) found that presidential 
regimes are more conducive to new party entrance since presidential regimes 
provide higher potential benefits to be obtained from controlling the office. On the 
other hand, Harmel and Robertson (1985, 514) found no significant relationship 
between parliamentary systems and new party formation. Bolin (2007, 12) argued 
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that the size of parliament rather than parliamentarism mattered and found that an 
increase in the size of parliament is more conducive to new party formation. 
Nevertheless, parliamentary regimes matter for understanding the splinter 
party formation. After all, government depends on the support of deputies in 
parliamentary regimes. If the established party is in government, the vote of 
confidence provides an important bargaining power for the dissident deputies of the 
established party. Besides, the privileges granted to parliamentary groups in terms 
of committee assignments, proposal of laws, tools to monitor the conduct of 
executive, access to mass media, and public subsidies might facilitate splinter party 
formation (Mainwaring 1991, 25–26). Hence, an analysis of splinter party 
formation should also take the characteristics of the type of the regime into 
consideration.  
2.1.2.6.  Locus of Discretionary Control over Resources 
Discretionary control over resources refers to the institutional design on 
distribution of public and private benefits. It is common to associate the 
centralization of decision-making and implementation power over the distribution 
of private and public benefits with the state and provincial governments in 
federalism and with the national governments in unitary systems (Chhibber and 
Kollman 2004, 75). However, as Chhibber and Kollman (2004, 79) note, the degree 
of centralization may vary across different policy realms in any country: “military 
policies have been centralized virtually everywhere, whereas streets and sanitation 
policies remain decentralized everywhere”. More importantly, the degree of 
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centralization within a country might vary over time. For example, although the 
USA and India had federal systems, power was heavily centralized in the hands of 
national governments after the great depression in the USA and during the reign of 
Indira Gandhi in India (Chhibber and Kollman 1988). Thus, what matters for 
ambitious politicians is not whether the regime is federal or unitary but which 
institutions are responsible for decision-making and implementation of distribution 
of public and private benefits.  
The degree of centralization is frequently noted in the studies on party 
switching. These studies assume that politicians are interested in the distribution of 
private and public goods in order to increase their election and/or re-election 
chance. Since, access to resources is crucial in achieving their goals, especially in 
pork-oriented systems; legislators are more likely to switch to parties that control 
access to these goods. It is in this way that “the institutions that assign control over 
state resources are likely to shape power relations and incentives that drive political 
behavior throughout the system, and  different patterns of resource control ought to 
lead  politicians to pursue different  career strategies” (Desposato and Scheiner 
2008, 509). If resources are controlled by states and provincial governments, voters 
will be concerned about politics at the state level and will be more likely to vote for 
locally strong parties even though these parties might not be competitive at national 
elections (Chhibber and Kollman 1988). Candidates who want to maximize their 
electoral fortune will respond to the concerns of voters and will be more likely to 
adapt to locally viable parties. This, in turn leads to fragmented national party 
systems such as the party systems of Argentina, Canada, Peru and Brazil (Jones and 
Mainwaring 2003, 10). In the event that resources are centralized in the hands of 
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national governments,  both voters and candidates will be concerned with national 
parties, which in turn will contribute to the nationalization of party systems, such 
as the cases of Chile, Honduras,  Jamaica and Uruguay (Jones and Mainwaring 
2003, 11). This, in turn, will empower the party in central office vis-à-vis the party 
on the ground and increase not only the disciplinary power of the party in central 
office over the legislators but also the costs of dissension.  
A group of scholars argue that the formation of new parties is more likely 
in countries where power is devolved to local authorities. This is related with the 
lower costs of organizing a party at regional level (Cott 2005, 25; Lucardie 2000, 
180). Once ethnic and ecology parties consolidate their support base and 
organizational strength at local level, they become better equipped to compete at 
national elections. Others argue that the locus of control of resources shape the 
legislative preferences related to party switching. In their study, Desposato and 
Scheiner (2008) found that legislators were concerned with national politics in the 
centralized Japanese political context and with ‘gubernational’ politics in 
decentralized Brazil. They also found that defectors from the governing Liberal 
Democrat Party formed new parties in order to be part of a coalition government so 
that they could maintain easy access to pork (Desposato and Scheiner 2008, 516). 
In another study, Desposato (2006) found that legislators in Brazil abandoned their 
party affiliations in order to maximize pork. Finally, the type of interest 
intermediation is argued to influence the prospects for dissenting groups. According 
to Kitschelt (1988, 211–212), corporatist measures increase the rigidity of the 
system and opposition to corporatism provides fertile ground for the rise of new-
left parties. Unlike Kitschelt, Tavits (2006, 105) argues that corporatism is an 
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impediment for new party entrance since corporatist measures decrease the benefits 
to be obtained by controlling the public office.  
2.1.3. Rational Choice Perspective and Party Building 
Starting with the new millennium, a group of scholars, including Hug 
(2001), Tavits (2006; 2007), Bolin (2007; 2010) and Lago and Martinez (2011) 
employed rational-choice approaches to the study of new party formation. 
Similarly, a number of studies on party switching, including Laver and Benoit 
(2003), Heller and Mershon (2003), Hagopian, Gervasoni and Moraes (2009), 
Desposato and Scheiner (2008), and Desposato (2006) have also dealt with the 
calculations of individual legislators. These studies start from the premise that 
politicians are ambitious entrepreneurs that are interested in achieving certain goals, 
including re-election or winning higher seats (Strom and Müller 2009, 30). 
However, politicians face collective dilemmas, “situations in which the rational but 
unorganized action of group members may lead to an outcome that all consider 
worse than outcomes attainable by organized action” (Cox and McCubbins 2007, 
77).  The method of solving the collective dilemmas that politicians face is the 
creation of attractive leadership posts (Strom 1990, 574). Leaders have three 
essential features (Cox and McCubbins 2007, 84):  
(1)They bear the direct costs of monitoring the community faced with 
the collective dilemma, (2) they possess selective incentives 
(individually targetable punishments and rewards) with which to 
reward those whom they find cooperating or punish those whom they 
find “defecting”, and (3)  they are paid, in various ways, for the 
valuable service they provide. 
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Just as the political parties are formed by political entrepreneurs that bear 
the costs, new parties are formed by a proto-party elite who coordinate their 
members’ activities (Ceron 2011, 183). While selecting the strategy to be employed 
against the party leadership, these political entrepreneurs take risks and potential 
benefits of dissent and new party formations into consideration (Berrington 1985, 
442). They engage in a strategic game with the party leadership for enforcing their 
demands. The outcome, for Ceron (2011, 184) depends on the focal point and 
strategic move and for Hug (2001, 46), on the nature of demand and potential 
strength of the potential party. Although both the party leadership and dissident 
faction operate within a political context named the opportunity structure, they are 
far from possessing perfect information about electoral behavior or about the choice 
of each other (Hug 2001, 41; Lago and Martinez 2011, 7). For this reason, similar 
opportunity structures end with different outcomes. In this sense, although the 
opportunity structure constraints the actors with conflicting interests, it is the 
calculations and decisions of the political actors that explains why some parties split 
and why proto-party elites form a new party rather than joining an established one. 
2.1.3.1.Opportunity Structure 
The rational-choice approach does not neglect the importance of the 
institutional or sociological factors, but analyzes these factors within the concept of 
an opportunity structure. Opportunity structure has been developed by resource 
mobilization theories in order to explain social movements but was then used in 
explaining the variance of formation of Green parties across advanced democracies 
(Lucardie 2000, 180). Briefly, the term is used to express the degree of ‘openness’ 
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or ‘accessibility’ of a political system for political entrepreneurs (Bolin 2010, 3). 
Although most attention has been paid to electoral systems, other institutional 
variables, including rules on public funding, regulations on party’s access to media, 
executive-legislative relations and federalism have been considered as a part of the 
opportunity structure. Kitschelt (1986, 58) defines a nation’s political opportunity 
structure as comprised of “special configurations of resources, institutional 
arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the 
development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others”. 
Strom (1990, 579) defines the structures of political opportunities as “the offices 
that parties seek, the rules for attaining them and the general pattern of behavior 
surrounding their attainment”. Similarly, Lucardie (2000) notes five dimensions of 
the opportunity structure, namely, formal access to state, political structure, interest 
association, cleavage structure and political conjuncture. Hug (2001, 56–60) states 
five dimensions of opportunity structure that are influential over strategic behavior 
of conflicting sides. These are formation costs, salience of new issues, benefits from 
important demands, electoral benefits for new parties and fighting costs. Tavits 
(2006; 2007) states that there are three dimensions of the opportunity structure, 
namely, cost of formation, benefit of office and perceived level of electoral 
viability, which influence the prospects for new party formation. 
2.1.3.2.Retrospective Voting 
The concept of opportunity structure provides room for not only 
sociological and institutional factors, but also contingencies, such as incumbents’ 
economic performance and political scandals. The latter provides space for new 
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comers by leading to an increase in the number of dissatisfied voters. According to 
retrospective voting hypothesis, votes are cast on the basis of economic 
performance rather than economic policy proposals and promises (Başlevent, 
Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2005, 549).  The central premise of the retrospective 
voting hypothesis is that uncertainty about the future and about the sincerity of the 
candidates and/or parties makes past action the best guide for assessing their future 
utility (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2009, 379). Economic performance 
might be measured by GDP growth, inflation and unemployment rates. The 
relevance of incumbents’ economic performance for party splits is that poor 
economic performance might provide an opportunity for new party formation. 
Accordingly, voters dissatisfied with the government’s economic policies have two 
options: they might vote for an established party in opposition or for ‘untried 
parties, including radical and newly formed ones. Vote switching based on the 
incumbents’ economic performance refers to ‘incumbent volatility’, whereas the 
voting for the untried parties refers to ‘traumatic volatility’ (Hazama 2007, 29)9.  
Retrospective voting hypothesis has been generally confirmed by the 
scholarly work on new party formations. Harmel and Robertson (1985), Lucardie 
(2000) and Hug (2001) found that economic recessions provide an opportunity 
space for new party entrance. Hug (2001, 92–93) found that new party formation is 
                                                 
 
9 Incumbent volatility is expressed as “absolute net vote swings between governing parties and 
opposition parties” whereas the traumatic volatility is “represented by absolute swings between the 
parties that have at any time remained in government for more than one year consecutively and those 
that have not” (Hazama 2007, 29).  
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negatively associated with the economic growth rate and positively with 
unemployment. Pinard (1975; cited in Lucardie 2000, 181) found that 
unemployment and deprivation of small businessmen and farmers’ welfare were 
the main reasons behind the formation of the Social Credit Party of Quebec. 
Mainwaring and Zoco (2007, 12) and Mainwaring, España and Gervasoni (2009, 
11) found that economic growth had a modest effect on electoral volatility, whereas 
inflation had no clear impact. Roberts and Wibbels (1999, 576) found that electoral 
volatility in Latin America in the post-1980 period was a function of short-term 
economic perturbations. Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu and Şenatalar (2005, 558) found 
that economic voting for the AKP in 2002 elections is basically a reaction to 
personal sufferings caused by the 2001 economic crisis in Turkey. Hazama (2007, 
134) found that the change in real per capita GNP and unemployment affected the 
changes in votes for incumbents in Turkey between 1950 and 2002. That is why, it 
is plausible to expect party fissions and new party entrance to be more frequent 
following poor incumbent economic performance.  
2.1.3.3.Party System Institutionalization and Splinter Party Entrance 
The party system is a system of interaction resulting from inter-party 
competition (Pedersen 1990, 197). It is mostly classified according to the number 
of relevant parties and the ideological distance separating these parties (Sartori 
2005). The relevance of the party system to the study of new party formation comes 
from the fact that it influences the calculations of the proto-party entrepreneurs to 
enter or not enter in the electoral competition. Accordingly, political entrepreneurs 
are less likely to invest in new parties in the event that the party system is 
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institutionalized. Institutionalized party systems, which are characterized by a 
stable number of parties in the assembly, low levels of electoral volatility, higher 
levels of legitimacy of established parties, and a relative independence of the party 
organization from the interests of a few ambitious leaders signal to political 
entrepreneurs that their party will be less likely to receive an electoral support 
(Wolinetz 1990, 221–222). On the other hand, uninstitutionalized party systems, 
which are characterized by high electoral volatility, low popularity of established 
political parties, low turnout rates, weak grounding of parties in civil society, 
financial dependence of parties on state subsidies for their revenues, frequent party 
switching, a high effective number of parties, small party membership and weak 
partisan identities, provide more room for new party entrance (Enyedi 2006, 229; 
Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, 6). Under such uncertain voting patterns and 
interparty competition, dissatisfied political entrepreneurs are more likely to try 
their chance in the electoral market (Lago and Martinez 2011).  
Scholars working on party systems agree on the point that party systems in 
established democracies are more institutionalized than those of new democracies. 
Scholars analyzing the development of party systems in new democracies also 
converge on the point that party fissions and fusions have been more frequent after 
the initial elections. Accordingly, during the transition period, opposition to the 
authoritarian incumbents and the need to overcome the obstacles faced by the 
democratization process lead the opposition to form alliances. Once the 
authoritarian incumbents are turned down and once they are in office, these 
‘transition oriented grand coalitions’ (Cotta 1996, 83) are likely to come to an end 
since the unifying cause for the groups with conflicting interests has eroded once 
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the authoritarian incumbents are replaced by democratically elected governments 
(Cotta 1996, 77; Olson 1998, 433). As Cotta (1996, 80) states, “when confronted 
with the new issues arising after the accomplishment of the transition, internal 
ideological differences (and personal rivalries between leaders)  could not be 
overcome anymore and unity gave way to division”. Hence, following the initial 
elections, new incumbents splinter and recombine into numerous smaller groupings 
as answers to the new political agenda (Cotta 1996, 86). The number of effective 
parties, including splinter parties, substantially increases between the founding and 
subsequent elections. 
Although scholars analyzing the party systems of new democracies 
converge on the point that party fissions and fusions have been more frequent after 
the initial elections, they diverge on the question of whether this phenomenon is 
ephemeral or long-standing. According to the shakedown hypothesis, party systems 
will get more and more ordered after consecutive elections (Bochsler 2005, 56). 
Firstly, electoral laws provide the mechanism to restrict the effective number of 
legislative parties. Secondly, political entrepreneurs will react to the electoral laws 
and invest their resources on viable parties. As the uncertainty decrease after 
consecutive elections and as the established parties develop clearer policy positions, 
voter preferences will be stabilized and electoral volatility will diminish (Olson 
1998, 460; Tavits 2005, 296). As voters’ preferences become more predictable, 
party formation and party switching will be more costly. For this reason, the 
effective number of parties and the rise of splinter parties will decrease in the long 
run (Lago and Martinez 2011, 16; Tavits 2007, 114).  
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A number of studies found that the number of new parties decrease after 
consecutive elections in new democracies. Lago and Martinez (2011, 16) found that 
new party formation in Spain decreased after consecutive elections. Tavits (2007, 
114) found that new party entries decreased as parties established their reputations 
over time. However the trend was not unilinear. While countries such as Poland, 
Czech Republic and Hungary have developed more stable party systems, many of 
the former Soviet Republics continue to lack institutionalized party systems 
(Bielasiak 2002, 205; Olson 1998, 463). Variances among countries in terms of 
party system institutionalization despite the consecutive elections have been 
explained with reference to institutional variables or historical legacies. Filippov 
(1999) found that party system fragmentation is lower in parliamentary systems 
compared to presidential systems. Toole (2000, 456) found that different electoral 
systems play a part in party system institutionalization by helping to lower the levels 
of fractionalization. Bochsler (2005, 49) found that electoral thresholds are 
responsible for the variances in party systems across former Soviet Union countries. 
Bielasiak (2002, 198) noted the importance of past legacies and argued that the 
Soviet regime precluded political movements outside the Communist party so that 
there were few attachments between the political actors and the public.  
On the other hand, scholars comparing the party systems in new 
democracies and in advanced industrial democracies advocate that it is unlikely for 
new democracies to evolve to stable party systems of the established democracies 
(Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 156; Mair 1997, 180). 
This is a consequence of the period and sequence effects. Mainwaring and Zoco 
(2007, 156) explained these effects as follows:  
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The period effect is that, in earlier competitive regimes, parties 
incorporated new citizens into the political systems. They had 
powerful identities, and the citizens who were mobilized by them 
developed strong attachments to them. Parties in later democracies 
were less central in mobilizing and creating new citizens. They did 
not form the encompassing social networks that working class and 
Christian Democratic parties did in early decades of the twentieth 
century, and they did not win the profound allegiance that these 
earlier parties forged. The sequent effect is related to the emergence 
of television as a major factor in enabling candidates to win election 
in competitive regimes created in recent decades. When television 
emerges as a major campaign vehicle before parties are well 
entrenched, political actors have less incentive to engage in party-
building. It is easier and –in short term- more effective to use modern 
mass media than build a party.  
 
Since parties formed in new democracies are unlikely to form encompassing 
social networks, electoral volatility will not diminish over time (Mainwaring and 
Torcal 2005, 10). The argument is confirmed by a number of studies on electoral 
volatility. Mainwaring and Zoco (2007, 165–166) analyzed 47 old and new 
democracies and found that the birth date of democracy has the highest effect on 
electoral volatility. Baldini and Pappalardo (2009, 10) found that the mean electoral 
volatility for democracies inaugurated by 1945, 1946 -1976 and after 1977 were 
9.4%, 17.0% and 36.6%, respectively. In this sense, what matters is not the duration 
of democracy but its birth date (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 166). Hence despite 
the repeating electoral game, new democracies will continue to be more fertile for 
new party entries and party splits than established democracies.  
2.2.Conclusion 
The review of the literature on new party formation, party system 
institutionalization and party cohesion leads us to gain an insight to both exogenous 
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and endogenous dimensions of party politics. Yet, none of the approaches listed 
above provide a full understanding of the reasons behind the decision of the 
dissident members of established party to form a party of their own. Studies 
employing a sociological approach to the study of party split overemphasize the 
importance of the problem push. The institutional approach to the study of splinter 
party formation underlines the importance of institutional facilitators of splinter 
party formation. Both approaches focus on factors exogenous to host parties to 
explain new party formation but neglect the role of the proto-party elite in party 
splits. On the other hand, the rational choice perspective grants agency to intraparty 
actors in understanding new party entrance without undermining the importance of 
institutional facilitators or socio-economic changes on political parties. Yet, 
scholarly work employing a rational choice perspective mainly focuses on the 
exogenous factors and undermines the difference between the genuinely new 
parties and splinter parties. Therefore, a model that explains how established parties 
split and when splinter parties are formed is necessary.  
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CHAPTER III 
A MODEL OF SPLINTER PARTY FORMATION 
The review of the literature in the previous chapter reveals the lack of 
theoretical studies on splinter party formation. Although scholarly works on the 
new party formations, party system changes, and party switching provide us with 
important clues about the exogenous factors that the political entrepreneurs of the 
proto-party take into consideration before forming a new party, these studies remain 
silent about the endogenous factors and the role of the proto-party elite in party 
splits. This chapter presents a theoretical model of splinter party formation. It is 
mainly asserted that party split is only one of the possible outcomes of the strategic 
interaction between the dissident faction and the majority faction supporting the 
party leader. This particular outcome is preceded by two stages: dissent and 
intraparty conflict. During the dissent phase, discontent is voiced behind doors. It 
is in the second stage, the intraparty conflict phase that minority faction manifests 
its dissent in various forms and party leadership responses. The decisions of the 
competing sides are conditioned by a number of endogenous and exogenous factors. 
Endogenous factors include leadership autonomy, the nature of disagreement and 
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the relative power of competing factions across the different layers of party 
organization. Exogenous factors include entry costs and the perceived viability of 
a new party. Once the party leader refuses to accommodate dissident faction’s 
demands and the dissident faction refuses to step back, the third phase starts. 
Dissident faction might choose to remain loyal, switch to an established party or 
form a new party. Party splits occur if the dissident faction chooses the last two 
paths. 
This chapter is organized as follows:  Firstly, definitions of political parties 
and factions are presented. This is followed by identification of the three stages of 
the model. Next, endogenous and exogenous factors influencing the decisions of 
the dissident faction and the party leadership are presented. The final part, deals 
with the potential paths to be taken by the dissidents and the reasons behind the 
dissident’s opt for new party formation rather than infiltration.  
3.1.Defining Political Parties 
Conventionally, political parties have been treated as unitary actors. This 
has been a sacrifice made for analytical gain in the study of inter-party politics and 
a consequence of the practical difficulties in gaining reliable information about 
political competition at a sub-party level (Benoit and Giannetti 2009, 229). 
However, most political parties face periods of intraparty conflict. Although most 
of these conflicts are resolved within party platforms, some of these conflicts are 
exposed, mostly by dissenting factions. These instances reveal that political parties 
are not in fact unitary actors. Moreover, the studies on factionalism reveal that 
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political parties are composed of sub-groups. In this sense, as Maor (1998, 1) states, 
“different coalitions of forces are being formed within the party and actors striving 
for dominance interact with each other in the struggle for relative influence within 
the organization; the interplay between internal actors, each with his or her own 
agenda, is thus the driving force of party life”.  
Political parties might be defined as any group seeking to elect 
governmental officeholders under a given label, which may or may not be on the 
ballot (Epstein 1993, 9). While this definition enables us to select cases, it does not 
provide any room for intraparty actors. Hence, as Sartori (2005, 63) suggests, 
political parties might resemble to a miniature of a political system with their 
authority structures, representative processes, electoral systems and sub-processes 
for recruiting leaders, defining goals and resolving internal system conflicts. They 
are composed of different organs that are horizontally and vertically linked.  
Katz and Mair’s three faces of party organization enable us to gain an insight 
into the changing viability of different party organs. Accordingly, party 
organizations have three faces: party in public office, party in central office and the 
party on the ground (Katz and Mair 2001). The party in public office refers to the 
elected members of the party in parliament and in government. It comprises the 
parliamentary party, known also as parliamentary group, which is crucial for 
cabinet formation in parliamentary systems. On the other hand, party in central 
office and the party on the ground constitute the extraparliamentary party. The party 
in central office refers to the national leadership of the party organization, whereas 
the party on the ground represents the rank-and-file of the party, comprising 
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ordinary party members as well as party activists who play a more extensive role 
than members at grassroot level (Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Three Faces of Party Organization 
 
 
Source:  Ayan (2009, 19).  
 
Here, we should note that the relationship between these three faces of party 
organization and functions of three organizational faces have evolved over time. 
Historically, it was first the party in public office that was formed in response to the 
transfer of power to the legislatures (Scarrow 2006, 17). The enfranchisement of 
new voters increased competition among legislative groups and paved the way for 
the formation of the electoral committees. Finally, the need to mobilize a larger 
electorate ended with permanent connections between the parliamentary groups and 
the electoral committees in the form of formal party organizations (Duverger 1970, 
5–7; Epstein 1993, 19; Sartori 2005, 37). However, as the urban and rural working 
classes increased in numbers, they felt the need to organize not only industrially but 
also politically (Biezen 2003, 21). These classes which were denied the right to vote 
formed a coherent and centralized extraparliamentary organization before they 
acquired parliamentary representation (Duverger 1970, 36).  
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According to Duverger (1970, 40–41), the organizational superiority of 
these externally-created parties led the internally-created bourgeoisie parties to 
adopt the organizational characteristics of the former. Hence, with the ‘contagion 
from the left’, the balance of power between the central party organization and 
parliamentary party shifted to the disadvantage of the latter in almost all Western 
democracies (Gibson and Harmel 1998, 215). However, starting in the 1960s, a 
group of scholars argued for the organizational ‘contagion from the right’ (Epstein 
1993, 257) and for the transformation of the parties’ organizational structures to 
‘catch-all’ (Kirchheimer 1990), ‘electoral-professional’ (Panebianco 1988, 262), or 
‘cartel’ parties (Mair 1994). With the rise of these organizational types, the power 
shifted back to the party in public office. The trend is not unique to the parties in 
the West; the party in public office has the upper hand in control of the party 
organization in internally created and parliament-centered parties that were formed 
during the third wave of democratization (Biezen 2003, 31; Olson 1998, 434).  
After noting the changing balance over power between the three faces of 
political parties, we should also deal with their functions for different party 
members. Briefly, political parties help deputies to overcome their coordination 
problems, articulate choices, aggregate preferences and supply labels under which 
candidates vie for public office (Cox and McCubbins 2007; Miskin 2003; Strom 
and Müller 2009). They provide incentives to different actors that are located at 
different layers of the party organizations. Panebianco (1988, 9) categorizes these 
incentives into two, namely collective and selective incentives. Collective 
incentives are benefits that the organization distributes equally among the 
participants and include “solidarity incentives –‘intangible rewards created by the 
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act of associating’- and purposive incentives –‘intangible rewards that derive from 
the sense of satisfaction of having contributed to the attainment of a worthwhile 
cause’” (Bettcher 2005, 341). On the other hand, selective incentives are the 
benefits that the organization distributes only to some of the participants in varying 
amounts. They might include material incentives such as money and specific 
solidarity incentives –“intangible rewards arising out of the act of associating that 
can be given to or withheld from specific individuals (e.g. Offices)” (Bettcher 2005, 
341).  
Political parties are voluntary and collaborative devices for mutual gain that 
attract politicians, activists and the voters (Strom and Müller 2009, 29).  Panebianco 
(1988, 25) identifies three recipients of organizational incentives: party members, 
activists and leaders. Party members are mainly motivated by solidarity and 
purposive incentives such as promises for future policy (Strom and Müller 2009, 
36; Strom 1990, 575). On the other hand activists are the party’s small minority 
which continually participates and whose activities enable the organization to 
function (Panebianco 1988, 26). They supply the voluntary labor and funds required 
for the party to carry out its functions (Strom and Müller 2009, 36). Panebianco 
(1988, 25) states that the dividing line between party members and activists is 
unclear and argues that activists can be divided into two subgroups: believers and 
careerists. Believers are those whose participation depends primarily on collective 
incentives of identity, whereas careerists are those whose participation depends 
primarily on selective incentives. These selective benefits might include office 
payoffs such as posts in party body and in cabinet or electoral payoffs such as 
candidacies and parliamentary seats (Ceron 2011, 39). Careerists might be 
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interested in not only securing the existing selective benefits but also achieving 
higher political offices called ‘mega-seats’ (Depauw and Martin 2009, 109). Their 
responsiveness to selective incentives emphasizes their dependency to top 
leadership (Maor 1998, 16; Panebianco 1988, 27). For Panebianco (1988, 27) the 
careerists “constitute the main force behind the factional games, are often the 
human base for schisms, and represent a potential source of turbulence and threat 
to the organizational order which the leaders must neutralize”. They also constitute 
the pool from which future party leaders emerge.    
Finally, party leaders are those that are willing to internalize the collective 
interests of the party and monitor their fellow partisans (Strom and Müller 2009, 
32). They control selective incentives to reward cooperative party members and to 
punish those who defect. As such, they are likely to engage in conflict with the 
careerists (Depauw and Martin 2009, 109). In compensation, they are rewarded 
with attractive positions such as government offices. During the factional conflict, 
the party leadership will be more likely to take sides with the majority faction that 
has voted for the leader since party leaders are primarily concerned with keeping 
their status as party leader (Luebbert, 1986; cited in Back 2008, 74). This majority 
faction might be called the ‘dominant coalition’, which is defined by Panebianco 
(1988, 37–38) as a coalition of internal party forces that align with the party leader 
in ruling the host party.   
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3.2.Defining Factions  
Party split is a consequence of subgroup formation and conflicting subgroup 
identities and/or conflicting interests (Hart and Van Vugt 2006, 394). An analysis 
of the literature on factionalism reveals that these internal actors have been labeled 
as currents, fractions, factions, cliques, conflict groups, wings, interest groups, 
tendencies or clientele groups. This variety of labels stems from the fact that 
scholars working on factionalism have attempted to provide typologies of these sub 
party groups based on organizational and motivational dimensions.   
Earlier works on factions considered any intraparty grouping that competed 
with each other for the realization of their goals as a faction. They were defined as 
semi-visible, irregular and unstable pre-party entities that could evolve into political 
parties (Chambers, 1963; cited in Belloni and Beller 1976, 534–535), or leader-
follower groups with well-defined roles: “followers give support to the leader in 
parliament and in intraparty struggle; the leader has the primary responsibility to 
provide positions, funds and other necessities of a good life” (Nicholas 1977, 57). 
Against this, Rose (1964, 37–38) argued that factions are self-consciously 
organized as a body with a measure of discipline and cohesion that should be 
distinguished from tendencies defined as “a body of attitudes expressed in 
parliament about a range of problems: the attitudes are held together by a more or 
less coherent political ideology”. Rose was followed by Sartori (2005, 68–69) and 
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Bettcher (2005) in providing a typology of factions based on their organizational 
characteristics10.  
Beller and Belloni (1978: 437; cited in Reiter 2004, 252) state that factions 
“structure the process of intraparty politics and decision making… define the 
struggle for control of the party, its policies, its leadership and offices, its doctrines, 
its treasury, etc… are devices for the distribution of party patronage –and, for 
governing parties, of government patronage; and they are instruments for 
generating and supporting rival candidates for public office”.  They are relevant for 
party splits as they are the main actors initiating party splits and forming new parties 
(Boucek 2002, 461). Similar to social movements or citizen initiatives, they have a 
new demand or a neglected issue that they would like to be addressed (Boucek 
2002, 459). They mostly pressure the party leadership for the fulfillment of the 
perceived demand but they might also evolve into a ‘proto-party’ (Lucardie 2000, 
179) or ‘potential new party’ (Hug 2001, 40) in the sense that they mobilize their 
political resources in order to take part in the decision-making process.  
For our subject, what is significant about factions are not their structural 
properties but their relationship, activities and consequences of these activities for 
party politics (Boucek 2009, 466). For this reason, we adopt the general definition 
provided by Zariski (1960, 33) and define factions as “any intraparty combination, 
                                                 
 
10 For review of the definitions of factions and factionalism, see Belloni and Beller, 1976; Boucek, 
2009. For more on the organizational typologies of factions, see Bettcher (2005, 343–344); Hine, 
1982; Rae (1994, 8); Reiter (2004, 258); Sartori (2005, 68).   
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clique or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common 
purpose and are organized to act collectively –as a distinct block within the party – 
to achieve their goals”. These subgroups enable the dissatisfied members of the 
parent organization to voice their demands around a common leader.   
Strom (1990, 566–568) has identified three models of party behavior: vote-
seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking. Accordingly, party members might be 
primarily interested in increasing their votes, holding offices or promoting certain 
issues or ideologies (Harmel and Janda 1994, 265). While all parties will hold 
multiple objectives, each party will have a primary goal that overrides other 
considerations. Likewise, factions have a primary goal. Zariski (1960, 33) states, 
goals of factions might include patronage (control of party and government office 
by members of the faction), the fulfillment of local, regional or group interests, 
influence on party strategy, influence on party and governmental policy, and the 
promotion of a discrete set of values to which members of the faction subscribe. 
Factions might simply be interested in distribution of offices or promotion of certain 
policies and ideologies. Although earlier studies on factions suggested that factions 
are self-seeking groups primarily concerned with the accumulation and distribution 
of selective and divisible goods such as party posts, campaign funds, government 
appointments and contracts, later works suggested that factions are not primarily 
interested in personal goals but are also motivated by policy and agenda-setting 
(Benedict 1985, 363; Sartori 2005, 22).  
The accurate attribution of the motives of faction members is a hard mission. 
It is due to the fact that it is rare for politicians to use their own career interests as 
the explicitly-stated principles around which to organize a faction (Hine 1982, 41–
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42). Indeed, even factions of principles struggle with the ruling coalition for 
controlling viable executive positions. For our subject, the relevance of the 
motivation of factions comes from the fact that they provide us with clues about the 
dissent within the host party. Then what are the reasons of dissent?  
3.3.Stages of Splinter Party Formation 
Figure 2: Stages of Splinter Party Formation 
 
 
Splinter party formation is an outcome that is reached only after a series of 
stages. The first stage, dissent, is the phase during which dissident party members 
start to organize around a cause or during which already existent faction becomes 
disappointed with the party leadership’s policies and strategies. The second phase, 
intraparty conflict, is the phase where dissent is manifested in the form of exit or 
voice. The final part, departure is the stage when dissatisfied dissidents decide on 
their final strategy (Figure 2). 
72 
3.3.1. Dissent 
Most parties pass through periods of unity and dissension. There are 
numerous reasons for dissatisfaction. Some of these reasons are contextual and 
impossible to be generalized. For example the Great Depression produced tensions 
and realignments in bourgeoisie parties in Norway, Germany and Spain (Hine 1982, 
48). The British Conservative Party suffered from disunity which mirrored 
moments of major national choice: tariff reform and imperial preference at the 
beginning of the 19th century; question of defense and rearmament in the 1930s; 
the European Economic Community in the early 1960s; and the debate over 
monetary policy in the 1980s (Boucek 2009). The Sino-Indian border dispute split 
the Indian Communist Party into two factions (Katrak 1961, 139; Sharma 1976, 
349). The occupation of Czechoslovakia by the USSR fractionalized the Turkish 
Labor Party (Lipovsky 1991, 99). The anti-colonialism movement led to a split 
within the French Socialist Party (Cole 1989, 80). The evolution of the Nation Party 
of South Africa into a party dominated by the Afrikaner bourgeoisie ended up with 
a party split (Charney 1984, 269). The victory of transition-coalitions eroded their 
unity and paved the way for frequent party splits and mergers in the second and the 
third wave democracies (Boucek 2002, 461; Cotta 1996). Lack of internal party 
democracy, elite competition for power, personal differences, intolerance and 
failure to handle factionalism within parties, personalization of power and the 
premium placed on personal loyalties led to the formation of breakaway parties in 
South Africa (Nuvunga and Adalima 2011, 7).  
Nevertheless, we might derive from the literature a number of factors that 
facilitate factional conflict. These include the debate over the host party’s policy 
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position due to rise of new demands or electoral defeat, conflicts over strategies 
over the coalition under multipartysim, conflicts over distribution of spoils, and 
leadership succession in polities with high degree of personalism (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Potential Reasons of Dissent 
 
 
3.3.1.1.Rise of New Demands and Pressures for Party Change 
The transformation of social cleavages is the most cited reason behind the 
change in party systems as well as the formation of new parties to represent new 
cleavages. Accordingly, the transformation of social cleavages leads to the rise of 
new voters whose demands should be articulated either by new or established 
parties (Ignazi 1992; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Kitschelt 1988). However, the 
extent to which changes in cleavage structures find their reflection in party system 
change is a matter of debate. Although scholars working on party systems in 
established democracies argue that the transformation of the social cleavages in 
these countries is the primary reason behind the rise of new parties, those working 
on new democracies argue that there is not one-to-one fit between party systems in 
new democracies and the cleavage structures (Manning 2005; McAllister and White 
2007).  
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In our model, the relevance of changes in cleavage structures comes from 
the fact that it forces established parties to reconsider their issue position. However, 
for this to occur, the cleavage structure has to be politicized (Özbudun 1981; Sayarı 
1978). Once an existing or a new cleavage is politicized, the party leadership has to 
decide whether or not to adapt the new demands (Hug 2001, 46). Adapting these 
demands might sometimes require fundamental changes in party program, issue-
position and even party label. Established parties are reluctant to incorporate new 
demands that require party changes due to three reasons. Firstly, they become 
identified with issue positions that constrain their political movement. Secondly, 
parties depend on the support of certain social groups that constrain their social 
appeal. Finally, parties are built on delicate power bases; party change might 
challenge cohesion and might deprive the party from the voluntary labor provided 
by political activists (Janda et al. 1995, 174). Nevertheless, some parties might 
decide to initiate change in their policy positions, especially following electoral 
defeats (Agh 2000; Janda et al. 1995; Somer-Topcu 2009).  
All parties have a primary goal. The party’s failure to realize its primary 
goal constitutes an ‘external shock’, which is defined by Harmel and Janda (1994, 
267–268) as “an external stimulus so directly related to performance considerations 
on a party’s ‘primary goal’ that it causes the party’s decision makers… to undertake 
a fundamental re-evaluation of the party’s effectiveness on that goal dimensions”.  
In this sense, the nature and scale of the shock depends upon the goal priority of the 
established party. Vote-seeking parties will be shocked by collapse of electoral 
support; office-seeking parties will be shocked by loss of participation in 
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government, whereas parties whose principal aim is ideological will be shocked by 
exogenous changes that undermine their credo (Duncan 2007, 71).  
It should be noted that the influences of electoral defeat on intraparty politics 
depends on the perceptions of those holding the party ruling offices (Wilson 1994, 
265). When party members believe that the party performed badly at the elections 
due to contingencies such as wars that have little to do with the policies that the 
party advocates, intraparty conflicts are less likely to arise (Janda et al. 1995, 185). 
Janda et al (1995, 182–183) have classified the perception of electoral results into 
five categories, namely calamitous, disappointing, tolerable, gratifying and 
triumphal, and defined calamitous elections and disappointing elections as follows:  
A calamitous election is one viewed by party activists as decisively 
confirming a party’s negative performance. Such an election can be 
evidenced by a large loss of seats in a single election or from a 
continued pattern of electoral decline or even stagnation. A party 
could also regard an election as calamitous if its major rival 
simultaneously achieved a huge victory that seemed to seal the fate 
of the frustrated party…A disappointing election is one viewed by 
party activists as a distinct rebuke to the party for its performance. 
Such an election could be evidenced by a moderate loss of seats and 
votes in single elections, by its rival’s superior showing in the 
election, or by loss of a leading role in government. It could also be 
evidenced by a small loss of seats when activists expected a sizable 
gain.  
 
From these, we might conclude that when the party members perceive 
electoral performance of the host party as calamitous or disappointing, it is more 
likely that dissent will occur.  
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Figure 4: Rise of New Demands, Electoral Defeat and Intraparty Conflict 
 
 
The process of party change is a conflict-ridden one that mostly starts with 
an external stimulus in the form of a heavy electoral defeat or the rise of a 
compelling demand, continues with changes in party leadership and the 
composition of the dominant coalition and ends with changes in the party program 
(Harmel and Janda 1994, 279–280; Janda et al. 1995). The process is prone to 
division between those demanding and opposing party change (Figure 4). That is, 
the conflict takes place between reformers and conservatives. In the event that the 
reformist faction can control the ruling offices, including party leadership, party 
changes are more likely (Harmel and Tan, 2003). In such cases, the conservative 
faction is likely to feel a sense of perceived inability to voice dissent (Sani and 
Todman 2002, 1647). Besides, new norms proposed by the reformist faction might 
be perceived by the conservative faction as fundamentally denying group identity. 
When the conservatives perceive the new norms as subverting party identity, they 
might believe that the party that used to be no more exists (Sani and Todman 2002, 
1648). When they feel that party identity has been subverted, they will see 
themselves as not having voice (Sani and Todman 2002, 1648). As a result, the 
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conservative faction might form a breakaway party or join an already existing party 
whose fundamental principles are consistent with the dissenting faction’s members’ 
beliefs, and values (Sani and Todman 2002, 1649). In this sense, if the reformist 
faction succeeds in controlling the party organization, the conservative faction is 
likely to form what Lucardie (2000) calls as ‘purifier party’ for purification of the 
original ideology of the host party.  
In the event that the conservatives succeed in controlling the party 
organization, the reformers have two options. They might infiltrate into an 
established party which demands to articulate their interests or they might form a 
new party. This party might take the form of a ‘prolocutor party’, a type of new 
party formed to articulate particular interests without reference to an explicit 
ideology, or ‘prophetic party’, which articulates new ideologies that revolve around 
the new issues that are neglected by the established parties (Lucardie 2000).  
3.3.1.2.Conflict over Formation of Coalitions 
The issues at stake might also involve the question of pure coalition strategy: 
the willingness to work with one set of parties rather than another (Hine 1982, 38). 
This is a potential problem in multiparty systems with parliamentary governments 
where none of the established parties is able to hold the majority of seats necessary 
for government formation. Under such contexts, the party’s capacity to implement 
its program depends upon with whom it works in coalition, how strong that partner 
is, and what it will tolerate (Hine 1982, 38).  
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Earlier works on coalition-formation treated political parties as unitary 
actors in the bargaining process for coalition-formation (Druckman 1996, 398). 
While earlier studies on coalition formation assumed that parties were pure office-
seeking unitary actors, later works have acknowledged that parties are policy-
seeking actors so that they are more likely to form coalitions with ideologically 
closer parties (DeWinter and Dumond 2006). However, unitary-actor assumption 
of political parties has given way to studies that recognize the difficulties that the 
party leaders face during the formation and survival of coalitions. In 1986, Luebbert 
(cited in Back 2008, 74) argued that for party leaders who are in office, it is more 
important to remain party leaders than to remain in office. Hence, they will strive 
to minimize party disunity by attempting to base the party’s attitude towards 
participation in a coalition on preferences that produce the least disunity (Maor 
1998, 3). Since then, scholars have acknowledged the importance of factions in 
coalition formation. However, there are conflicting findings regarding the role of 
factionalism in coalition formation and termination. Most studies found that 
factionalism was negatively associated with a factionalized party’s participation in 
coalition and the duration of coalition and positively associated with the duration 
of negotiations (Back 2008; Chambers 2008; Druckman 1996).  Against this, Maor 
(1995, 1998) suggested that it is easier for factionalized parties to remain in 
coalition provided that there are organizational channels for diffusion of dissent. 
What is common in both studies with conflicting findings is that they highlight the 
importance of factional conflicts during the formation of coalition governments.  
Coalition formation triggers intraparty conflict among factions regarding the 
stance of the host party towards participation in government. Especially, 
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ideologically-driven factions will be more concerned with the policies that the 
potential coalition partner advocates. Hence, it is likely that factions of principles 
are more likely to revolt against the party leadership in the event that the host party 
negotiates for a coalition with another established party ideologically distant from 
the host party. 
3.3.1.3.Conflicts over Selective Benefits and Leadership Succession Crisis 
As stated before, political parties provide collective and selective benefits 
for their members with heterogeneous goals. Factions fight for the control of the 
party in order to provide more selective benefits to their followers and in order to 
influence the policy position of the parent organization (Boucek 2002, 459). 
Although factions of principles are primarily interested in policy goals, they have 
to fight for the control of the ruling offices within the party organization, as the 
factions of principles do in order to realize their policy goals. In this sense, the 
distinction between these two analytically separated faction types becomes blurred.  
Fixed number of parliamentary seats and the mega-seats (i.e. higher political 
offices) result in factional competition for these limited seats. By establishing a set 
of internal rules that assign proportional payoffs to each faction, the party provides 
incentives for each faction to work together in order to maximize the party’s 
strength (Ceron 2011, 133). In this sense, to the extent that the party leadership 
distributes office and electoral payoffs proportionally, a party split is less likely. 
However, party leaders are likely to enhance the strength of their followers within 
the party so that s/he can secure his/her status. The exclusion of a faction from 
80 
selective benefits might, in turn, trigger intra-elite conflict. In this sense, the way 
that party leadership distributes viable seats provides us with clues to understand 
the way that host parties split.  
The distribution of selective benefits might turn to be a serious source of 
conflict during periods of leadership succession. The selection of party leadership 
is important especially in polities where party leaders possess enormous powers. 
Scholars working on Turkish politics have frequently underlined the importance of 
party leaders’ decisions and choices in party politics in Turkey (Bektaş 1993, 71; 
Özbudun 2000, 83–84; Turan 2003, 157). As Sayarı (2002a, 3) states: 
The importance of leaders in shaping political outcomes in Turkey 
stems largely, though not exclusively, from the near absolute control 
that they exercise over party organizations. By controlling the 
nomination of candidates in the elections, serving as the principal 
gatekeepers in the distribution of political patronage, and enjoying 
extensive autonomy (such as legal means to abolish local party units 
that oppose the central executive leadership and expel dissident party 
members from the organization) party leaders have managed to 
amass a great deal of personal power at the expense of organizational 
autonomy.  
 
Given the highly important place of the party leader, it is natural for factions 
to compete to maintain the election of their leaders as party chair. Moreover, as 
doubts about the future of the present party leader increase, the balance of power 
within the party organizations is likely to be altered by new factional coalitions. 
Once one of the factions secure the election of its leader as the party chair, it is 
highly likely for the party leader to attempt to consolidate his/her power over the 
party organization by rewarding the electorate that elected him/her. This attempt 
will further alter the previous balance of power within the party. Besides, it might 
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require the dismissal of some of the existing party rulers in order to obtain vacant 
seats in ruling party offices. When the new leader alters the balance of power to the 
advantage of his followers, it is likely for the faction supporting the previous leader 
to revolt against the new leader. In this sense, not only leadership succession might 
result with party splits, but also the process after the election of the party’s new 
leader is likely to be prone to intraparty conflict.  
3.3.2. Intraparty Conflict: Voice or Exit 
Dissent starts in a latent way. It becomes observable when it is manifested 
by a group of dissidents in various forms, including party split. Intra-party conflict 
might take two forms: intra-elite conflict and elite-follower conflict. Intra-elite 
conflict is usually accompanied by elite-follower conflict since members of the 
conflicting elites have their respective followers in the party organization. Yet, they 
are analytically distinct modes of conflict (Maor 1998, 11). Intra-elite conflict is the 
conflict that occurs within the parliamentary party, including those between 
members of parliament and party representatives in government, whereas elite-
follower conflict signifies any other internal disputes. As Maor (1998, 10–11) 
states:  
Intra-elite conflicts, for example, may be manifested by resignation 
of elite members (i.e. the ‘exit’ option), dissension in parliament, and 
petitions and appeals to party elites with the intention of forcing a 
change in party strategy (i.e. the ‘voice’ option). Elite-follower 
conflict, by comparison, may be manifested by a decline in party 
membership (i.e. the ‘exit’ option), demonstrations of party activists 
and petitions or appeals to party elites with the intention of forcing a 
change in party strategy (i.e. the ‘voice’ option).  
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In 1970, Hirschman suggested that customers might react in the form of 
voice or exit when there is a decline in product quality. That is, dissatisfied members 
might leave the organization (exit), or express their dissatisfaction directly to some 
authority (voice) (Hirschman 1970, 4). According to Hirschman (1970, 38), voice 
is preferred to exit under two conditions:  
An evaluation of the chances of getting the firm or an organization 
producing A “back to the track”, through one’s own action or through 
that of others; and a judgment that it is worthwhile for a variety of 
reasons, to trade the certainty of B which is available here and now 
against these chances.  
 
This brings us to the loyalty option, which corresponds to an attitude of 
commitment to the organization (Amjahad and Sandri 2011, 7). According to 
Hirschman (1970, 77–78), any individual with considerable attachment to a product 
or organization will often search for ways to make himself/herself influential, 
especially when the organization moves in what s/he believes is the wrong 
direction. Because of this, loyal members of an organization are more likely to 
resort to voice rather than exit (Dowding, John, and Mergoupis 2000, 476).  
Party split is initiated by the decision of the dissidents. When they are 
dissatisfied with the performance of the party leadership, they might simply depart 
from the party. In other words, they might resort to exit option either with or without 
attempting to voice their dissent within the host party (Dowding, John, and 
Mergoupis 2000, 473). After their resignation, they might simply remain as 
independent, switch to an ideologically neighboring party or form a new party. 
Although party switching is a preferable option for individual deputies, it is a highly 
costly option for the dissident faction. This is due to the size of the dissidents, which 
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makes it hard for the targeted party leadership to absorb the dissenting faction 
without harming the delicate balance of power within the target party. On the other 
hand, investing their resources in a political project that might not achieve success 
is likely to deter the dissenting faction from exit in the first place. For this reason, 
dissident faction is more likely to use the available means of dissent diffusion and 
voice their demands before departure. 
Table 5: Ways to Voice Dissent 
Within Party 
Organization 
Party in Central Office 
National Congress motions 
Call for extraordinary congress 
Competition for central offices 
Debate at the Executive Board 
Party in Public Office 
Debate at Group Meeting 
Call for Group Meeting 
Competition for Group Executive Boards 
Party on the Ground Competition for local executive boards 
Outside Party 
Organization 
Crossing the Floor 
Abstention 
Bill proposal 
Voting against party bill 
Vote of no confidence 
Expose Dissent 
Press Release 
Memorandum 
Exit Resignation 
 
Table 5 illustrates the possible ways of dissent manifestation. When 
dissatisfied members opt for voice, they might either use the party platforms or 
voice their demands outside the party. Firstly, members of the dissident faction 
might voice their dissent using the extraparliamentary organization. They might 
propose motions at the national congress. They might call for extraordinary 
congress to debate the party line. They might nominate candidates for 
administrative and disciplinary offices and party leadership. Moreover they might 
force the party leadership and executive boards to resign. In addition to these, they 
might attempt to increase the number of their supporters in the party on the ground 
to exert pressure over the party in central office. They might try to influence the 
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local congresses in order to maintain selection of their candidates. As in the case of 
Turkish political parties, they might compete for the control of local branches which 
are highly critical in controlling membership records (Turan 1988, 64). Through 
such control, they can eliminate the followers of competing factions and maintain 
the election of their supporters as delegates to the upper congress.  
The parliamentary party provides another opportunity for dissidents to 
manifest their dissent. They might debate at the regular group meetings or call for 
parliamentary group to convene with a particular agenda. They might nominate 
their candidates for executive boards of the parliamentary party so that they can 
control the agenda setting process. They might also force the existing parliamentary 
party executive board to resign and then nominate their candidates.  
Dissident factions’ deputies might also voice their demands outside the 
party organization. As the study of Leston-Bandeira (2009, 701–703) on the 
Portuguese parliament shows, legislators of a dissident faction might manifest their 
dissatisfaction in various ways. Firstly, they might leave the committee or the 
plenary room just before a particular vote takes place. Secondly, they might 
delegate their right to vote to other deputies of the same party. Thirdly, with or 
without voting against the party line, they might release written explanations in 
order to justify their voting against the party line which will be published together 
with the parliamentary debate. Fourthly, they might present criticisms through 
questions or long speeches during the plenary sessions. Fifthly, deputies might act 
against the party line through amendments or bill proposals that are contrary to the 
party line. Sixthly, in order to show to the electorate that their interests have been 
defended in the assembly, legislators might organize press releases to express their 
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disagreements. Finally, dissident deputies might vote against the party line, and 
sometimes, vote against the cabinet. 
Figure 5: Potential Responses of the Party Leadership 
 
 
Party split is the result of the decision of dissidents. If the dissidents choose 
to remain silent or exit without engaging into competition with the party leadership, 
then the leadership of the party does not have to respond. In the first case, the party 
leadership lacks the information about the degree of discontent. In the second case, 
the party leadership has nothing to do to keep dissidents within the host party 
(Erlingsson 2002, 10). However, if the dissidents voice their dissatisfaction, the 
representatives of the established party have three options (Figure 5). They might 
simply accommodate the demands of dissidents, co-opt some of them to the ruling 
coalition or resort to disciplinary measures (Ceron 2011; Erlingsson 2002).  
The party leader might simply accept the demands of the intraparty 
opposition and amend the party bylaw or the party program in order to realize their 
demands. Secondly, the party leader might co-opt the leadership of the dissenting 
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faction in order to neutralize intraparty opposition. Co-optation usually goes hand 
in hand with disciplinary measures and legitimation. In order to divide the dissident 
faction, the party leader might incorporate some of their members and expel the 
others. In order to weaken the dissenting faction, party leaders usually opt for the 
dissolution of party organs dominated by the dissidents. In cases of massive purges, 
the party leader is likely to seek a vote of confidence in order to legitimize his/her 
decisions.  
3.3.3. Factors influencing the Outcomes 
Party split is a consequence of the interplay between the dissenting faction 
and party leadership. It occurs when the party leader refuses to accommodate the 
demands of the dissident faction and when the dissident faction insists on the 
realization of its demands. Studies on new party formation have shown that this 
interaction is conditioned by exogenous factors. The dissident faction is expected 
to leave the party when the costs of exit are low and when benefits of exit are high 
(Tavits 2006). However, even when costs of exit exceed perceived benefits of exit; 
dissident faction might be forced to exit when the party leader completely or 
partially purges members of dissenting faction.  
Dissidents who voiced demands are expected to depart when the party 
leadership does not accommodate their demands. The party leader’s resort to the 
option of whip depends on a number of endogenous factors, including the nature of 
disagreement, leadership’s autonomy and the relative size of the dissenting faction 
both in the host party and in party system. On the other hand, while deciding 
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whether to retreat from opposing, the dissenting faction takes the exogenous factors 
into consideration. These factors influencing the calculations of the dissidents 
include the entry costs and perceived benefits of office (Table 6). 
Table 6: Factors influencing the Competing Factions’ Strategies 
Factors Hypotheses Indicators 
The Nature of 
Disagreement 
H.1: Party leadership will be less likely 
to accommodate dissidents’ demands in 
case of disagreements over party’s policy 
goals. 
Statements of dissident 
members regarding party 
change and their criticisms 
against the party leaders. 
 H.2. The party leader is less likely to 
accommodate the dissidents’ demands if 
the dissenting faction rejects the 
legitimacy of party leader’s rule 
Relative Power of 
Competing 
Factions across 
Different Layers of 
Party Organization 
H.3: Party leadership is less likely to 
accommodate dissident faction when the 
dissidents do not hold a considerable 
number of supporters in the decision-
making party organ 
Distribution of seats of the 
ruling party office and the 
parliamentary seats among 
the competing factions. 
H.4: If the parent party is in government, 
the lower the parliamentary 
fragmentation and the effective number 
of parliamentary parties indexes, the 
lower the party leader is likely to 
accommodate the dissidents’ demands 
Parliamentary fragmentation 
and the effective number of 
parliamentary parties 
indexes  
Leadership 
Autonomy 
H.5: The more inclusive the party 
leadership selection method, the less 
likely it is that the party leadership will 
accommodate dissident’s demands 
Votes obtained by the party 
leader in Congress prior to 
and after the split. 
 
Entry Costs 
H.6: The lower the spatial the 
requirements, the less likely it is that 
dissidents will retreat 
Spatial requirements 
H.7: The higher the disproportionality 
and the RRP, the more likely it is that 
dissidents will retreat 
Disproportionality and RRP 
indexes 
Perceived Viability 
of New Parties 
H.8: The higher the volatility rates, the 
less likely it is that dissident faction will 
retreat 
Total volatility index 
H.9: The higher the turnout rates, the 
more likely it is that the dissidents will 
retreat 
Turnout Rates 
3.3.3.1.Endogenous Factors 
All factions are bound to be united by some kind of common endeavor. They 
might strive to change or conserve the policy position of the parent organization. 
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Or else, they might simply compete for the distribution of selective benefits. Studies 
on individual party splits demonstrate that parent organizations are prone to splits 
in case of major disagreements over policy goals or policy positions and strategies 
of the parent organization towards an external stimuli that leads to re-evaluation of 
the party’s policy position (Boucek 2002; Cole 1989; Hine 1982). Hence, it might 
be concluded that, the threat to defect is credible when the ideological distance 
between the dissenting faction and the party’s position increases (Ceron 2011, 137). 
This distance might stem from the party leader’s decision to initiate party change. 
It might also stem from the perceived distance between the policies agreed upon by 
all factions and the actual measures employed by the party leadership. Therefore: 
H.1: Party leadership will be less likely to accommodate dissidents’ 
demands in case of disagreements over party’s policy goals.  
 
In cases where intraparty conflict is about the assignment of policy and 
electoral payoffs, the party leader might find it easier to integrate demands by 
redistributing viable seats or enlarging the number of seats. However, this is only 
possible when the factions agree on the party’s major goals (McAllister 1991, 217). 
In the event that ideology does not act as a unifying bond, parties might be prone to 
splits (Owens 2003, 23; Reiter 2004, 268). Indeed, conflicts over selective benefits 
might threaten party unity in case their disagreement revolves around the legitimacy 
of party leader. If the dissenting faction directly attacks the party leader and 
attempts to undermine the legitimacy of his/her rule, then accommodation becomes 
impossible given that party leaders are primarily concerned with keeping their 
status as party leader (Luebbert, 1986; cited in Back 2008, 74). Due to this, even 
clientelistic parties might be prone to splits. Therefore:   
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 H.2. The party leader is less likely to accommodate the dissidents’ 
demands if the dissenting faction rejects the legitimacy of party 
leader’s rule.  
 
The nature of disagreement can be measured in two ways. Firstly, 
comparison of the programs of the splinter party and the host party enables us to 
find out the degree of ideological distance between the competing factions. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the criticisms directed by the dissidents provide 
us important clues about the reasons of dissent.  
Strategies developed by the dissenting minority faction and the dominant 
coalition are also influenced by their relative powers and dispersion of their 
influence within the party organization. As Ceron (2011, 137) states, to be harmful 
to party unity, the dissenting faction should have a considerable number of 
supporters. This number is significant in relation with the party’s organizational 
characteristics. As stated before, the party has three faces: party on the ground, party 
in central office and party in public office. The faction which holds the majority in 
the party face that is responsible for nominations and determination of party policies 
holds the control of the party. If the dissenting faction has a considerable number 
of supporters, or if the supporters of the dissidents increase over time, the party 
leadership is less likely to neglect the former’s demands. On the other hand, if the 
dissenting faction is gradually losing its strength over the ruling party organization, 
then it is easier for the party leader to neglect their demands. Therefore:  
H.3: Party leadership is less likely to accommodate dissident faction 
when the dissidents do not hold a considerable number of supporters 
in the decision-making party organ. 
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The relative strength of the dissenting faction and the party leader’s faction 
can be observed through Congress results. Congressional votes of competing 
candidates and their lists both prior to the split and at the first congress after the 
split reveal the extent to which the competing factions received support. Secondly, 
the number of deputies/senators signing a memorandum and the number of resigned 
deputies show the number of the dissident faction’s relative strength. Finally, the 
number of resigned or purged provincial chairs shows us the extent to which the 
dissidents are supported by the party on the ground.  
In a parliamentary system in which government formation or termination 
depends on the support of the majority of deputies, the relative size of the dissenting 
faction should be considered together with the distribution of seats in Parliament. 
The dissenting faction might constitute a harmful threat for party unity if the 
number of seats it holds in Parliament is crucial for the maintenance of government. 
Otherwise, the leader of the ruling party might find it easy to neglect their demands. 
Due to this, when dissidents voice their demands in a predominant party system, 
the party leader might trade party unity with party cohesion and whip the dissidents. 
Moreover, if the party leadership finds itself in an electorally safe situation, such as 
the existence of an unviable opposition or a sub-competitive electoral market, the 
host majority party is expected to factionalize and party leadership is expected to 
neglect dissidents’ demands than accommodate their demands (Canon 1978, 834; 
Sartori 2005, 76).  
The relative power of the ruling party in Parliament can be measured by the 
indexes of parliamentary fragmentation and effective number of parliamentary 
parties. Parliamentary fragmentation weights parties by size and is obtained by first 
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taking the percentage of filled seats won by all parties as a decimal, squaring this 
value and summing these values for all parties. The figure obtained is then 
subtracted from one to produce the figure for parliamentary fragmentation. On the 
other hand, the effective number of parliamentary parties weights parties by size by 
first taking the vote share of each party as a decimal, squaring this value and 
summing these values for all parties. The figure obtained is then inverted to produce 
the figure for effective number of electoral parties (Siaroff 2000, 27–28). In both 
indexes, independents are ignored. Lower values indicate predominant 
parliamentary party system, whereas higher values indicate fragmented party 
systems. Therefore:  
 H.4: If the parent party is in government, the lower the parliamentary 
fragmentation and the effective number of parliamentary parties 
indexes, the lower the party leader is likely to accommodate the 
dissidents’ demands. 
 
The way the party leader is elected has considerable leverage upon the ways 
that intraparty conflicts are handled (Ceron 2011, 37). Accordingly, the party leader 
who is mainly concerned with keeping his/her chairmanship status is responsible 
for the allocation of payoffs within factions. The electorate that is authorized for 
leader election can range from a small circle of party elites to all party members 
(Figure 6). If the leader is nominated by small committees in which factions will 
retain considerable veto power over nomination of the party leader parallel to their 
relative strength, the appointed leader will be more likely to stick to the inter-
factional arrangement on which the leader’s delegation was based on (Ceron 2011, 
36). On the other hand, if the leader is directly elected by a wide selectorate, the 
factions’ veto powers will shrink. In such cases, the leader will be stronger vis-à-
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vis the factions and will provide the party with the added value of his/her charisma 
(Ceron 2011, 37). In addition to this, the overall electoral performance of the party 
will help the party leader to retain the legitimacy of his/her rule and contribute to 
leadership autonomy.  
Figure 6: Leader Selectorate and Leadership Autonomy 
 
Source: Ceron (2011, 50).  
 
Ceron hypothesized that the more inclusive the party leader election 
methods, the more party leaders have autonomy over the distribution of payoffs. 
The more the leader is autonomous in the distribution of payoffs; the more likely it 
is that the leader will disproportionally distribute the payoffs in favor of the 
dominant coalition. This, in turn, will prolong the disappointment of the minority 
faction. Therefore:  
H.5: The more inclusive the party leadership selection method, the 
less likely it is that the party leadership will accommodate dissident’s 
demands.  
 
Here we should note that the introduction of public funding and access to 
the media has decreased the dependency of the party leadership on membership 
dues and voluntary labor provided by party members and activists. Moreover, as 
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stated before, developments in communication technology have contributed to the 
further concentration of power in the hands of the party leader and the 
‘presidentialization of politics’ (Biezen 2003; Katz and Mair 2001; Webb and 
Poguntke 2005b). These developments have indirectly increased the autonomy of 
the party leader vis-à-vis a dissenting faction. For this reason, it is plausible to 
expect party leaders to whip or neglect the demands of dissidents after the 
introduction of public funding and developments in communication technology.  
3.3.3.2.Exogenous Factors 
As stated before, party splits are likely to occur when the party leader refuses 
to accommodate the dissident faction’s demands and when the dissident faction 
refuses to step back in the factional strife. While deciding on their strategies, the 
leadership to the dissenting faction exercises some degree of foresight and is aware 
of the possibility that they might be expelled (Ceron 2011, 196–197). Hence, they 
take the costs of new party formation and potential viability of a new party into 
consideration before entering into factional competition with the party leader and 
the dominant coalition.  
Entry costs are the costs required for the formation of a new party. These 
costs include the costs to register officially, to appear on the ballot, to pass through 
the visibility filter, and to access public offices (See Chapter II). Costs to register 
officially and to appear on the ballot are the petition, and spatial and monetary 
requirements which can be found by the analysis of the electoral laws, and if 
available, the party laws. Since petition requirements and monetary deposits 
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become meaningful in inter-variation studies, they are excluded from the scope of 
this study. On the other hand, spatial requirements are included since these 
requirements have varied with each institutional change in Turkey. Spatial 
requirement refers to the requirement to organize in a certain number of 
constituencies before entering into an electoral competition. If this number is high, 
it is likely that dissidents will prefer to voice than exit. Therefore: 
H.6: The lower the spatial the requirements, the less likely it is that 
dissidents will retreat. 
 
Disproportionality, the most cited variable impeding new party entrance 
measures the extent to which the results each party gets at the elections are reflected 
onto their seat shares in the legislative assembly (Kalaycıoğlu 2002, 57). Similar to 
disproportionality, the index of relative reduction in parties (RRP) captures the 
reductive effects of electoral law on the party system by showing the extent to which 
electoral systems set barriers to entry (Boucek 2002, 467). Electoral systems 
producing disproportional vote-to-seat conversion and higher RRP increase the 
votes required to gain access to Parliament. When these rates are high, splinter 
groups are required to gain a higher number of votes for being elected. Due to this, 
they are expected to refrain from new party formation under such electoral systems. 
Therefore:  
H.7: The higher the disproportionality and the RRP, the more likely 
it is that dissidents will retreat. 
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Disproportionality can be measured by various indexes11. Here, we use the 
Loose-more-Haneby Index. This is found by taking the absolute difference between 
the percentage of votes and the percentage of seats won by a particular party (or the 
others) and summing this value for all parties (and others). Finally, since one 
assumes that one party’s gains are another’s loss, the figure is divided by two 
(Siaroff 2000, 29–30). On the other hand, the RRP index is expressed as the 
difference between the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) and the 
effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) and is calculated as follows 
(Boucek 2002, 467): 
𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑃 − 𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑃 
𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑃
× 100 
Another exogenous factor influencing the calculations of the dissidents is 
the perceived viability of a new party. Accordingly, political entrepreneurs are less 
likely to invest on new parties when the party system is institutionalized since they 
calculate that their potential new party will be less likely to receive support 
(Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Wolinetz 1990, 221–222). Uninstitutionalized party 
systems characterized by high electoral volatility, low popularity of established 
political parties, low turnout rates, a weak grounding of parties in civil society, the 
financial dependence of parties on state subsidies for their revenues, frequent party 
switching, high effective number of parties, small party membership and weak 
                                                 
 
11 For these indexes, see Kalaycıoğlu (2002, 57); Lijphart (1999).  
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partisan identities provide more room for new party entrance (Enyedi 2006, 229; 
Mainwaring and Torcal 2005, 6; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004, 151). Among these 
factors, the volatility is the most important indicator of party system 
institutionalization. Higher total volatility figures indicate the lack of voter 
attachment to the established parties and the presence of free-floating voters which 
can be considered by the proto-party elite as the potential support base of a possible 
new party (Lago and Martinez 2011, 8). Therefore:  
H.8: The higher the volatility rates, the less likely it is that dissident 
faction will retreat 
 
This study uses Pedersen formula for calculating volatility. Total volatility 
is calculated by first taking the absolute difference between the percentage of votes 
won in the elections and the percentage won in the previous elections by a particular 
party and summing this value for all parties. The value obtained is then divided by 
two to yield total volatility (Siaroff, 2000: 32).  
Dissident deputies might also find it easy to exit when the host party’s 
viability decreases (Heller and Mershon 2003; Miskin 2003, 11). This decrease 
might be a consequence of a government crisis, corruption scandals, economic 
crisis or international developments (Harmel and Robertson 1985; Hug 2001; 
Lucardie 2000). Else, in the case of polities where voters vote for the party leader 
rather than the party name, developments related to the party leader might decrease 
the viability of the host party.  
The viability of a possible new party and the host party can be measured by 
public polling. However, since public polling was unavailable to Turkey before the 
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1977 elections, political entrepreneurs could use the one-third senate renewal and 
local elections to assess support to the host party12. Due to this, this study will use 
public polling results if available, and the election results to assess the value of the 
host party. Additionally, voter turnout rates will be used for assessing the viability 
of a new party. Lower turnout rates might indicate electoral market failure (Lago 
and Martinez 2011, 12), anti-party sentiments (Lewis 2001, 545), and voters’ 
discontent with established parties (Krouwel and Bosch 2004, 7) or even the system 
of governance (Lyons and Linek 2010, 393). These might signal to the proto-party 
elite that it is the right time to form their own parties to attract dissatisfied voters. 
Therefore:  
H.9: The higher the turnout rates, the more likely it is that the 
dissidents will retreat.  
3.3.4. Departure: Splinter Party Formation versus Infiltration 
Once the dissidents depart from the parent organization, they have four 
options. They might abandon politics, remain independent for a while with the hope 
that their demands will be reconsidered by the host party leadership, infiltrate into 
an ideologically neighboring party that welcomes the dissidents or form a new 
political party to represent the issues which they believed were underrepresented 
                                                 
 
12 The first pre-election study was conducted in 1977 by Üstün Ergüder and Selçuk Özgediz funded 
by the daily Hürriyet. The findings were published by Ergüder in 1980 (Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu 
2007, 167).  
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by the parent organization (Berrington 1985). Although individual party members 
might simply abandon politics, this is less likely for members of a dissenting 
faction. This is due to the fact that they have a unifying theme to be realized 
(Boucek 2002, 459). Hence, they have three main options (Turan, İba, and Zarakol 
2005, 19).  
The first option, resign and remain independent, is mostly a preliminary step 
to the formation of a new party. That is, resigned deputies mostly wait for the echoes 
of their exit in the host party with the hope that their departure would trigger 
discontent of a larger section of the host party. During this wait-and-see period, they 
are less likely to engage in publicized negotiations with another established party 
since such an act will not be welcomed by dissidents’ remaining sympathizers. 
However, once they realize that they will no more influence developments in the 
host party, they will either search for dialogue with the existing parties or start to 
work on new party formation (Turan 1985, 24).  
Negotiations with a target party depend on a few factors. Firstly, deputies 
are likely to switch to established parties to ideologically neighboring parties 
(Berrington 1985, 442; Desposato 1997, 5; Heller and Mershon 2003). Hence, there 
should be a target party which is closer to the dissidents in terms of their policy 
goals. Secondly, this target party should be an electorally viable one so that 
investing on this party can increase the dissidents’ chance for future payoffs 
(Desposato 1997, 2). Finally, a penetration of the dissidents to the target party 
should enhance expectations of the target party members (Laver and Benoit 2003, 
216). 
99 
Infiltration into an established party is a viable alternative since the 
dissidents can benefit from the brand name of the target party if the target party has 
proven its viability (Berrington 1985, 456). However, there are various obstacles. 
For the dissidents, submission to discipline of the target party will bring new 
uncertainties. Since the dissident faction will be an outsider, it will be hard for the 
members of the dissenting faction to get into the narrow circle around the target 
party leader. This implies the persistent political inefficacy of the departed faction 
in the target party. Besides, even if they could reach for an agreement on allocation 
of certain ruling seats and nominations in coming elections, the extent to which this 
agreement will be realized is far from certain. This is because of the fact that they 
might lose their positions in the coming national Congress of the target party. 
Unless the dissenting faction is not accompanied by an important number of 
supporters that will also penetrate into the target party and that will maintain re-
election of their patrons to ruling offices of the target party, their political career 
will depend on the mercy of the target party’s delegates. Hence, departed dissidents 
will be less likely to merge into a target party. 
In addition to the possible uncertainties after the merge, we might state three 
more reasons for the unwillingness of the dissident faction to merge with the target 
party. Firstly, switching to even an ideologically close party is likely to be regarded 
negatively by the constituencies of the switching dissidents (Miskin 2003, 5).  
Secondly, if the dissident faction has enough seats to act as a veto player in the 
formation of government, as in the case of fragmented party systems, dissidents 
will receive more office payoffs by new party formation rather than submitting 
themselves to the benevolence of target party (Boucek 2002, 463; Turan 2003, 157). 
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If the entry costs are low and the electoral market is permissive, then the dissidents 
might receive more payoffs by forming a new party than joining an established one. 
Due to these, if the electoral system sustains proportional distribution of the seats 
and if there is a perceived demand for a new party, then departed dissidents will be 
more likely to form a new party.  
There are also various obstacles for the target party leadership to welcome 
the dissenting faction. First of all, the penetration of the dissenting faction to the 
target party should increase target party membership’s expectations. If the target 
party holds a majority of the parliamentary seats, then it will be less likely to 
welcome the new comers (Laver and Benoit 2003). On the other hand, if the arrival 
of the dissidents increase collective payoffs such as government formation, it is 
likely that the target party will welcome the departed dissidents. However, the need 
of the target party for the departed dissidents will increase the bargaining power of 
the dissidents. The departed dissidents will be more likely to demand higher payoffs 
than their proportion. This, in turn, will lead to a deadlock in the negotiation 
process.  
More importantly, infiltration of the dissenting faction into the target party 
will bring additional beneficiaries to the fixed payoffs. During the negotiations, the 
dissenting faction will demand a certain number of ruling seats so that they can 
influence the policy-making process and guarantee their nominations in the coming 
elections. This, in turn, will trigger discontent of the existing believers and 
careerists of the target party who believe that they should receive a larger amount 
of payoffs in return for their loyalty. In this sense, the target party will be prone to 
conflict over the arrival of the new comers. To the extent that the target party 
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leadership is autonomous from existing factions within the target party, it can 
handle the possible dissatisfaction after the arrival of the new comers. 
Paradoxically, the autonomy of the target party leader impedes the penetration 
option since leaders of both the dissenting faction and the target party will try to 
develop particular interests in the perpetuation of their positions (Turan 2003, 157). 
Due to these obstacles, the penetration option will mostly be an unattractive option.  
3.4.Conclusion 
This chapter was an attempt to provide answers to four questions:  
1. Why does dissent within a host party occurs? 
2. What are possible options for dissenting faction and party leadership? 
3. What are the major determinants influencing the ways that competing 
factions opt for? 
4. Why does the dissident faction, after its departure from the host party, opt 
for forming a new party rather than joining a target party? 
We have firstly provided definitions of political parties and factions. We 
have also dealt with different motivations that parties provide for different party 
members. Next, we have provided a model of splinter party formation that occurs 
in three stages: dissent, intraparty conflict and departure. During the first stage, 
dissent is latent and might be caused by a leadership succession crisis, a distribution 
of selective benefits, conflict over party change and conflict over coalition 
formation. The second stage is the stage where dissent is manifested in the form of 
either voice or exit. The way that dissent is manifested and the reaction of the party 
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leadership to dissent depends on a number of endogenous and exogenous factors. 
We have argued that party split was initiated by the dissenting faction and that it is 
likely for dissident faction to depart from the host party when its demands are not 
accommodated. The final stage starts with a wait-and-see period and ends with 
either infiltration or new party formation. The latter option is likely due to 
uncertainties in the event that the dissidents penetrate into an ideologically 
neighboring party, i.e. target party, and due to the decreases in payoffs to be 
distributed by target party leadership in the case of infiltration.  
The theoretical explanations for explaining the entrance of genuinely new 
and splinter parties to the political market that were presented in the previous 
chapter relate to the behavior of political entrepreneurs to the ‘problem push’ and 
the ‘opportunity pull’ surrounding the proto-party elite. While this work does not 
underestimate the importance of social, political and institutional factors in shaping 
the preferences and strategies of the proto-party elite, it differs from these works in 
three ways. Firstly, since one cannot speak of party split without dealing with the 
role played by the factions of any kind, it introduces factions into the scope of 
analysis. Secondly, it underlines the differences between the genuinely new and the 
splinter parties and emphasizes the importance of the intraparty dimension of 
politics in splinter party entrance. Within this context, it presents some hypotheses 
to be tested for understanding the response of the party leader to the demands voiced 
by the dissidents. Finally, acknowledging that not all the factionalized parties are 
prone to party splits, this work underlines the importance of the strategies and the 
preferences of competing factions in understanding party splits.    
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CHAPTER IV 
 PARTY SPLITS AND SPLINTER PARTIES IN THE 1950s 
Single party authoritarianism that characterized the early years of the 
Turkish Republic was replaced with multipartysim with the decision of the 
authoritarian incumbents for regime liberalization in 194513. From the formation of 
the first opposition party in 1945 to the first free elections in 1950, both the ruling 
incumbents and the main opposition party gave birth to new parties. Demand for 
reform within the ruling Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) 
ended with the expulsion of the reformists and the formation of the Democrat Party 
(Demokrat Parti-DP), the main opposition party during the liberalization period 
(Lewis 1951, 321)14. Following the split of the DP from the CHP, both the ruling 
                                                 
 
13 For a review of the reasons behind liberalization of the regime, see Albayrak (2004, 18–42); 
Karaömerlioğlu (2006).  
14 For details on the formation of the DP, see Albayrak (2004, 43–62); Aydemir (2000, 109–121); 
VanderLippe (2005, 115–120); Yalman (1970, 31–39).  
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CHP and the DP were fragmented into the moderate and radical factions15. The DP 
gave birth to the Nation Party (Millet Partisi-MP) in 1948 as a consequence of the 
conflict over the main opposition party’s relations with the authoritarian 
incumbents during the liberalization of the regime16. Once democracy became “the 
only game in town” with the 1950 elections, albeit for a limited period, the DP was 
faced with two more splits. First, the attempts of the party in central office to 
intervene in the administration of the DP Seyhan provincial branch and exclusion 
of the nationalists from the DP ended up with the resignation of five deputies who 
formed the Peasants’ Party (Köylü Partisi-KP) in 1952 (Ağaoğlu 1972, 74). Next, 
the discontent of the liberal deputies with the antidemocratic measures and poor 
economic performance of the DP government resulted in another split in the 
governing DP, which ended up with the formation of the Freedom Party (Hürriyet 
Partisi-HP) in 1955. The split that ended with the formation of the KP was a local 
incident but the split that ended with the formation of the HP was a more important 
development that shocked the DP leadership. Both splits were unexpected due to 
the electoral system, which converted votes to seats disproportionally.  
The HP was formed in late 1955 by 26 deputies that split from the governing 
DP. Conflict within the DP was closely related with the deteriorating economic 
                                                 
 
15 For more on the factionalism in the CHP during the liberalization of the regime, see Bila (1999, 
123–131); Kili (1976, 96–100); VanderLippe (2005, 165–167; 171–174).  
16 For details about the intraparty conflict in the DP and formation of the Nation Party, see Ağaoğlu 
(2002); VanderLippe (2005, 174–176); Yalman (1970, 126–128) 
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performance and the DP leadership’s failure to meet its promises for further 
democratization of the regime. The conflict became manifest when a group of DP 
deputies initiated the legislation for the right to proof (Ispat Hakkı). The DP 
leadership’s response to the dissident faction was the expulsion of the leaders of the 
faction, seeking a vote of confidence and promising to accommodate some of their 
demands. The leadership of the dissident faction who were purged from the DP 
prior to the fourth national congress of the DP first waited for the developments 
within the DP. DP leader Menderes reconfirmed the legitimacy of his leadership. 
Yet, he was shocked by a second wave of dissent over the riots in Istanbul known 
as the ‘6-7 September Incidents’. Due to the revolt of the remaining dissidents at 
the parliamentary group, Menderes stepped back. In return, the fourth Menderes 
government received a vote of confidence. Once the government was formed, the 
leading dissidents, who had expected that the remaining dissidents at the DP group 
would joined them, formed the HP (Figure 7).  
Figure 7: Analytical Narrative of Split within the DP  
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This chapter deals with the intraparty conflict in the governing party that 
ended with the formation of the HP. It will start with the detailed analysis of the 
dissent in the DP parliamentary group. Next, the strategies developed by the 
dissenting liberals and the party leader’s responses will be given in details. Finally, 
the endogenous and exogenous factors conditioning the decisions of the conflicting 
factions will be analyzed.  
4.1.Reasons of Dissent 
Dissent within the DP that ended with the formation of the HP stemmed 
from the policy distance between the liberal promises of the DP and the actual 
authoritarian measures of the DP government, and the government’s failure to 
manage the economy that ended with an economic downturn in the mid-1950s.  
As in the case of the second and third wave democracies, it was the 
intentions of various social groups to overthrow the authoritarian incumbents and 
the DP’s promises for more freedom from the oppression of the state that led to the 
victory of the party in the 1950 elections. However, similar to these examples, the 
victory of the opposition eroded its unity and paved the way for disunity. The DP’s 
overwhelming victories in the 1950 and the 1954 elections led the DP leadership to 
conclude that the DP was the real representative of the ‘national will’ (Demirel 
2011, 151). They believed that the people would not vote for the DP if the party had 
alienated the nation (Ahmad 2003, 110). Besides, the economic boom until the 1954 
elections and the machine politics helped the DP overcome social discontent. 
Hence, despite its liberal promises, the DP did not further democratize the regime 
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but leaned on the institutional design that the party had inherited from the single-
party regime.  
Following the 1954 elections, the government first introduced measures that 
would work to the advantage of the government. Hence, the electoral law (Law No. 
5545, dated February 16, 1950) was amended with the Law No. 6428 (dated June 
30, 1954). The amendment brought four novelties. Firstly, a candidate rejected by 
any party could not stand for another party in subsequent elections. With this 
amendment, the DP aimed to prevent the candidates that the DP rejected to join the 
ranks of the opposition parties. Secondly, the state officers that would run as 
candidates were required to resign six months prior to elections. Hence, the 
bureaucrats who had traditionally supported the CHP would be deterred from 
running in elections given that their re-appointment was determined by the 
government (Toker 1991, 27–28). Thirdly, political parties were forbidden from 
putting forward joint lists so that the opposition parties could not unite against the 
DP. Finally, the state radio would no more be used for electoral purposes. The 
implication of this amendment was the limitation of the usage of the radio only to 
the governing party (Eroğul 1970, 115; Sarıbay 1991, 126).  
The DP government also increased its hold over the bureaucracy. The 
bureaucracy’s autonomy from the executive branch was curtailed with the law that 
empowered the government to retire civil servants, including university professors 
and judges, who either had twenty-five years’ service or were over sixty (Dodanlı 
2007, 89; Sarıbay 1991, 126). Later, a new law enabling the government to dismiss 
any civil servant was passed (Eroğul 1970, 117). Moreover, the government 
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restricted the autonomy of universities by authorizing the Ministry of National 
Education with the right to dismiss academicians (Eroğul 1970, 117). 
But, more importantly, the DP tightened the press law. Prior to the 1954 
elections, a new Press Law that increased the maximum penalty for spreading 
inaccurate information calculated to endanger the political and economic stability 
of the country was passed (Lewis 1974, 146). Additionally, journalists were denied 
the right to prove what they published in case they were tried. Restrictions over 
freedom of the press led to the deterioration of relationship between Menderes and 
some prominent journalists, who had been demanding a liberal democratic order 
(Başar 1956, 21; Nutku 1979, 258). It was the introduction of these anti-democratic 
laws that alienated the liberal intelligentsia, which had supported the DP for its 
liberal promises (Başar 1956, 61; Karakuş 1977, 219–221; Nutku 1979, 300).  
Hence, the liberals of the DP concluded that the DP had changed during the 
chairmanship of Menderes.  
In addition to the distance between the liberal promises of the DP in 
opposition and the actual measures of the Menderes governments, the economic 
policies of the Menderes governments constituted another source of opposition. 
Once in government, the DP began a period of deficit financing for rapid 
industrialization, heavy construction of infrastructure and expansion of agricultural 
production (Simpson 1965, 144). The agricultural sector was considered by the DP 
government as the driving force of economic development. Hence, cheap farm 
credits, import of agricultural machinery, distribution of state-owned lands, 
subsidies for agricultural goods, and virtual tax exemption for farmers were 
introduced to promote the development of the agricultural sector (Ahmad 2003, 
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115–116; Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 76–79; Zürcher 2004, 224). The mechanization of 
agriculture and contingent developments such as US financial and technical 
assistance, increased demands to Turkish agricultural exports and good weather 
conditions led to a sharp increase in the incomes of the agricultural sector, the 
backbone of the DP (Eroğul 1970, 98; Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 81). Additionally, the DP 
government invested in infrastructure to facilitate the export of agricultural goods 
and to exchange votes for government services (Ahmad 2003, 115; Simpson 1965, 
147). The consequence of these policies was the support of the agriculture sector to 
the DP (Bulutay and Yıldırım 1969, 12).  
The DP government also promoted the development of the private sector. 
The Industrial Development Bank was founded by the government in order to 
facilitate long-term internal and external credits and technical assistance to the 
private sector (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 70). However, the DP efforts in this 
direction “were of a nature to foster not the spirit of entrepreneurship but rather the 
spirit of profit” (Başar 1956, 34–39; Buğra 1994, 121). That is, the private sector 
did not invest in productive enterprises due to unstable conditions and high risks 
attached to capital ventures. Rather, the private sector concentrated their investment 
on speculative real estate and service sector and profited from contracting with the 
state (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 70–71; Buğra 1994, 123; Simpson 1965, 149). The 
DP government also kept the Turkish lira overvalued. This made the import of 
goods extremely profitable for the private sector as long as the government issued 
import licenses (Ahmad 2003, 116). The consequences of these policies were close 
relations between some of the businessmen and the politicians, rumors about wealth 
accommodation through illicit deals with politicians, illicit deals in the allocation 
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of import licenses, and abuse in the allocation of public funds (Buğra 1994, 122–
124). Denial of the right to proof exaggerated these rumors. 
Figure 8: Economic Indicators (1950-1956)    
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from TÜİK (2009). Economic Growth indicates yearly change in 
Gross National Product (GNP). Inflation indicates yearly change in GNP Deflator. 
 
By 1954, the economy began to show signs of stagnation (Figure 8). The 
side effect of the DP’s rapid economic development policies was increasing 
inflation, foreign trade deficit and difficulties in the payment of a gigantic foreign 
debt (Eroğul 1970, 120; Simpson 1965, 146). Moreover, agricultural production fell 
and problems on importing capital goods and spare parts started (Ahmad 2003, 
116). The DP government first asked for more foreign loans but the US government 
rejected the demand (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 72). Although the devaluation of the 
overvalued Turkish lira was the cure to economic problems, the DP government 
was worried about the political impact that devaluation would have (Simpson 1965, 
148). Hence, the government turned to short-term high interest credits while trying 
to stop inflation through direct controls of prices and profits with the Law for 
Regulating Profits and the National Defense Law (Altunışık and Tür 2005, 72; 
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black market, shortages and a marked distortion of the price structure (Kalaycıoğlu 
2005, 82; Simpson 1965, 148). It was within this context that the first wave of 
conflict within the DP parliamentary group came to the fore.  
4.2.Intraparty Conflict 
Dissent within the DP group was manifested when eleven DP deputies issued a 
motion for enabling journalists the right to prove the truth of what they had written 
in case they were taken to court (Karpat 1961, 438; Zürcher 2004, 231)17. The 
motion known as the ‘right to proof’ received public attraction due to the trial of 
the journalists publishing the rumors of corruption about a prominent DP minister, 
Mükerrem Sarol (Baban 1970, 182–183; Karakuş 1977, 371; Sarol 1983, 247; 
Toker 1991, 105–106; Yalman 1970, 327). The debate over the proposal marked 
the summer of 1955 and the number of signatories increased to 19.  
                                                 
 
17 During the First and the Second Menderes cabinets, the DP group was also prone to conflicts. 
Dissent within the cabinet was manifested in the form of individual resignations. Hence, Avni 
Başman, Muhlis Ete, Nihat Reşat Belger, Refik Şevket İnce, Halil Ayan, Nihat İyriboz, Zühtü 
Velibeşe, Fahri Belen, Feyzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu, and Enver Güreli, resigned from the first and 
second Menderes cabinets (Karakuş 1977, 198; Öymen 2009, 59). The DP group was also 
dissatisfied with the Menderes cabinets. Dissident deputies showed their dissent by abstaining from 
vote of confidence. Despite the fact that the DP group had 408 members, the first and the second 
Menderes governments were able to receive 245 and 244 votes during the voting at the DP group, 
respectively. 163 and 97 DP deputies did not participate in the group meeting on the government 
program respectively. When the first and second Menderes government programs came to the 
assembly floor, 126 and 73 DP deputies abstained from voting of the government programs, 
respectively. Finally, during the voting of the second Menderes cabinet, 61 DP members voted 
against at the DP group. These 61 deputies were known as the Atmış Birler or as the Yaylacılar 
(Ağaoğlu 1967, 146; Çakmak 2008, 158).  
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In the initial stage of the conflict, the DP leadership did not consider the 
dissent as a threatening one (Sarol, 1983:  482). However, the insistence of the 
dissident deputies that became known as İspatçılar or Onbirler and the support of 
journalists to their cause signaled to Menderes the seriousness of dissent (Toker 
1991, 109). More importantly, the support of Feyzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu and 
Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, who were highly influential in the party, alarmed the DP 
chair and led him to perceive that his leadership had been debated (Toker 1991, 
110).  
The issue of the right to proof came to the agenda of the DP parliamentary 
group once again in October 1955. Two members of the General Administrative 
Council (GAC), the highest decision-making organ of the DP after the General 
Congress, signed the motion (Çakmak 2008, 161). In order to prevent a challenge 
posed by the İspatçılar at the coming congress, the DP GAC terminated the 
membership of these two members and declared that they would not be allowed to 
attend the fourth Congress (Sarol 1983, 484; Toker 1991, 156). Besides, the DP 
Ethics Committee demanded the 19 parliamentarians to submit their defense to the 
Party Council (Sütçü 2011, 171). In its declaration, the Committee regarded the 
İspatçılar as a “defeatist group who spoiled the solidarity within the party and 
whose only political capital was the right to proof” (Özçetin 2004, 71). In order to 
divide the dissidents, the Committee expelled nine of them, and asked the others to 
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withdraw their proposal (Karakuş 1977, 295)18. However, they did not retreat and 
resigned (Çakmak 2008, 162)19.  
The İspatçılar first waited for the 4th DP congress (Bozdağ 1975, 52). Prior 
to the Congress, Menderes demanded the resignation of Sarol in order to weaken 
the opposition (Sarol 1983, 492–493). The fourth General Congress ended with the 
victory of Menderes. With the fourth congress, the DP chair retained his control 
over the party in central office. Moreover, he legitimized the expulsion with the 
Congress decision confirming the expulsions (Sarol 1983, 484)20. Next, Menderes 
curbed the support base of the İspatçılar by dismissing their supporters in local 
branches (Özçetin 2004, 73). Besides, in order to prevent further resignations and 
divide the İspatçılar, Menderes declared that they would be welcomed to the DP 
(Nutku 1979, 292). 
Although Menderes retained control over the extraparliamentary party, he 
was far from suppressing the dissident within the parliamentary party. The 
remaining dissidents who did not back the İspatçılar were disappointed with the 
inability of the government to manage the 6-7 September incidents and the 
                                                 
 
18 Purged deputies were Feyzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu, Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, Safaettin Karanakçı, 
Ragıp Karaosmanoğlu, İsmail Hakkı Akyüz, Behçet Kayaalp, Ziyaat Ebuziya, Mustafa Timur and 
Sabahaddin Çıracıoğlu.  
19 Resigned deputies were Fethi Çelikbaş, Enver Güreli, İbrahim Öktem, Raif Aybar, Şeref Kamil 
Mengü, Muhlis Bayramoğlu, Ekrem Alican, Mustafa Ekinci and Kasım Küfrevi. Seyfi Kurtbek took 
side with DP chair Menderes. The dissidents were called the Nineteens (Çakmak 2008, 153–154).  
20 For details on the fourth DP congress, see Toker (1991, 155–161). 
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mounting economic problems (Başar 1956, 99; Birand, Dündar, and Çağlı 2007, 
87; Bozdağ 1975, 47–51). They demanded the government to share information 
about the 6-7 September incidents (Karakuş 1977, 285–288)21. When Menderes 
avoided the discussion of the events, the dissident deputies challenged Menderes’s 
candidate Teyfik Ileri, and elected their candidate Burhanettin Onat as the DP group 
chair.  
Table 7: Chronology of Events (1955) 
1 May  11 DP deputies submitted the motion for the right to proof. The proposal was 
rejected by the DP group. 
6-7 September  Riots in Istanbul and Izmir 
16 September  Changes in the cabinet due to the 6-7- September incidents.  
9 October  Minister of State Mükerrem Sarol resigned due to allegation of corruption. 
15 October  9 DP deputies were expelled. 10 DP deputies resigned. 
15-18 October  Fourth DP congress ended with the victory of Menderes. 
22 October  It was published that DP executive board would make changes in executive 
boards of at least 20 provincial organizations.   
30 October  Burhanettin Onat was elected as the DP group chair against Menderes’s 
candidate Teyfik Ileri. 
4 November  Menderes called the resigned deputies to join the DP. 
19 November  The İspatçılar declared that they would form a new party  
22 November  Debates at the DP parliamentary group. 
29 November  Third Menderes government fell. Menderes asked for personal vote of 
confidence and won vote of confidence.  
2 December  Mükerrem Sarol was temporarily dismissed from the DP on the ground that he 
had violated party unity. 
5 December  President Bayar held a meeting with the DP deputies.  
8 December  Fourth Menderes cabinet was declared. 
14 December  Menderes government received vote of confidence. 398 votes were in favor of 
government program and 58 were against.  
20 December  The HP was formed 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Ahmad and Ahmad (1976). 
                                                 
 
21 The status of Cyprus emerged as a major foreign relations problem for the DP in the summer of 
1955. In order to show the international community the opposition of the Turkish people against the 
Enosis, demonstrations were held in major cities in September, 1955. However, the demonstrations 
got out of control and large-scale riots took place in Istanbul and Izmir. Following the incidents, 
Minister of Internal Affairs Namık Gedik and Minister of Defense Ethem Menderes resigned.  
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The challenge posed by the remaining dissidents within the DP led the 
resigned İspatçılar to assume that a new party would receive considerable support 
of the remaining dissident DP deputies. Besides, the İspatçılar were worried about 
Menderes’s call for the İspatçılar to return to the DP since the call could divide the 
intraparty opposition (Çakmak 2008, 154). Yet, they estimated that Menderes 
would not retreat so that the remaining dissidents within the DP would switch to a 
party formed by the İspatçılar (Nutku 1979, 298). Hence, they held a press release 
for declaring their decision to form a new party. However, things did not happen as 
expected.  
The DP group meeting met to discuss the 6-7 September incidents and 
criticized the DP government for its poor economic performance (Bozdağ 2004, 
150–151; Karakuş 1977, 298–300; Nutku 1979, 295; Sarol 1983, 460–469). The 
dissidents in the DP group presented an interpellation on the subject of inflation and 
requested the Ministers of Finance, Trade and Foreign Affairs to resign (Bozdağ 
1975, 55; Toker 1991, 172–173). Thanks to the solution proposed by a minister 
who was targeted by the dissident deputies, Mükerrem Sarol, Prime Minister 
Menderes allowed all members of cabinet to resign and sought a vote of confidence 
for himself (Aydemir 2000, 235; Toker 1991, 168; Yalman 1970, 330). The solution 
known as the ‘Sarol Formula’ worked and only nine deputies voted against 
Menderes. In the end, the third Menderes cabinet fell. 
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The new Menderes cabinet and government program was presented on the 
13th of December 195522. In order to prevent further resignations from the DP, the 
government promised to fulfill all of the demands that the dissident members had 
presented to President Bayar (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 144). These included the 
abolishment of anti-democratic laws, an amendment of the election law, the right 
to proof, the introduction of an upper house, an efficient combat against black 
marketing and inflation, the liberalization of the press law and autonomy for 
universities (Çakmak 2008, 163). Besides, President Bayar met with DP deputies 
in order to convince them to support the new Menderes Cabinet. In the end, 
although 37 DP deputies voted against the government program and seven deputies 
abstained from voting, the Fourth Menderes cabinet received a vote of confidence 
(Nutku 1979, 297). With the compromise of the party chair, the İspatçılar whose 
number had increased to 23, had nothing to expect from the DP group.  
4.2.1. Exogenous Facilitators of the Split in the DP 
Comparative studies on new party entrance highlight the importance of 
institutional factors in explaining variances across countries. New party formation 
is expected to increase under permissive institutional contexts with low spatial 
requirements and lower barriers to enter Parliament. Additionally, political 
                                                 
 
22 For details on the formation of the cabinet, see Toker (1991, 175–181). 
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entrepreneurs are expected to invest in new parties when the existing ones are not 
likely to receive much support.  However, this was not the case for the split in the 
DP.  
4.2.1.1.Entry Costs 
During the 1950s, the requirements to register officially and to appear on 
ballot were favorable for new party entrance. According to the Law on Associations 
(Law No. 3512, dated June 28, 1938), political parties could be formed without 
prior approval23. There were no monetary deposit or petition requirements to appear 
on the ballot. The 35th article of the Law on Election of Deputies (Law No. 5545, 
dated February 16, 1950) stipulated that political parties could nominate candidates 
only for provinces that the political party had formed provincial branches in (Araslı 
1972, 105). Hence, there was no spatial requirement to compete in elections.  
Although there were few requirements for new parties to compete in 
elections, they were in a disadvantageous position in terms of using state’s financial 
resources. During the 1950s, parties were not granted any subsidies (Aydın 2005, 
246). Despite the absence of public funding, the governing party was in a highly 
advantageous position since it could use governmental resources in exchange for 
                                                 
 
23 The fourth article of the Law No. 3512 (dated June 28, 1938) stipulated that prior permission of 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs was required to form a political party. With the amendment of the 
law in 1946, the prior permission requirement for political associations was repealed (Gülsoy 2007).  
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votes, thanks to the centralization of economic and administrative resources in the 
hands of the executive (Özbudun 1988, 40). Actually, during the 1950s, the 
governing party functioned as a highly effective political machine and distributed 
party patronage in the form of roads, waterways, mosques and various public works. 
The party also established close contacts with the leaders of the business 
community who were accorded special privileges with respect to licenses, contracts 
or import quotations in return for large donations to the party (Sayarı n.d., 613). 
This posed a vicious cycle for the opposition as their failure to access governmental 
resources reduced the possibility to exchange votes with goods and services (Sayarı 
n.d., 613). Moreover, the governing party could legislate to take away the assets of 
the opposition parties24. Also, the governing party could decide regarding the 
dissolution of opposition parties25. Hence, investing on a new party was a highly 
risky option.  
The opposition parties were also in a highly disadvantageous position to 
pass through the visibility filter. During the first half of the 1950s, the main political 
communication means, radio and the newspapers, were effectively used by the 
governing party (Öymen 2009, 56). Although the electoral law permitted all 
competitors to use the state-owned radio for a period of ten minutes during the 
                                                 
 
24 For example, in December 1953, the Assembly passed the Law No. 6195 (dated December 14, 
1953) for the expropriation of CHP’s all movable and immovable assets.  
25 For example, the DP group decided the temporary closure of the MP on the 8th of July 1953 
because of its use of religion for political interests. The party was banned by the judicial court on 
the 27th of January 1954. It was reconstituted as the Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi in 1954.  
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electoral campaigns, the DP amended the law in 1954 to prohibit the opposition 
from using the state radio (Aksoy 1960, 63–64)26. The DP government also 
transferred the right to distribute official advertisements, which constituted an 
important source of revenue of the dailies, to the government so that it could 
selectively reward or punish newspapers (Demirel 2011, 204; Karakuş 1977, 190–
193). Finally, the DP tightened the press law in order to punish those journalists 
criticizing the government. 
Another factor inhibiting new party entrance was the electoral system. 
According to the 13th article of the 1924 constitution, legislative elections would 
take place every four years. There was no fixed size for the legislature; provinces 
served as constituency, electing one member if its population was under 55.000 and 
one additional member for each 40.000 inhabitants (Hale 1980, 402). Although 
party ballots, candidate ballots and preference ballots were permitted, the majority 
of the electorate used party lists without amendment (Hale 1980, 402). The 
combination of the simple plurality electoral formula with the voter preference for 
party lists led the party with the majority of votes in the constituency to win nearly 
all seats per district (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 74). Under the multi-member district 
                                                 
 
26 According to the 45th article of the electoral law, parties that have nominated candidates at least 
for five provinces had the right to use the state radio. Those that had nominated candidates for more 
than twenty provinces could use the radio two times per day during the electoral campaigns. With 
the amendment of the electoral law in 1954, parties were denied the right to use the state radio for 
electoral purposes. Yet, the speeches about the acts of government were not considered as electoral 
propaganda. For statements of the DP and CHP leaders regarding the use of radio, see Aksoy (1960).  
120 
winner-take-all system, only the well-known politicians and regionally 
concentrated parties could gain access to Parliament (Hale 1980, 410).  
Table 8: Disproportionality, Fragmentation and the RRP Index (1950-1957) 
Year Parliamentary 
Fragmentation 
Index 
Effective 
Number 
of 
Electoral 
Parties 
Effective 
Number of 
Parliamentary 
Parties 
Disproportionality 
Index 
Relative 
Reduction 
in Party 
Index 
1950 0.25 2.16 1.33 30.22 41,3 
1954 0.132 2.14 1.15 34.58 48,8 
1957 0.568 2.42 1.76 20.91 30,4 
 
Source: Calculated by the author from TÜİK (2008). Parliamentary fragmentation index, the 
effective number of electoral parties and the effective number of parliamentary parties are calculated 
by the formulae proposed by Siaroff (2000). Relative reduction in party index is calculated by the 
author by the formula proposed by Boucek (2002).   
 
The most important consequence of the majoritarian electoral formula was 
the highly disproportional distribution of parliamentary seats, which worked to the 
disadvantage of minor parties (Table 8). The electoral system encouraged the search 
for electoral coalitions and party mergers. First, the CHP and the Republican Nation 
Party (Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi-CMP) and then the CHP, the HP and the CMP 
negotiated electoral coalitions before the 1954 and the 1957 elections27. Moreover, 
following the 1957 elections, the KP merged with the CMP and the latter’s name 
changed to Republican Peasants’ Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi-
CKMP) whereas the HP merged into the CHP.  
                                                 
 
27 For details on the negotiations for electoral coalition between the CMP and the CHP prior to 1954 
elections, see Toker (1991, 127). For details on the negotiations for electoral coalition between the 
CMP, CHP and the HP, see Toker (1991, 210–237).  
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Although the majoritarian electoral formula was expected to discourage 
fissiparous tendencies (Hale 1980, 410; Sayarı 2002b, 27), it did not prevent the 
rebellion of 19 DP members against Menderes’s leadership. Despite the obstacles 
for new parties to pass through the visibility filter, the absence of state funding, and 
the electoral system producing high RRP and disproportional levels, the dissident 
political entrepreneurs within the DP revolted against the DP leadership (Hale 1980, 
410). Hence, the formation of the HP invalidates our hypothesis that higher exit 
costs deter party splits.  
4.2.1.2.Viability of New Parties 
Figure 9: Indicators of the Viabilities of New Parties (1950-1957) 
 
 
Source: Computed by the author from TÜİK (2008).  
 
The split in the DP does not confirm our expectation on the relation between 
the perceived viability of the new parties and the tendency of the dissidents to split 
(Figure 9). Prior to the formation of the HP, volatility levels had been the lowest in 
the history of the Republic. Indeed, volatility increased after the DP split. 
Additionally, although turnout rates had decreased slightly, this was far from 
signaling market failure. In this sense, the split within the DP does not confirm the 
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hypothesis on the relationship between the perceived viability of new parties and 
the dissidents’ insistence on their cause.  
4.2.2. Endogenous Facilitators of the Split in the DP 
The split in the DP, despite the highly unfavorable institutional context and 
the lack of signals for the demand for a new political party, can be better understood 
with reference to the endogenous factors that enabled the party leader first to neglect 
but then to accommodate the demands of the dissident deputies.  
4.2.2.1.The Nature of Disagreement 
Disagreement within the DP was closely related with the distance between 
the promises of the DP and the actual measures employed by the DP government. 
Although the DP had promised to further democratize the country, the Menderes 
governments enacted a series of laws to curb the freedom of the opposition. From 
1950 to 1955, dissidents within the DP came to the conclusion that constitutional 
changes should be introduced so that the DP would not repeat the perceived 
mistakes made during the single-party rule (Hürriyet Partisi 1957, 47). While 
dissidents first demanded to enhance freedoms, they demanded further institutional 
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changes once they formed the HP28. Although the DP programme promised to fulfill 
some of these demands, the remaining institutional demands were not found in the 
party programme29. Actually, the DP chair was against the unrestricted freedom of 
press and the proportional electoral system since the former “would be harmful to 
the democratic order” (Sütçü 2011, 169) and the latter would result in coalitions 
and consequent political instability (Ağaoğlu 1972, 63; Kocamemi and Ayberk 
1958, 46). Although the fourth Menderes government had promised to fulfill the 
remaining demands of the dissidents that were parallel to the principles stated in the 
HP party program, the prior performance of the Menderes governments led the 
departed dissidents to conclude that the government programme was not reliable. 
Finally, the DP leadership believed that they represented the national will since the 
electorate had voted for the DP despite the authoritarian measures they were blamed 
for (Ahmad 2003, 110; Bozdağ 2006, 39). The majoritarian understanding of 
democracy on the part of the DP leader was not acceptable for the liberal İspatçılar 
who perceived themselves as the ‘idealists’ of the DP (Bozdağ 1975, 54; Nutku 
1979, 306) and who believed that the DP was not only responsible for the emanation 
of the national will but also for the protection of fundamental freedoms (Hürriyet 
                                                 
 
28 Among these institutional changes were the amendment of antidemocratic laws, a proportional 
electoral system, the introduction of bicameralism and the Constitutional Court, autonomy for 
universities, the establishment of a non-partisan administration, freedom of press and guarantees for 
the protection of civil liberties (Hürriyet Partisi 1956, 68–76). 
29 The DP program emphasized the importance of the autonomy of universities (article 39), 
establishment of non-partisan administration (article 19), protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms (article 8), and removal of the laws that violated the fundamental rights and freedoms 
(article 8) (Demokrat Parti 1952). 
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Partisi 1956, 68). Given that the dissidents did not believe in the sincerity of 
Menderes regarding the institutional reforms, the intraparty conflict within the DP 
was hard to resolve.  
4.2.2.2.Relative Power of Competing Factions across Different Layers of Party 
Organization 
The party leadership is less likely to accommodate the dissenting faction’s 
demands if the dissidents do not hold a considerable number of seats in the 
parliamentary party, party on the ground and/or party in central office. The case 
was no different for the DP. The DP group won 503 of the 541 seats in Parliament 
in the 1954 elections and the number of dissident deputies who had proposed the 
law on right to proof was only 19. Besides, the dissidents had only two seats in the 
DP GAC, which was composed of 15 members, including the party chair30. Finally, 
the dissidents did not have considerable support from the party on the ground. The 
declaration of Menderes about the rearrangement of provincial executive boards in 
20 provinces might be interpreted as a sign that the opposition was strong in these 
provinces (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 142). However, given the fact that the 20th 
article of the DP bylaw enabled the GAC to dismiss members of the local executive 
boards, the intraparty opposition could not rely on provincial branches (Kabasakal 
                                                 
 
30 These two GAC members were Feyzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu and Fethi Çelikbaş. Karaosmanoğlu 
received 760 out of 871 delegates and Çelikbaş received just 338 votes at the third DP congress.  
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1991, 205). Besides, the confirmation of the expulsion of the İspatçılar at the fourth 
Congress revealed that the DP leader was highly influential over Congress 
delegates. In short, the dissidents could not rely on the extraparliamentary party for 
voicing their demands. As such, the DP chair could easily neglect the demands of 
the opposition. 
When the second wave of discontent hit the DP leadership in November 
1955, Menderes chose to accommodate the dissidents’ demands. This was due to 
the fact that the remaining dissidents had a considerable number of seats in the DP 
group as indicated by the election of dissident’s candidate as DP group chair. 
Although the DP leadership’s candidate for TBMM spokesman, Refik Koraltan, 
had received 193 votes, the dissidents’ candidate, Fahri Belen, got 147 votes. 
Hence, the fourth Menderes government promised to fulfill the demands of the 
remaining dissidents in order to avoid them switching to a new party that would be 
formed by the İspatçılar. The support of 341 deputies to the fourth Menderes 
cabinet against the 44 DP deputies, which voted against the government or 
abstained, revealed that the İspatçılar had no chance to ‘purify’ the DP.  
With respect to its mechanics, the 1950s conforms to the basic 
characteristics of two-party systems with a high ratio of two-party vote and seat 
concentration, and low level of support to the third parties (Özbudun 1981, 230, 
2011, 59; Sayarı 2002b, 11). Moreover, deep-rooted rivalries, feuds or competition 
for supremacy between the opposing factions at local level contributed to a 
crystallization of voter alignments and the institutionalization of the two-party 
system (Sayarı n.d., 605–606). However, when the criterion of control over 
governmental power rather than the party number is used, the Turkish party system 
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during the 1950s falls into the category of a ‘predominant party system’ in which 
“the same party wins, over time, an absolute majority of seats (not necessarily of 
votes) in Parliament” (Sartori 2005, 173; Sayarı 1978, 44–45). Besides, the indexes 
of parliamentary fragmentation and effective number of parliamentary parties 
reveal that the electoral system produced a predominant party system in Parliament. 
Hence, Menderes did not accommodate demands of the İspatçılar until the second 
wave of intraparty revolt.   
4.2.2.3.Leadership Autonomy 
In the first decade of the 20th century, Michels (2001, 135) stated that “in 
virtue of the democratic nature of his election, the leader of a democratic 
organization has more right than the born leader of the aristocracy to regard himself 
as the emanation of the collective will, and therefore to demand obedience and 
submission to his personal will”. Hence, party leaders that are elected by more 
inclusive election methods can easily neglect dissidents’ demands since a directly 
elected party leader can retain high legitimacy.  
A more inclusive leadership selection method and consequent leadership 
autonomy from the factional pressures led the DP chair to neglect the demands of 
the dissidents. According to the 17th article of the DP bylaw, Congress delegates 
that were elected at the provincial congresses were responsible for the election of 
the party leader, and the members of the General Administrative Council and the 
Disciplinary Boards (Demokrat Parti 1952). Not only the direct election of the party 
leadership by the congress delegates but also the victory of the DP in 1954 elections 
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retained Menderes’s legitimacy. The DP received 58.4% of the total eligible votes 
and won 503 seats in 1954 elections. Such a great majority led Menderes to perceive 
himself and the DP as the representative of the national will, for which he alone 
held himself responsible (Baban 1970, 178; Demirel 2011, 264; Toker 1991, 112). 
Hence, he could legitimize the authoritarian measures introduced to suppress 
intraparty opposition and the opposition party with reference to the electoral victory 
and to the leadership selection methods. As such, the DP leader could neglect 
demands of the İspatçılar.  
4.3.Formation of the HP  
Once it became clear that the dissident İspatçılar had no room within the 
DP, they started to work on a new party. The selection of a new party formation 
path stemmed from the HP leadership’s overestimation of their support and the 
enmity between the DP and the CHP. Firstly, the HP leadership was in the idea that 
once a ‘genuinely democratic’ party was formed, the remaining dissidents within 
the DP would switch to their party as the Menderes cabinet would not fulfill its 
promises. They were expecting that at least 100 and at most 168 DP deputies would 
switch to their parties (Simav 1975, 50). Besides, the HP leadership was in the idea 
that they would win 33% of the votes and 203 seats in the next elections (Kocamemi 
and Ayberk 1958, 86). However, the increase of the seats held by the HP from 26 
in December 1955 to 36 in January 1956 invalidated the HP leaders’ expectation 
(Nutku 1979, 301).  
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Secondly, cooperation with the leader of the CHP, who was blamed for the 
single-party regime, was unlikely since such a strategy would challenge their claim 
that they were the true democrats, given that the memories of the authoritarian CHP 
rule were still fresh (Özçetin 2004, 91; Toker 1991, 182–183). Indeed, the HP 
leadership was in the idea that the CHP ceased to be a viable opposition party 
(Simav 1975, 20). It was only after the adaptation of the demands of the HP for 
institutional changes by the CHP in 1956 that the policy distance between the HP 
and the CHP decreased (Kili 1976, 118; Bila 1999, 172). On the other hand, 
infiltration into the CMP was an unviable option since the electoral history of the 
MP/CMP had revealed that the party was not a viable one31. In the end, the HP was 
formed on 20th of December, 1955.  
4.4.Conclusions 
The analysis provided above reveals the importance of endogenous factors 
in understanding party splits. Firstly, the dissidents and the party leader disagreed 
upon the fundamentals of the party’s policies. Though the party leader believed that 
the party’s primary goal was the emanation of the national will, the dissidents 
believed that the party should be responsible for enhancing freedoms. Secondly, the 
lack of support to the dissidents at the party on the ground led the party chair to 
                                                 
 
31 The MP/CMP received 4.6%, 5.3% and 6.5%, of the votes in 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections, 
respectively. 
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easily neglect their demands. Additionally, the predominant party system decreased 
the bargaining power of the dissidents. Finally, the autonomy of the party leader 
from the factions made it easy for Menderes to expel the dissidents. Hence, despite 
the high entry costs and low viability of new parties, the dissidents of the DP had 
to depart from the parent organization due to the exclusionary measures of the party 
leader.  
The analysis above also reveals that a party split is a dynamic process. 
Although the DP leader was reluctant to meet the demands of the İspatçılar at first, 
he accommodated the demands voiced by the remaining dissidents parallel to the 
demands of the İspatçılar when they challenged the Prime Minister. This was due 
to the fact that the remaining dissidents had a considerable number of seats in the 
DP Parliamentary Group and they could use the vote of confidence as a strategic 
tool to enforce their demands. When their demands were met by the DP leadership, 
the remaining dissidents did not prefer to switch to a new party. This was 
unanticipated by the İspatçılar, who were in the idea that a considerable number of 
deputies would join them once they formed the new party. In this sense, while the 
expectations about the potential defections from the parliamentary group might lead 
the proto-party elite to form a new party, the strategies of the leadership of the 
parent organization might prevent their expectations to come true. Due to this, the 
dynamic nature of the factional competition should be underlined in the study of 
party splits.        
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CHAPTER V 
PARTY SPLITS AND SPLINTER PARTIES IN THE 1960s 
On 27 May 1960, a group of low ranking officers put an end to the Democrat 
Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) rule. The transient government ruled the country until 
the convening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet 
Meclisi-TBMM) on 25th of October, 196132. Although the officers had declared that 
the so-called 27 May Revolution did not target any party or groups, the leaders and 
the deputies of the DP were imprisoned and were banned from politics33. This was 
followed by the dissolution of the DP on the ground that the party had not convened 
its regular convention (Gençkaya 1998, 166)34. The dissolution of the DP and the 
                                                 
 
32 For more on the military rule between 1960 and 1961, see Giritlioğlu (1965, 170–216); Güngör 
(1992, 17–58); Weiker (1963) 
33 The military incumbents incorporated an article to the new constitution in order to purge the 
imprisoned DP leaders from politics. The 68th article of the 1961 constitution stipulated that persons 
who had been sentenced to imprisonment for more than five years were not eligible for election even 
if such persons have been pardoned. 
34 For more on dissolution of the DP, see Özbey (1961). For more on the Yassıada trials, see, Weiker 
(1963, 25–47).  
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imprisonment of DP leaders left an artificial political vacuum to be filled by new 
parties with new political entrepreneurs that would otherwise remain outside 
politics (Ahmad 2003, 138). Some of the former members of the Freedom Party 
(Hürriyet Partisi-HP) formed the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi-YTP), 
whereas the DP on the ground united around the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP). 
Parties of the 1950s were prone to splits in the 1960s. Conflict within the 
Republican Peasants’ and Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi-CKMP) 
over the party’s stance towards the coalition with the Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) ended `with the resignation of the party chair and 
the re-opening of the Nation Party (Millet Partisi-MP) in 1962 (Abadan-Unat 1966, 
184)35. Opponents of the left-of-center in the CHP formed the Reliance Party 
(Güven Partisi-GP) as a reaction to the perceived contamination from the left. Next, 
conflicts over the stance of the CHP towards the military-imposed governments 
after the 1971 memorandum and disagreements over the limits of the ‘left-of-
center’ ended with the formation of the Republican Party (Cumhuriyetçi Parti-CP) 
in 197236. On the other hand, although the AP had come first in the 1969 elections, 
deputies who were disturbed by the increasing control of the AP chair over the party 
formed the Democratic Party (Demokratik Parti-DkP) in 1970. From the critical 
                                                 
 
35 For the history of the Nation Party, see Pancaroğlu (2006).  
36 For details on intraparty conflict that ended with the formation of the CP, see Bakşık (2009, 298–
387); Bila (1999, 236–266); Cılızoğlu (1987); Ecevit (1972); Kili (1976, 267–337); Neftçi (1997); 
Satır (1972) 
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realignment elections of 1973 to the next military intervention in 1980, no party 
splits occurred despite the prevalence of permissive conditions for new party 
entrance. 
This chapter deals with intraparty conflicts in the two mainstream parties, 
the CHP and the AP that ended with the formation of the GP and the DkP, 
respectively. The chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, since the institutional, 
political and social factors conditioning the dissident factions did not significantly 
change between the two splits in 1967 and 1970, the exogenous factors are analyzed 
in detail. Secondly, a detailed analysis of the three stages and the role of endogenous 
factors in explaining splits within the cases are presented. This part starts with the 
presentation of the reasons of the dissent within the CHP and continues with the 
analysis of the strategies and preferences of the competing factions and the role of 
endogenous factors in shaping these preferences. Next, the split within the AP is 
analyzed in the same order. 
5.1.Exogenous Factors of Party Splits in the 1960s 
Prior to the initial elections, a new electoral law and Constitution was 
enacted. The new institutional design provided fertile ground for new party entrance 
by decreasing disproportionality. Additionally, the ban on the Democrat Party 
provided suitable conditions for new party entrance. Below we examine the external 
environment shaping the preferences of competing factions.  
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5.1.1. Entry Costs 
The electoral law enacted prior to the initial elections in 1961 increased the 
spatial requirements compared to the 1950s. Similar to the case of the 1950s, there 
were no monetary or petition requirements for political parties to appear on the 
ballot. However, compared to the previous electoral law, the new Law on Election 
of Deputies (Law No. 306, dated May 25, 1961) stipulated that only parties that had 
established their province and sub-province branches in at least 15 provinces six 
months before the elections or had parliamentary group were eligible to register for 
the ballot with the condition that they convened their respective general congresses. 
Hence, if the dissidents could pass the ten seat threshold that was required to form 
a parliamentary group, they could override the spatial requirement and appear on 
the ballot with no additional costs37. 
Nevertheless, new parties were in a more advantageous position in terms of 
protection from arbitrary government decisions, such as passing through the 
visibility filter and benefiting from public funding. The new constitution made the 
dissolution of political parties more difficult. Unlike the 1950s during which the 
political parties could be dissolved by the Cabinet or ordinary courts, only the 
                                                 
 
37 10th article of the Law No. 306 (dated, May 25, 1961) stipulated that parties that held their 
executive committee meeting, that organized at least in the 15 of 67 provinces six months before the 
elections took place, and that nominated candidates for all seats available in these 15 provincial 
electoral districts were eligible to register to the ballot. The article was amended with the Law No. 
533 (dated February 13, 1965). With the amendment, new parties with parliamentary groups were 
exempted from the spatial requirements (Araslı 1972, 108).  
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Constitutional Court could deliver the verdict to dissolve political parties in the new 
Republic. In this way, political entrepreneurs were relatively freer from the 
governing party’s interventions. 
One of the important novelties brought by the new Political Parties Law 
(PPL) (Law No. 648, dated July 13, 1965) was the introduction of public funding 
for political parties. 74th article of the PPL stipulated that parties that received 5% 
of the votes in former elections were eligible to receive public funding38. As such, 
although splinter parties could not benefit from public funding until they entered 
the next elections, they could gain the right to public funding if they win 5% of the 
votes or at least ten seats. Given the absence of national thresholds and the 
introduction of proportional representation, minor parties could easily benefit from 
public funding. Hence, the costs of new party formation decreased. 
Finally, new parties were in a more advantageous position in terms of 
gaining access to the state media compared to the 1950s. The 1961 constitution 
retained the state monopoly over the radio and television broadcasting, granted 
autonomy to the State Radio and Television Corporation and relatively freed the 
                                                 
 
38 The Political Parties’ Law (PPL) was amended in 1968 in order to provide public funding for 
splinter parties. However, the amendment was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 
1969. In return, the PPL was amended in 1970 in order to provide funding for parties that received 
more than 5% of the votes in previous elections. This time, the Court found any state subsidies as 
unconstitutional in respect of substance. Due to this, the parties agreed on a constitutional change. 
The only splinter party that benefited from public funding without participating in elections was the 
GP (Aydın 2005, 248; Perinçek 1968, 56). With the constitutional amendment in 1971, political 
parties that received at least 5% of the total eligible votes or that won at least ten seats had the right 
to public funds.  
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institution from government interferences (Weiker 1981, 171). More importantly, 
the 52nd article of the Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voters’ 
Registrations (Law No. 298, dated April 26, 1961) guaranteed access of political 
parties to the state-owned radio, one of the main media of electioneering in the 
1960s. As such, it became easier for new parties to pass through the visibility filter. 
Table 9: Electoral System for the National Assembly in the Second Republic 
 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 
Term  4 years 4 years 4 years 4 years 4 years 
Electoral 
formula 
D’Hondt  
with 
district-
level quota 
D’Hondt  with 
national 
remainder 
Classical 
D’Hondt  
Classical 
D’Hondt  
Classical 
D’Hondt  
District 
Magnitude 
1-31 1-31 1-33 1-38 1-44 
Ballot 
structure 
Separate 
ballots/ 
Open list 
Combined ballot 
paper/ 
Closed list 
Combined 
ballot paper/ 
Closed list 
Combined 
ballot paper 
Open list 
Combined 
ballot paper/ 
Open list 
Candidate 
nominations 
Central 
office 
quota 
(10%) 
Primaries (95%) 
+central office 
quota (5%+1/3 
of national 
remainder) 
Primaries 
(95%) 
+central 
office quota 
(5%) 
Primaries 
(95%) 
+central 
office quota 
(5%) 
Primaries 
(95%) 
+central 
office quota 
(5%) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Kalaycıoğlu (2002, 64); TBMM (1982); Tuncer (2003). 
 
The military regime significantly changed the institutional design within 
which the political parties operated (Table 9). The 1961 Constitution maintained 
the supremacy of Parliament but introduced a second chamber, a demand voiced by 
the opposition parties in the 1950s. According to the new constitution, the TBMM 
was composed of two houses: the National Assembly (Millet Meclisi-MM) and the 
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Senate of Republic (Cumhutiyet Senatosu)39. The MM, the lower house to which 
the government was responsible consisted of 450 deputies that were elected for a 
four-year term. Each province was taken as a provincial election district and the 
number of deputies to be elected was assigned in relation to the constituent unit’s 
population (Hale 1972, 394). Although the new electoral system did not bring any 
legal threshold, the candidates had to receive votes more than the constituency 
threshold that changed according to district magnitude (Türk 1993, 21). Open list 
ballots were used for 1961, 1973 and 1977 elections though voters refrained from 
using preferential voting40.  
The new electoral system posed a challenge to party cohesion in two ways. 
Firstly, competition for the realistic positions started41. Under the multimember 
district majoritarian electoral system of the 1950s, the rank of the candidate in the 
party list was not much important since all candidates could be elected if the party 
won a plurality in a constituency. However, with the introduction of the 
proportional system in the 1960s, the importance of realistic position increased, 
since there could be winners from multiple parties in the same electoral district. 
Hence, whether a candidate was at the first or the second position in the party list 
                                                 
 
39 The MM shared its legislation power with the Senate but could override the veto of the Senate. 
According to the 92nd article of the constitution, if a bill was approved by the lower house but 
rejected by the Senate, the former had the right to enact the law if it exceeded the percentage that 
the Senate rejected the bill.  
40 Only four candidates in two provinces was elected with preferential voting in 1973 whereas 
voters did not change lists proposed by parties in 1961 and 1977 elections (E. Tuncer 2003, 133). 
41 Realistic positions include all positions or districts that are seen as winnable before the elections 
(Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 14).  
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influenced his/her electoral fortune. Consequently, the competition for these 
positions increased (Araslı 1972, 69). More importantly, the introduction of the 
primaries intensified factional conflict for nominations. As will be demonstrated 
below, this was one of the main reasons of factional conflict in the AP. 
Table 10: Disproportionality, Fragmentation and RRP Index, (1961-1977) 
Year Parliamentary 
Fragmentation 
Effective 
Number of 
Electoral 
Parties 
Effective 
Number of 
Parliamentary 
Parties 
Disproportionality 
Index 
Relative 
Reduction 
in Party 
Index 
1961 0.694 3.40 3.26 2.80 4.12 
1965 0.619 2.71 2.62 2.98 3.32 
1969 0.574 3.33 2.35 14.72 29.43 
1973 0.699 4.31 3.32 11.12 22.97 
1977 0.595 3.13 2.47 11.03 21.09 
 
Source: Computed by the author from TÜİK (2008). Disproportionality, parliamentary 
fragmentation, the effective number of electoral parties and the effective number of parliamentary 
parties are calculated by the formulae proposed by Siaroff (2000). Relative reduction in party index 
is calculated by the author by the formula proposed by Boucek (2002). 
Secondly, and more importantly, the shift from a majoritarian to 
proportional electoral system decreased entry costs. The new electoral law (Law 
No. 306, dated May 25, 1961) which brought the D’Hondt electoral formula for 
allocation of the MM seats produced more proportional vote-to-seat conversion 
(Table 10)42. Given the fact that both the disproportionality and the relative 
reduction in party index decreased significantly compared to the 1950s, dissident 
deputies were more likely to be re-elected in case they formed splinter parties (Hale 
1980, 411). Hence, the lower entry costs provided dissident deputies more 
                                                 
 
42 The electoral system was amended in 1965. With the amendment, constituency threshold was 
abolished in favor of national remainder system which worked to the advantage of the smaller parties 
(TBMM 1982, 104; Türk 1993, 21). Following the 1965 elections, the AP majority in the parliament 
re-introduced the D’Hondt system for elections to the TBMM (TBMM 1982, 109).  
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bargaining power in their conflict with the established party leadership (Sayarı 
2002b, 12).  
On the other hand, the proportional electoral system indirectly increased the 
viability of new parties since the system paved the way for coalition governments 
which increased the bargaining power of minor parties, including the splinter ones, 
in coalition-formation (Ayata and Ayata 2001, 91; Hale 1980, 411; Sayarı 2002b, 
27). By entering into coalitions, these minor parties could gain access to state 
resources for distributing them to their clients. However, despite the multiparty 
system after the 1973 elections, which increased the benefits to be obtained by 
forming splinter parties, party splits did not occur between 1973 and 1980. This 
shows that the proportional electoral systems or the multiparty systems are not 
sufficient for encouraging party splits on their own.  
5.1.2. Viability of New Parties 
The perceived viability of new parties is likely to facilitate the entrance of 
new parties either formed by dissident entrepreneurs of the existing parties or by 
those with no relation to the established parties (Tavits 2006). Party splits and 
splinter party formation are expected to be more frequent in the subsequent 
elections in uninstitutionalized party systems with high levels of volatility and 
during periods when there is a trend of decreasing turnout rate (Lago and Martinez 
2011; Tavits 2007). 
An analysis of the Turkish case reveals that turnout rates significantly 
decreased after the military intervention (Figure 10). With the exception of the 1961 
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elections, all elections held during the Second Republic had lower turnout rates 
compared to the majoritarian elections of the 1950s. Scholars explained this 
difference with reference to four reasons: deinstitutionalization of party system due 
to the ban on the DP (Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu 2007, 18); replacement of the 
mobilized voting with autonomous voting behavior during the phase of 
modernization (Özbudun and Tachau 1975, 470–471; Özbudun 1976), the degree 
of polarization (Hale 1980, 411) and the frequency of elections (Weiker 1981, 143). 
Figure 10: Indicators of Viability of New and Established Parties (1961-1977) 
 
 
Source: Computed by the author from TÜİK (2008)43.  
 
The frequency of party splits and new party entrance and the trend of 
decreasing turnout rate until the 1973 elections confirm our expectation that party 
splits are more likely to occur when the turnout rates are in a trend of decrease. 
During the period, the mainstream parties were prone to party splits. However, 
                                                 
 
43 Disparities between the total volatility values we have calculated and the values calculated by 
other scholars such as Hazama (2007) and Tosun (1999) stem from the fact that we have taken the 
AP as a genuinely new party, whereas Tosun (1999), Siaroff (2000) and Sayarı (1978) have taken it 
as continuation of the DP. Hazama (2007) and Özbudun (2000) have omitted 1961 elections. Similar 
to Siaroff (2000), we included the 1961 elections into analysis in order to demonstrate the effects of 
military interventions on the voter preferences. 
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when the turnout rate entered a pace of increase with the 1973 elections, no splits 
occurred even though factionalism was persistent in some parties such the CHP 
(Bila 2009, 279–289). Indeed, the increase in turnout trend was accompanied by 
fusions. For example, rather than using their coalition potential, dissident members 
of the AP, who had formed their parties, returned back to the parent organization in 
1975 (Bozdağ 1975, 120–123). In this sense, although the 1980 military 
intervention prevents us from making further generalizations, the relationship 
between turnout rate and dissidents’ insistence on their demands seems to be 
validated.  
Electoral volatility, which is an important indicator of the degree of party 
system institutionalization, is expected to influence calculations of the dissident 
party members before their departure from the host party. Volatility is significant 
for party splits since it signals to ambitious dissidents the existence of a floating 
voter base that may vote in case they form a party of their own. However, the 
relationship between volatility and party split is not straightforward. The increase 
in the supply of new parties due to party splits might increase total volatility. On 
the other hand, political entrepreneurs might interpret the high levels of volatility 
as the signal of a free floating voter base that might support a new party so that they 
might be more likely to depart from the host party. In this sense, there is a 
tautological relationship between the total volatility and new party entrance 
(Krouwel and Bosch 2004; Lago and Martinez 2011). 
The tautological relationship between volatility and new party entrance is 
evident in the case of the post-1960 Turkish party system. High levels of volatility 
during the 1960s stemmed from the dissolution of the DP and the fragmentation of 
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the right. When the DP was dissolved, former DP voters mostly voted for the AP, 
and to a less extent, the YTP, CKMP and later the MP. The success of the AP in 
capturing the DP votes in 1965 elections at the expense of the YTP contributed to 
electoral volatility in 1965 elections. On the other hand, the downward trend of 
volatility was reversed in the1973 elections due to the split in the AP and the 
entrance of the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP) as a genuinely new 
competitor on the right. Hence, it was the increase in the supply of new parties and 
the support of voters for these right-wing parties that led to an increase in volatility 
levels in the 1973 elections.  
Nevertheless, the deinstitutionalization of the Turkish party system with the 
military intervention in 1960 contributed to the rise of a floating voter base whose 
demands could be answered by splinter or genuinely new parties. This is especially 
true in the case of the formation of the DkP that received the blessing of the former 
Democrats who withdrew their support from the AP chair due to the latter’s 
reluctance to meet the former’s demands for the restoration of their political rghts44. 
                                                 
 
44 Once they were released, the former Democrats who were supported by the dissidents of the AP 
demanded the restoration of their political rights (Karpat 2004, 59). The fourth General Congress of 
the AP decided to amend the constitution in order to restore the political rights of the released 
Democrats. Besides, the CHP proposed to amend the 68th article of the constitution, which acted as 
a barrier for the Democrats’ political rights (Birand, Dündar, and Çaplı 1994, 156). Yet, under the 
pressures of the President and the military, the AP Senate Group referred the proposal back to the 
commission (Sakallıoğlu 1993, 79; Uraz 1970, 50–75). In return, former President Bayar called the 
former DP voters not to vote for any party in the 1969 elections (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 374). 
Bayar’s call and the decrease in turnout rates coincided. On the other hand, once the DkP was 
formed, Bayar took part in the electoral campaigns of the DkP and called for voters to vote for the 
DkP (Bilgiç 2002, 232; Bozdağ 1975, 106). This time, the DP leader’s support to the DkP concurred 
with the support of the 11.9% of the voters to the DkP. 
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On the other hand, the dissidents of the CHP probably believed that the classes 
which they believed had been alienated from the party due to changes in the policy 
orientation of the CHP could be attracted by a new party. In this sense, the dissidents 
in both the AP and the CHP hoped to receive the votes of the voters who were 
dissatisfied with the performance of the parties that they had voted for in previous 
elections.  
It should be also noted that the high levels of volatility did not encourage 
dissidents to form their own parties after the 1973 elections. In this sense, though 
volatility provides us with clues about the entrance of new parties formed by 
dissidents until the1973 elections, the extent to which volatility rates prepared the 
ground for new party entrance after the 1973 elections is far from clear.  
In addition to the electoral indicators presented above, party splits might be 
a consequence of the poor economic performance of the governing parties. The 
inability of the governing party to deal with economic difficulties might trigger 
intraparty conflict. Moreover, such a situation might also decrease the viability and 
potential electoral support for the governing party in coming elections. This, in turn, 
decreases the benefits to be obtained by the dissenting faction from remaining in 
the governing party. Consequently, the dissenting members might be likely to 
depart from the ruling party. 
The expectation stated above is not confirmed (Figure 11). The AP, which 
governed the country from 1965 until the 12 March 1971 memorandum had a 
positive economic performance. Despite this, the AP was prone to fission in 1970. 
In the case of the CHP, the party had been prone to intense factional strife starting 
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with 1976. The tension in the party reached its peak when the Third Ecevit 
government failed to deal with economic problems in 1979 (Bila 2009, 284). 
Despite this, the CHP did not split. In this sense, the economic performance of the 
governing party seems not to contribute to party splits.  
Figure 11: Economic Indicators (1962-1980) 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from TÜİK (2009). Economic growth indicates the yearly change 
in Gross National Product (GNP). Inflation indicates the yearly change in the GNP Deflator. 
Averages for each legislative term are taken. Average for the period 1972-1973 is taken 
independently since the military had imposed above-party governments. 
 
In short, the new institutional design decreased disproportionality and 
enabled minor parties, including newly formed splinter parties to benefit from the 
state-owned radio broadcasts and public funding. Such a permissive institutional 
context decreased the costs of entry and encouraged party splits and new party 
formations in the 1960s. However, the absence of party splits despite the enduring 
institutional permissiveness and persistent factionalism in the second half of the 
1970s shows that institutional facilitators are not solely responsible for party splits.  
In addition to this, the downward trend in voter turnout rate seems to be 
associated with party splits in the 1960s. Especially, as will be dealt below, 
dissatisfaction of the former DP members with the AP leadership seems to play an 
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important role for the low turnout rates in 1969 elections. Moreover, the increase in 
volatility due to the military intervention seems to have pave the ground until the 
1973 elections but not after that. Finally, unlike the case of the DP, in which the 
economic performance of the government played an important role in triggering 
intraparty conflict, the AP experienced party split even though the government had 
a positive economic performance.  
Although these institutional and contextual variables are influential over the 
strategies developed by competing factions, party split is also a consequence of 
endogenous variables, including the nature of disagreement, the relative power of 
competing factions and leadership autonomy. The following part will deal with the 
analytical narratives of the party splits in two mainstream parties, namely the CHP 
and the AP, and analyze the endogenous factors facilitating party split and splinter 
party formation. 
5.2.Intraparty Conflict over Party Change: Split in the CHP and Formation of 
the Reliance Party, 1967 
The split within the CHP, which ended with the formation of the GP, was a 
consequence of the party’s veteran leader Ismet İnönü’s attempt to define the CHP 
as left-of-center. İnönü was suspicious of the ambitions of the conservative faction; 
hence, he allied with the reformist faction known as the New Movement. The defeat 
of the CHP in the 1965 elections provoked factional conflict that ended with the 
split in 1967. The New Movement gained the control of the ruling offices at the 
1966 Congress, thanks to the support of party chair. The opponents of left-of-center, 
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who were of the idea that the left-of-center slogan was the prime reason behind the 
electoral defeat in the 1965 elections, publicized the intraparty conflict and 
demanded the party chair to stop supporting the reformist faction. Although İnönü 
tried to balance the conflicting factions at first, he then traded party unity for party 
cohesion. Hence, he called the extraordinary congresses to convene in order to stop 
the dichotomy between the parliamentary and extraparliamentary parties. That 
ended with the defection of the dissident conservatives and the formation of the GP 
(Figure 12).  
Figure 12: Analytical Narrative of the Split within the CHP 
 
 
5.2.1. Dissent 
Dissent in the CHP was closely related to the veteran CHP leader’s support 
for the rising New Movement, which advocated the party’s move to the left-of-
center. Starting in the mid-1950s, the CHP had started to pay attention to 
socioeconomic issues (Karpat 2004, 114). However, during the 1950s, the party 
was mainly concerned with institutional changes such as the introduction of 
bicameralism and proportional representation. When these demands were met with 
146 
the 1961 Constitution, the salience of socioeconomic issues increased. 
Simultaneously, the rise of the Turkish Labor Party with its capable and articulate 
leaders and the debates of leftist intellectuals who had organized around the journals 
of Yön, Özgür İnsan and Forum in the first half of the 1960s found its reflection in 
the debates on the party’s policy position (Ayata 2002, 103; Kili 1976, 211; 
Özbudun 1981, 231; Zürcher 2004, 237). It was within this context that the party’s 
stance on the new issues was debated at the Party Assembly in 1962 (Sağlamer 
1974, 170). During the meeting, a group of Party Assembly members  stated that 
the CHP could no more claim to represent the interests of all social classes after the 
introduction of proportional electoral system and that the party had to abandon its 
reliance on local notables (Koloğlu 2000, 71). Against this, the conservatives stated 
that there was no need for reforming the CHP and argued that the demands voiced 
by the reformers would be a clear violation of Ataturk’s legacy (Simav 1975, 78–
84). Nevertheless, the conflict over party change was postponed until the 1965 
elections. 
Prior to the 1965 elections, the CHP had already started to change. The 17th 
Congress held in 1964 concluded that the ideals stated in ‘Primary Aims 
Declaration’ and ‘Principal Targets’ had been realized. Therefore, a new phase 
called ‘the Progressive Turkey Ideal’ started (Tachau 1991, 107). Next, the electoral 
manifesto for the 1965 elections was prepared by representatives of both the 
conservatives and the reformers (Altuğ 2001, 138). The electoral manifesto of the 
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CHP included promises that signaled the party’s move towards the left45. Finally, 
in the June of 1965, the CHP chair Ismet İnönü stated that the CHP as an etatist 
party could be located at the left of center (Bila 1999, 214). 
Figure 13: Electoral Performance of the CHP (1950-1977) 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from TÜİK (2008). 
 
The 1965 election results constitute an example of what Janda et al (1995) 
defined as ‘calamitous elections’. The CHP came the second with its votes declining 
to their lowest level since 1950 (Figure 13). More importantly, the victory of the 
AP just five years after the military intervention was perceived as a ‘counter-
revolution through the ballot’ (Arcayürek 1992, 13). The consequences of electoral 
defeat for the CHP were twofold. Firstly, as will be shown in detail below, the 
                                                 
 
45 In its electoral program, the CHP promised tax and land reforms, general health insurance, 
nationalization of the strategically important mining industries, state regulation over the oil industry, 
state-private sector partnership for industrialization, elimination of the regulations that challenge the 
development of national industry, promotion of the establishment of cooperatives and participation 
of labor to the management of state-owned enterprises (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1965). 
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factional conflict over party change intensified. Secondly, the factions and their 
leaders became clearer. 
The left-of-center slogan and the 1965 electoral results divided the CHP into 
two main factions: the reformers and the conservatives. The reformers, known also 
as the ‘left-of-center movement’ (Ortanın Solu Hareketi) or the ‘New Movement’ 
(Yeni Hareket), argued that the CHP had to acknowledge class conflicts and 
abandon representing the landed interests and the conservative notables46. They 
pointed out the party’s relationship with the notables as the prime reason behind the 
electoral defeat in 1965 (Toker 1993, 88). Prior to the elections, Turhan Feyzioğlu 
and Nihat Erim were considered as the natural leaders of the movement (Neftçi 
1997, 91; Sağlamer 1974, 175). However, following the electoral defeat, Feyzioğlu 
took side with the conservatives, whereas Erim chose to remain neutral (Koloğlu 
2001, 302). Those who demanded party change asked Bülent Ecevit for the 
leadership of the New Movement (Koloğlu 2000, 78). Ecevit welcomed the call 
with the permission of İnönü and became the leader of the New Movement (Akar 
and Dündar 2008, 118; Altuğ 2001, 138). 
Until the 1965 elections, conservatives were headed by Ferit Melen. 
Following the elections, Turhan Feyzioğlu, who was once considered as the leader 
                                                 
 
46 The New Movement was composed of three groups (Toker 1993, 79). First were the deputies 
that were recruited during the 1950s which demanded more voice. Second were the academicians 
who would later be known as the Mülkiye Junta (Mülkiye Cuntası). Finally, the Marxists of the CHP 
advocated the left-of-center positioning of the CHP (Akar and Dündar 2008, 119; Altuğ 2001, 132). 
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of the reformers became the spokesmen of the conservatives (Koloğlu 2001, 302). 
Unlike the New Movement, which adopted a self-ascribed name, the conservatives 
did not adopt a clear name. Rather they were labeled by the press as the Seventy-
Six (Yetmişaltılar) or the Eights (Sekizler) and by the CHP leader as ‘right-wing’ 
(Emre 2007, 109). Against the New Movement, the opponents of party change were 
of the idea that the left-of-center indicated a party change, which was unnecessary 
and against Kemalist principles (Bila 1999, 218; Koloğlu 2001, 131). Hence, they 
demanded the party leader to abandon the left-of-center policy. 
Leadership succession constituted another dimension of dissent. The CHP 
chair İnönü was born in 1884 and was at the age of 81 in 1965. Following the 1965 
elections, he held a series of bilateral meetings with the leading CHP politicians. In 
the end, İnönü reached the conclusion that the conservatives and Feyzioğlu posed a 
threat to his leadership (Aykan 2003, 203; Bakşık 2009, 229; Cılızoğlu 1987, 85). 
Among the leading CHP members, Ecevit was perceived as the least ambitious 
politician by İnönü (Altuğ 2001, 71)47. Hence, starting with the 1965 elections, 
İnönü supported Ecevit while trying to preserve the balance of power among 
factions. 
                                                 
 
47 It was not only Inonu but also opponents of Ecevit that welcomed his leadership to the new 
movement. According to Nihat Erim and Turhan Feyzioğlu, two important competitors of Ecevit, 
Ecevit would not pose a threat their influence over the party administration (Altuğ 2001, 71; Koloğlu 
2000, 78; Sağlamer 1974, 234).   
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5.2.2. Intraparty Conflict 
Following the 1965 elections, the conflict within the CHP revolved around 
the relationship between the slogan of the left-of-center and the electoral defeat 
(Abadan-Unat 1966, 161). A group of party members were of the idea that the use 
of the left-of-center slogan was a mistake. Others argued that it was the association 
of the left-of-center with communism that alienated the masses (Bila 1999, 218). 
More importantly, the conservatives argued that the emphasis on land reform 
alienated the conservative notables, the traditional support base of the CHP (Toker 
1993, 88). Against this, the representatives of the rising reformist faction argued 
that it was the alliance with the conservative notables that constituted the obstacle 
to the success of the CHP (Toker 1993, 88). İnönü first opted for a compromise 
between the competing factions. The CHP did not use the slogan left-of-center in 
the 1966 senate one-third renewal elections. Although the Party Assembly and the 
CHP Parliamentary Group issued declarations that confirmed the party’s policy 
position, the party’s opposition to socialism was underlined in order to find a middle 
way between the competing factions (Koloğlu 2001, 297; Sağlamer 1974, 199). 
However, with the CHP’s defeat in the 1966 by-elections, the conflict between the 
factions intensified (Toker 1993, 78). 
The dissident right wing first used party platforms in order to voice dissent 
(Sağlamer 1974, 199). This was followed by the memorandum of 76 deputies who 
demanded the CHP leader to declare that the left-of-center slogan alienated masses 
from the CHP (Bozkır 2007, 276). The dissidents also competed with the New 
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Movement at the 18th general congress. However, they lost the competition with the 
New Movement over the Party Assembly, hence the party in central office48. 
Table 11: Chronology of Events (1965-1967) 
10 October 1965 1965 elections were held. The AP won a majority of seats and votes.  
19-21 November 1965  The influence of left-of-center slogan over the CHP’s defeat was 
debated at the CHP parliamentary group. 
5 June 1966 Senate one-third renewal elections. CHP avoided using the term left-
of-center. 
10 June 1966 The CHP group confirmed the left-of-center policy. 
4 August 1966 76 deputies demanded İnönü to declare that left-of-center slogan 
alienated masses from the CHP 
9-12 August 1966 The Party Assembly meeting confirmed that CHP was located at the 
left-of-center. 
24 September 1966 In the Istanbul provincial congress, İnönü warned that the dissidents 
would lose their seats in case they insist on their opposition to party 
policies. 
14 October 1966 The book “Left-of-Center” written by Ecevit was published.  
18 October 1966 18th General Congress convened. The New Movement won 23 out of 
43 seats of the Party Assembly. Conservative faction won eight seats. 
October 1966 The Party Assembly elected Ecevit as secretary general. 
31 December 1966 The Party Assembly declared the CHP’s adherence to the left-of-
center. Eight members opposed the declaration.  
2 January 1967 Dissidents published a booklet claiming that Ecevit was attempting to 
turn the CHP into a socialist party. 
8 January 1967 The Central Executive Committee accused the eight of being in 
collaboration with the opponents of the CHP.  
9-11 January 1967 The Conflict between Ecevit and Feyzioğlu intensified.  
25 January 1967 The CHP group meeting convened with the demand of dissidents. 84 
of the deputies voted in favor of the existing group executive board. 
4 February 1967 Provincial chairs declared their support to Ecevit. 
15 March 1967 The Central Executive Committee demanded the expulsion of the 
eight dissidents but the parliamentary group rejected the demand. 
16 March 1967 İnönü called for extraordinary Congress to convene 
28 April 1967 4th Extraordinary Congress convened. The congress decided to adopt 
changes demanded by the chair. 33 deputies and 15 senators 
resigned. 
12 May 1967 The Reliance Party was formed. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Ahmad and Ahmad (1976); Emre (2007). 
                                                 
 
48 Party Assembly was the highest decision-making body of the CHP. It was composed of the chair, 
chairs of the women and the youth branches and 40 members elected at the General Congress. The 
Assembly was responsible for administrating the party between two general congresses and for 
taking any decisions on behalf of the party with the exception of changing party bylaw and deciding 
on party dissolution. Moreover, the Assembly had the right to select and dismiss the secretary 
general and the members of the Central Executive Committee. 
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Following the 18th General Congress, the CHP was torn into two competing 
organs: the parliamentary group supported the conservatives, whereas the New 
Movement held the majority at the party in central office (Karakaya 2008, 338). 
Dissidents competed with the New Movement for the control of the group executive 
boards and maintained the election of their leaders to the group executive boards 
even though the party chair was against this (Erim 2006, 840). They also continued 
to voice their opposition at the Party Assembly meetings. During the Party 
Assembly meeting in December 1966, they criticized the secretary general for his 
ambitions to turn the CHP into a socialist party (Emre 2007, 130). They also 
opposed the Party Assembly resolution and demanded the incorporation of the 
statement “the CHP was not a socialist party and would not be a socialist party”, a 
statement made by İnönü and issued as a Congress resolution at the 18th General 
Congress. However, this was rejected by the New Movement. Following the 
publication of the debates in Ulus, the daily of the CHP, the dissidents issued a 
communique accusing the party administration for violating the party programme 
and the electoral manifesto (Emre 2007, 131). Next, they published a booklet 
accusing the secretary general Ecevit for his alleged ambition to turn the CHP into 
a socialist party (Kili 1976, 233–234). Besides, despite the opposition of the party 
in public office, the dissidents called for the CHP MM group meeting in order to 
seek for vote of confidence from the parliamentary groups. 88 deputies participated 
and the parliamentary group executive board, which was held by the dissidents, 
received the support of 84 deputies (Bektaş 1993, 80; Neftçi 1997, 108). Following 
the Party Assembly meeting on the 15th of March, 1967, the dissidents issued a 
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memorandum accusing Ecevit and the New Movement of an inclination towards 
socialism (Emre 2007, 134–135). 
Before dealing with the CHP leader İnönü’s response to the dissenting 
conservatives, a few points should be mentioned. Firstly, the CHP leader İnönü 
traditionally discovered fresh talents and supported them against prominent CHP 
politicians in order to protect his leadership (Toker 1993, 83–85). During the course 
of liberalization in 1945, İnönü first gave his support to Nihat Erim and the 
moderates in their competition with the hardliner prime minister Recep Peker (Bila 
1999, 136). During the confrontation between secretary general Kasım Gülek and 
the party chair İnönü in the 1950s, the latter discovered a new talent, Turhan 
Feyzioğlu, as a potential leader against Gülek (Toker 1993, 87). Once Feyzioğlu 
lost his reliability during the CHP coalitions in the first half of the 1960s, İnönü 
encouraged Minister of Labor Bülent Ecevit for the leadership to the reformist wing 
of the party. Finally, in his confrontation with the secretary general Ecevit during 
the 12 March period, İnönü supported Kemal Satır against Ecevit (Kurt 2002, 64). 
Secondly, İnönü conventionally traded party cohesion for party unity (Heper 
1999, 136). The demands of the four CHP deputies for intraparty reform ended with 
İnönü’s speech openly calling on them to form a new party in 1945 (Bila 1999, 
110). Moreover, İnönü challenged the dissident faction at general or extraordinary 
congresses and relied on his charisma and consequent impact over Congress 
delegates. In order to purge Kasım Gülek from the CHP, İnönü called the delegates 
of the 15th General Congress to choose either him or Gülek (Bila 1999, 189). The 
situation was not different in the later factional conflicts. When he wanted to 
remove the conservatives, he competed with them at the fourth extraordinary 
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Congress and persuaded delegates to support Ecevit. Finally, when he decided that 
he could no longer work with the New Movement, he challenged the faction at the 
fifth extraordinary Congress (Arcayürek 2006, 63). 
During the conflict between the conservatives and the New Movement, the 
CHP leader supported the latter while trying to keep the party united. İnönü 
constantly declared his support to the left-of-center and warned its opponents that 
they would lose their positions in the CHP at provincial congresses (Ecevit 1966, 
67; Kili 1976, 224). Although the candidates of the New Movement were not well-
known by Congress delegates, the Movement could succeed in winning 23 of 43 
Party Assembly seats with the support of İnönü (Altuğ 2001, 147). Though İnönü 
was in favor of the election of a moderate figure that would not provoke the 
conservatives, Bülent Ecevit, was elected as the secretary general by the Party 
Assembly49. From then onwards, Ecevit held the second important seat in the 
party50. 
When the confrontation became public in the late 1966, İnönü retained his 
support for the New Movement. In reaction to Feyzioğlu’s attempt to seek the 
support of the parliamentary board, İnönü called for the minor congress to convene. 
                                                 
 
49 Inonu was in favor of election of a moderate politician that would be also welcomed by the 
conservatives, Kemal Satır as secretary general. However, Ecevit insisted on holding the office. 
Ecevit was also supported by Satır and Nihat Erim. In the end, Ecevit received 31 votes out of 43 
members of the Party Assembly and was elected as secretary general (Altuğ 2001, 147; Bakşık 2009, 
236; Sağlamer 1974, 223).  
50 The secretary general was the leader of the Central Administrative Committee. The members of 
the Committee and secretary general were elected by the Party Assembly among its members.  
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During the Congress, İnönü stated that he did not want to work with the leading 
dissidents (Bozkurt 1969, 118; Kili 1976, 235). This was followed by the Party 
Assembly meeting on the 15th of March, 1967. Following the meeting, the Central 
Executive Committee called the Parliamentary Group Board of Discipline to punish 
the dissidents. However, the disciplinary board members took side with the 
conservatives and refused the demand of the party in central office (Özbudun 1968, 
229). Failing to discipline the dissident eights, İnönü concluded that they should be 
expelled. Hence, he called the extraordinary congress to convene in order to amend 
the party bylaw to authorize the Party Assembly to refer its members to disciplinary 
boards.  
The fourth Extraordinary General Congress convened on the 28th of April, 
1967. During his speech at the opening of the congress, İnönü stated that the 
conservatives overrode the authority of the extraparliamentary party by publicly 
declaring their opposition to the decisions taken at the General Congress, Party 
Assembly meetings and the provincial chairs’ meetings (İnönü 1967, 7). For İnönü, 
the harmony between the extraparliamentary and parliamentary parties had been 
broken. İnönü stated that he was responsible for maintaining the harmony between 
these two parts of the party so that the party bylaw should be amended to empower 
the party chair to perform his duty. In the end, Congress decided for the 
amendments in the party bylaw to authorize the Party Assembly with the right to 
refer Party Assembly members to the Higher Board of Discipline (Kili 1976, 237). 
In order to prevent huge scale resignations, İnönü declared that only the eight Party 
Assembly members would be referred to disciplinary board (İnönü 1967, 21–22). 
Despite this, 33 deputies and 15 senators resigned from the CHP, criticizing the 
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CHP leader for promoting socialists and for violating the authority of the deputies 
(Karakaya 2008, 332–333). In response, the CHP Party Assembly accused them of 
attempting to rule the parliamentary party as a separate party, for publicizing the 
conflict and charged them with treason against the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 
1968, 9–10).   
5.2.3. Endogenous Factors of Party Split 
Although the institutional design was highly permissive for the entrance of 
splinter parties, the decision of the dissidents to depart from the CHP was more a 
result of the neglect of their demands by the party chair. This was due to the 
ideological nature of factional disagreement, the weakness of the dissidents in the 
extraparliamentary party and the existence of a highly autonomous and charismatic 
leader that took part with the New Movement.  
5.2.3.1.The Nature of Disagreement 
Intraparty conflict in the CHP was to a most extent ideological and revolved 
around two main points. The first point of disagreement was the relationship 
between the role of the left-of-center slogan and the CHP’s defeat in 1965 elections. 
According to the conservatives, the ordinary Turkish citizen had a distaste of the 
word ‘left’. Hence, the redefinition of the party’s position as the left-of-center ended 
with the electoral defeat in 1965 elections (Toker 1993, 88). This argument was 
opposed both by the party chair and the secretary general. The CHP chair argued 
that the party members’ support to the left-of-center invalidated the conservatives’ 
157 
claims (İnönü 1967, 10). In a similar vein, Ecevit (1966, 42) argued that the Turkish 
people were already at the left-of-center with their belief in democracy, equality 
and social justice. The problem for Ecevit was not about the left-of-center, but with 
the CHP’s failure to deliver its message to the masses. 
Secondly, factions disagreed on the relationship between the left-of-center 
and party change. The conservatives argued that the left-of-center indicated a 
change in the party’s policy position. They believed that this was a subversion of 
the party’s original ideology, Kemalism (Karakaya 2008, 332–334). They were in 
the idea that the New Movement had a hidden agenda to convert the CHP into a 
socialist party in the long run (Karakaya 2008, 331). Against them, both İnönü and 
Ecevit claimed that the left-of-center did not refer to a change in party policies; 
rather it was a redefinition of the party line with the concepts that had become 
popular. As İnönü (cited in Emre 2007, 81) states: 
While our country is developing, I wish to define the terms ‘leftist’, 
‘rightist’ that is used in the current civilization in economic and 
political terms. We were saying the same thing while we were statist 
for 40 years. I said we are on the left-of-center for this reason. In fact 
we have been on the left-of-center since we said we are secular… 
You become on the left-of-center if you are on the left-of-center. But 
you do not mess with someone else’s religion conviction. You do not 
make them communist or create insecurity. You are reformist. You 
are not a conservative. Your constitution stands on the social basis. 
You adopt social justice. 
 
In a similar vein, Ecevit (1966, 68) stated that the left-of-center was a 
movement that stemmed from the party’s original ideology. According to the CHP 
chair and the secretary general, the left-of-center was a short definition of the 
Kemalist principles of populism, etatism and reformism (Ecevit 1966, 64–65; İnönü 
158 
1967, 9). This need stemmed from the enactment of a reformist constitution and the 
changing social needs brought by the modernization process (Bila 1999, 215; Ecevit 
1966, 13).  
Both İnönü and Ecevit rejected the claim that the left-of-center indicated the 
first step of the transformation of the CHP into a socialist party (İnönü 1967, 9). For 
İnönü, the left-of-center was different from socialism with its emphasis on 
nationalism, secularism and republicanism and the rejection of the domination of a 
particular class (CHP, 1967: 11). In Ecevit’s opinion (1966, 32), the left-of-center 
would never turn into a communist movement since it was in favor of democratic 
order, private property rights and since it was against the tyranny of not only the 
wealthy but also the state (Ecevit 1966, 34–36). Indeed, both İnönü and Ecevit 
argued that the left-of-center would set barriers to the extreme left by maintaining 
economic development with social justice (Ecevit 1966, 91; İnönü 1967, 10). In this 
sense, the competing factions could not reach an agreement regarding fundamental 
party policies.  
5.2.3.2.Relative Power of Competing Factions across Different Layers of Party 
Organization 
During the conflict, the CHP was torn between the party in central office 
dominated by the New Movement and the parliamentary group controlled by the 
dissidents. The New Movement won 23 seats out of 43 seats of the Party Assembly 
at the 18th CHP congress. Moreover, the party’s Central Executive Committee came 
under the control of the New Movement (Bakşık 2009, 236). Besides, the New 
159 
Movement received the support of the party on the ground at the minor Congress 
held in February 1967 (Bozkurt 1969, 118). In this sense, the New Movement held 
the support of both the party in central office and party on the ground. However, it 
was deprived of the support of the parliamentary party. The support of 84 deputies 
out of 185 CHP deputies to the existing group executive board held by the leading 
conservatives indicated that the conservatives held on to a close majority in 
Parliament. Nevertheless, since the extraparliamentary party had the authority to 
amend the party bylaws and nominate candidates, and since the party leader was 
highly influential over Congress delegates, the dissident conservatives would not 
be able to maintain their political career in the CHP. Due to this, it was easier for 
the party leader to neglect the dissidents’ demands.  
5.2.3.3.Leadership Autonomy 
The CHP adopted a decentralized party model in which the party members 
on the ground delegated their authority to the party in central office through a chain 
of local congresses. Similar to other parties, the CHP bylaw designated the natural 
members and the general congress delegates who were chosen at provincial 
congresses as the selectorate for party leader (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 1966). 
Additionally, the personal charisma of the CHP leader in the eyes of the party 
members increased leadership autonomy as well as the costs of opposition to the 
party leader. Hence, the CHP leader could find it easy to neglect dissidents’ 
demands by relying on election methods and personal charisma.  
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5.2.4. Departure: Formation of the Reliance Party 
The changes in the party bylaw adapted at the 4th extraordinary congress and 
İnönü’s intention to purge the leading conservatives showed the dissidents that they 
could no longer maintain their political career in the CHP. Here, the words of 
Coşkun Kırca, a leading member of the conservative faction, deserve attention 
(cited in R. Akar and Dündar 2008, 124): 
The important thing for those that resigned from the party was their 
ambition to struggle against Ecevit’s intention to distance the CHP 
from Kemalism. This struggle could no more be held in the party. 
Since Ismet Pasha, Kemal Satır and Nihat Erim had come out against 
us, it was impossible for us to remain within the party. 
 
Once they resigned from the host party, the conservatives started to work 
for a new party without engaging in any contact with the established parties. This 
is closely related with the political project proposed by the dissidents. The 
conservatives proposed a nationalist and Kemalist political project as an antidote to 
the spread of communism. They were of the idea that Turkey was under a serious 
communist threat. The communists, who first tried to incorporate their demands to 
the 1961 constitution, had penetrated into the cadres of the CHP and were in an 
attempt to transform the CHP into a socialist anti-system party (Güven Partisi 1968, 
35, 1969, 8; İpekçi 1969, 128). Communism was a clear violation of Kemalism and 
a serious threat posed to national unity (Güven Partisi 1968, 37). However, the CHP 
leader was so old that he was not aware of the danger (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 
335). On the other hand, the AP was incapable of conducting an effective struggle 
against the communist threat (Güven Partisi 1968, 42). Hence, the reformist and the 
nationalist Reliance Party was presented as the only viable option that would protect 
161 
freedoms, democracy and national unity and effectively struggle against the radical 
left and fascism (Güven Partisi 1967, 9, 1968, 76–78, 1969, 9–11; İpekçi 1969, 
130). 
5.3.Conflict over Distribution of Selective Benefits: Split within the Justice 
Party and Formation of the Democratic Party, 1970 
The Justice Party was formed on 11th of February, 1961 as the successor to 
the outlawed Democrat Party. From the beginning, the AP was fractionalized into 
three groups: the moderates, the radicals and the nationalists. During the leadership 
of Ragıp Gümüşpala, the radicals dominated first the parliamentary party and then 
the party in central office. Despite this, a moderate figure, Süleyman Demirel, was 
elected as the second AP chair, after the death of Gümüşpala. From then on, the 
party faced factional conflict between the moderates and the radicals which became 
to be known as the Yeminliler and the Bilgiççiler. 
Figure 14: Analytical Narrative of Split within the AP 
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The series of events that ended with the formation of a new party started 
following the victory of the AP in the 1969 elections (Figure 14). Conflict over the 
nominations and the composition of the second Demirel cabinet, and the expulsion 
of some of the dissidents led the Bilgiççiler to issue a memorandum calling for 
intraparty democracy. When their demands were neglected, the dissidents voted 
against the government budget and led the second Demirel cabinet to fall. In return, 
the AP chair purged the leading dissidents from the AP and formed a new cabinet, 
excluding the dissidents once again. The dissidents first waited to see the results of 
the fifth AP congress. After the confirmation of Demirel’s leadership at the fifth 
congress, the DkP was formed. 
5.3.1. Dissent 
Duverger (1970, 1) states that parties are influenced by experiences that they 
had during their formative phase. In a similar vein, Panebianco (1988, xiii) notes 
that crucial decisions made by the founders of a new party, the first struggles for 
organizational control and the way in which the organization was formed leaves an 
indelible mark. This holds true for factionalism in the AP.  
The AP was built over former Democrats’ local organizations and was 
composed of various groups that were united in their opposition to the military 
intervention and the CHP but that were divided on the strategies to be employed 
during the transition to democracy (Demirel 2004, 57; Sakallıoğlu 1993, 122; 
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Şahinoğlu 1966, 38; Weiker 1963, 136)51. It was divided into three main factions: 
the Moderates (Mutediller), the Radicals (Müfritler), and the Radical Nationalists 
(Turancılar). The Mutediller were the new political entrepreneurs that were 
disappointed with the measures of the military government but that had no clear 
contract with the former Democrats (Demirel 2004, 30; Levi 1991, 136–137). They 
constituted the majority among the founders but lost their control over the party in 
public office to the Müfritler after the 1961 elections and the first General Congress 
(Bektaş 1993, 153; Bozdağ 1975, 80). The Müfritler were the right-wing faction 
which demanded a more conservative and nationalist outlook for the party 
(Sherwood 1967, 61). Unlike the Mutediller, the Müfritler asked for an 
uncompromising attitude towards the demands imposed by the military and called 
for measures that would provoke the military, including the nomination of a former 
DP member as candidate in presidential elections and an amnesty for the 
imprisoned DP deputies (Bilgiç 2002, 82; Karpat 2004, 55). Finally, the Turancılar 
was the minority faction that demanded a more nationalist outlook for the AP and 
that asked for a more active struggle against the ‘communist threat’ (Güler 2003, 
56; Levi 1991, 137)52. They were in agreement with the Müfritler in their demand 
                                                 
 
51 For more on the foundation of the Justice Party, see Şahinoğlu (1966).  
52 In addition to these factions, the imprisoned Democrats acted as a pressure group outsıde the 
party. The Democrats were those who had lost their chair and who ran their relatives in their stead 
(Burçak 1994, 111–112). They were mainly concerned with the release of the imprisoned DP 
members and the restoration of their political rights. To achieve their aim, they aligned with either 
the Mutediller or the Müfritler (Cebeci 1975, 115; Levi 1991, 138). They gave their support to 
Demirel during the second congress but then criticized Demirel since the AP chair did not support 
the CHP’s proposal for a constitutional referendum regarding political rights of released Democrats.  
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for the AP’s preoccupation with moral development but differed from the Müfritler 
with their close relations with the radical members of the National Unity Committee 
(Abadan-Unat 1966, 122; Kayalı 1994, 116). 
The dissent within the AP that was closely related to the split in the 1970 
was the competition for secondary leadership positions in the party organization53. 
The conflict can be traced back to the election of Süleyman Demirel as the AP chair 
at the second AP General Congress in 1964. Demirel had less chance in competition 
for elections for the new AP leadership compared to Saadettin Bilgiç, the 
representative of the Müfritler who was well-known to the party on the ground and 
party in public office (Bilgiç 2002, 126–128; Cebeci 1975, 104; Sayarı 1976, 190). 
However, his personal skills and the support of the press, businessmen, military and 
the Democrats ended up with the election of Demirel as the second AP Chair (Arat 
2002, 89; Birand, Dündar, and Çaplı 1994, 111; Kayalı 1994, 128; Toker 1992, 
221). What led to dissatisfaction of the figures around Bilgiç was not the election 
of Demirel as the new chair but their exclusion from the ruling positions (Bozdağ 
                                                 
 
53 In addition to this, the coalition with the CHP in 1962 and the demands of amnesty to the 
imprisoned DP deputies was a source of conflict in the AP. (Bilgiç 2002, 82; Birand, Dündar, and 
Çaplı 1994, 40). The domination of the Müfritler on first the parliamentary party and then the 
extraparliamentary party until the death of the first AP Chair Ragip Gümüşpala in 1963 ended up 
with the switching of some of the Mutediller to the YTP, than the formation of a new party (Bilgiç 
2002, 90–95). 
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1975, 87; Cebeci 1975, 115–116). From then on, the conflict took place between 
the supporters of Demirel (Yeminliler) and supporters of Bilgiç (Bilgiççiler)54. 
The composition of the cabinet and the distribution of nominations before 
the 1969 elections constituted another dimension of intraparty conflict. Demirel 
refrained from presenting himself as the candidate of a closed circle; therefore he 
excluded the Bilgiççiler first from the ruling party offices and then from the cabinet 
(Bozdağ 1975, 89; Cebeci 1975, 116). However, following the third General 
Congress, the AP chair realized that he could not maintain a sustainable cabinet 
without the support of the Bilgiççiler. Hence, he included seven of the Bilgiççiler 
to the cabinet in 1967 (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 326). Yet, the Bilgiççiler came 
into conflict with the party chair and the Yeminliler with their demand to hold seats 
both in the General Administrative Council (GAC) despite the party bylaw (Bektaş 
1993, 159; Güler 2003, 74)55. Moreover, during the primaries for the 1969 elections, 
                                                 
 
54 Yeminliler was a name ascribed by the supporters of Bilgiç and indicated those who protected 
their seats through submitting their will to the party leader (Bilgiç, 2002: 135). The Bilgiççiler was 
ascribed by the journalists. Both of the factions never adopted their names.  
55 The General Administrative Council was the executive organ of the AP and the locus of power 
(Dodd 1979, 122; Sayarı 1976, 1976). It was composed of the chair, Senate Group Chair, National 
Assembly deputy chairs and 24 members to be elected at the general congress. It was responsible 
for implementing decisions taken by the General Congress and the Central Representatives Council, 
administrating the party, approving candidates for primary elections (with the exception of standing 
parliamentarians), nominating 5% of candidates, deciding on the party’s policies regarding the 
coalitions, taking decisions regarding the nomination of ministers in consultation with the 
parliamentary party executive boards, setting up the new organizational units and dissolving the 
local branches. The AP bylaw stipulated that at most eight General Administrative Council members 
could hold seats both in the Council and the cabinet. Prior to the fourth AP congress, chair Demirel 
reserved four ministerial posts for the Bilgiççiler but the latter insisted on keeping six seats. The 
fourth AP congress selected nine of the ministers as members of the Council. Demirel demanded 
the resignation of some of the Bilgiççiler from the cabinet. In return, two ministers resigned in 
January 1968 (Güler 2003, 74; Kuru 1996, 95).  
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the Bilgiççiler came into conflict with the Yeminliler and worked against candidates 
nominated by the GAC in some constituencies during the electoral campaigns for 
the 1969 elections (Cebeci 1975, 122). Besides, despite the warnings of the GAC, 
Saadettin Bilgiç held a separate electoral campaigns (Bilgiç 2002, 194). These 
events led the AP chair to conclude that the proportional distribution of selective 
benefits would not end up with a cohesive party organization and a harmonious 
cabinet. 
5.3.2. Intraparty Conflict 
The series of event that ended with the formation of the DkP started with 
the AP’s motion to limit interpellation debates to 20 minutes (Uraz 1970, 156). 
While 34 AP Deputies left the floor in protest, only three of them were referred to 
the disciplinary board. Despite the opposition of the Bilgiççiler in the GAC, the 
GAC dominated by the Yeminliler referred the AP Mayors who worked against the 
party candidates and dissolved the local branches that did not work for party 
candidates (Bilgiç 2002, 200; Uraz 1970, 211). In return, 72 deputies and senators 
signed a memorandum opposing the referrals and accusing Demirel for betraying 
the ideals of the party in order to establish a single man rule (Demokratik Parti 1971, 
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16–22)56. Demirel did not retreat and called the dissidents to use party platforms for 
voicing dissent and to obey to decisions of the democratically elected party organs 
(Güven 1997, 11–13; Uraz 1970, 221). Once Demirel did not take the demands of 
dissidents into consideration, the leading dissidents in the GAC resigned.  
The dissidents were in conflict about their future strategies. Although 41 
deputies were of the idea of voting against the government budget in order to force 
Demirel to reconsider his decisions, about 30 deputies opposed this strategy (Güven 
1997, 17). In the end, 41 AP Deputies and five purged deputies voted against the 
budget and demanded President Cevdet Sunay to appoint another AP member as 
prime minister (Birand, Dündar, and Çaplı 1994, 167; Demokratik Parti 1971, 43–
45). 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
56 The memorandum stated that the General Administrative Council’s decisions indicated the first 
step of the plan to transform the AP from a party of principles to a party of individuals and groups. 
The petitioners reclaimed that the AP group executive board’s decision to refer three deputies to the 
Honor Divan was against the AP bylaw and the constitution since there was no binding group 
decision and since the constitution ordered non-accountability of the members of the TBMM. 
Regarding the extraparliamentary conflict, the petitioners argued that evidences were not collected 
properly and the procedures mentioned in the AP bylaw were not fully realized. In its final part, the 
memorandum demanded ruling offices to reconsider the referrals (Demokratik Parti 1971, 16–22).  
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Table 12: Chronology of Events (1969-1970) 
12 October 1969 1969 Elections. 
3 November 1969 Demirel excluded the Bilgiççiler from the second Demirel cabinet 
7 November 1969 146 deputies left the AP Group Meeting on the new government program 
12 November 1969 Former AP Group Deputy Chair Ethem Kılıçoğlu accused Demirel with 
frauds. 
22 December 1969 34 AP deputies left the AP Group Meeting that had convened to debate 
the proposal to limit the interpellation debates 
30 December 1969 Three of the dissident deputies were referred to the High Honor Divan.  
7 January 1970 Local executive boards supporting the Bilgiççiler were dissolved. 5 
members of the Bilgiççiler were referred to High Honor Divan.  
17 January 1970 The memorandum of the 72s. 
4 February 1970 Six GAC members resigned. 
8-18 February 1970 The news published in Günaydın alleging Demirel family with 
corruption and political influence. 
12 February 1970 41 AP deputies voted against the government budget proposal. 
14 February 1970 The second Demirel government fell. President Sunay reappointed 
Demirel for the formation of the cabinet. 
17 February 1970 The CHP requested for parliamentary investigation regarding 
publications in the Günaydın. 
21 February 1970 The Central Representatives Council convened and supported Demirel  
15 March 1970 The third Demirel government received vote of confidence. 43 AP 
deputies abstained from the voting. 
25 June 1970 26 AP deputies were permanently expelled.  
12 August 1970 The investigation commission published its report finding no evidence of 
frauds. 
5 September 1970 Bilgiç declared that the dissidents would form a new party. 
25 September 1970 The dissidents met to debate on a new party. 
19 October 1970 The MM Spokesman Ferruh Bozbeyli resigned. 
21 October 1970 5th AP Congress convened. Demirel received 1425 votes of the 1500 
delegates.  
November 1970 Individual resignations. 
18 December 1970 The Democratic Party was formed. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Ahmad and Ahmad (1976); Demokratik Parti (1971); Kuru 
(1996). 
 
The Bilgiççiler also employed an attrition campaign against Demirel. A 
group of members led by the former deputy chair of the AP MM group, Ethem 
Kılıçoğlu, and the former ministers Mehmet Turgut, Vedat Önsal and Faruk Sükan 
started the Filed Opposition (Dosyalı Muhalefet) in order to remove Demirel by 
accusing him of fraud (A. Tuncer 1971, 15; Uraz 1970, 301). The charges of the so-
called filed opposition were published in the daily Günaydın between the 8th and 
169 
18th of February, 1970 (Gevgilili 1987, 465)57. The CHP requested a parliamentary 
investigation on the allegations of political influence for obtaining personal favors 
for Demirel’s family (Gürkan 1973, 256). The investigation committee formed on 
the 24th of June 1970 found no evidence of unjust enrichment58. The next day, 26 
deputies were permanently expelled from the AP. This decision was followed by 
individual resignations that increased especially after the convention of the fifth 
General Congress59. 
The AP Chair Süleyman Demirel chose to neglect dissidents’ demands and 
whip them. When the 72 deputies and senators issued a memorandum, Demirel 
stated that he would not decide by memorandums (Uraz, 1970: 198). Following the 
fall of the second Demirel cabinet, the AP chair did not make any changes that 
would please the dissidents. Neglect was accompanied by the whip. Yet, Demirel 
refrained from disciplinary measures that would lead to huge scale resignations. 
Hence, the Joint Honor Divan met after the government crisis suspended the 
membership of the leading dissidents for a period of one year and forgiving ten 
deputies. Demirel stated that similar punishments would be decided in case the 
remaining dissidents voted in favor of the Third Demirel Government (Kuru 1996, 
                                                 
 
57 Demirel and his family were accused of the sale of a piece of land belonging to the Turkish State 
Railways to Demirel’s brother under price, and of obtaining credits from various state banks by 
using political influence. The daily also published a list of companies belonging to the Demirel 
family (Demokratik Parti 1971, 31–32; Uraz 1970, 355–356).   
58 For more on the investigation committee, see Gürkan (1973, 256–259); Uraz (1970, 374).  
59 Following the Congress, ten deputies and senators resigned from the party.  
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121). However, the abstention of the dissidents from voting on the third Demirel 
cabinet and their support to the CHP’s proposal for the formation of an investigative 
committee led Demirel to permanently expel 26 dissident deputies (Bilgiç 2002, 
217) 60. Finally, Demirel attempted to legitimize the purges. During the conflict, 
Demirel constantly pointed out the fact that he was democratically elected by the 
highest decision-making organ and that conflict could be resolved by using party 
mechanisms (Güven 1997, 23–25; Uraz 1970, 484–487). Moreover, Demirel called 
on the Central Representatives Council to convene and received the support of the 
Council, and hence the party on the ground. (Uraz 1970, 487–490)61. 
5.3.3. Endogenous Facilitators of Party Split 
The dissidents’ decision to rebel against the party leader was shaped by the 
decrease in the entry costs compared to the 1950s as well as the decrease in the 
turnout rates, which signaled the voters’ discontent with the established parties. 
Moreover, they were certain that the former Democrats who had withdrawn their 
                                                 
 
60 The 43 AP deputies that abstained from the voting of the government issued a communique 
stating that they were adherents to the founding philosophy of the AP and that they would not support 
Demirel until the allegations were revealed (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 384).  
61 The Central Representative Council was composed of the party chair, 15 elected 
parliamentarians, former chairs, former prime ministers, provincial chairs and the chairs of the youth 
and women branches. It was responsible for confirming or modifying party policies in accordance 
with the directives of the General Congress and for the election of the four deputy chairs. Although 
it was envisioned as the second highest decision-making party organ, it mostly acted as a 
consultative body to coordinate relations between the three faces of the party (Sayarı 1976, 191). 
Levi (1991, 147) notes that the Council chose a committee of fifteen among themselves in order to 
prepare a list of candidates for the central bodies of the party, which was mostly accepted by the 
Congress delegates unanimously. 
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support from the AP leader before the 1969 elections would take side with them in 
their competition with the party leader. However, challenging the party leader was 
a risky decision since the entry costs slightly increased with the amendment of the 
electoral law in 1968, and more importantly, since half of the voters cast their votes 
for the AP. Their decisions were more a response to Demirel’s decisions to neglect 
their demands and whip them. The latter’s decision can be explained with reference 
to endogenous factors.  
5.3.3.1.The Nature of Disagreement 
A limited number of studies over the intraparty conflict in the AP relates the 
split to the overrepresentation of industrial conglomerates’ interests during 
Demirel’s chairmanship. Accordingly, the assessment of foreign-trade policy 
problems and proposed solutions were on the hearth of the conflict between these 
different factions of the private sector who were struggling to influence government 
strategies in order to increase their share of economic rent. The protectionist 
coalition, including the import substituting industrialists, the importers, the State 
Economic Enterprises and the institutions with import and industry related duties 
were concerned with overvalued exchange rates, high import barriers and the de-
emphasis on export promotion. Their interests conflicted with the pro-trade groups, 
including the tourism sector, exporters, the producers of exportables and the 
agricultural sector, who demanded realistic or undervalued exchange rates, a liberal 
import regime and the promotion of exports (Tekin 2006, 134). The affirmative 
populism developed by the AP could postpone the interest conflict to the extent that 
the government could sustain economic growth (Keyder 1987, 204). However, the 
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balance of payment crisis in the late 1960s alienated the commercial and 
agricultural groups, who were disturbed by the overrepresentation of the industrial 
interests (Sakallıoğlu 1993, 63; Sencer 1974, 377–388; Tachau 2002). Moreover, 
small capital was also in a disadvantaged position in its relations with the 
government compared to big business that enjoyed easy access both to sources of 
information and to decision makers in getting available funds (Altunışık and Tür 
2005, 74; Buğra 1994, 157). When the AP government proposed a tax reform in 
1970 that would hurt the interests of small capital and the agricultural sector, these 
groups allied with the commercial groups in their struggle against the 
overrepresentation of the industrial conglomerates’ interests and took sides with the 
DkP (Bulutay 1970, 89; Dodd 1979, 110; Gevgilili 1987, 461; Güler 2003, 85; 
Karpat 2004, 319; Sencer 1974, 410; Tosun 1999, 107; Zürcher 2004, 252). 
The argument that the AP split due to the resentment against the 
overrepresentation of industrial and big business interests holds true to some extent. 
For example, the DkP chair Ferruh Bozbeyli criticized the enrichment of the top 
businessmen through informal contacts with political authorities and the use of state 
resources to reward Demirel’s followers (Bozbeyli 1976, 190). For Bozbeyli (1976, 
190), the DkP was at the right of the AP with its emphasis on nationalism, moral 
values and the protection of small-scale producers against large economic forces. 
Bozbeyli also stated that his party’s emphasis on freedom of private property 
indicated the formation of a financial market that would protect the savings of 
ordinary citizens rather than the enrichment of the top business through their 
contacts with political authorities. 
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Despite this, it was only after their departure from the AP that the dissidents 
openly criticized the AP government for the overrepresentation of particular 
interests. During the intraparty conflict phase, they were more concerned with the 
leadership style of Demirel than the underrepresentation of the agricultural or the 
small-scale producers’ interests. During the 1970, the dissidents were of the idea 
that they were the devotees of the 1946 spirit and that Demirel and the Yeminliler 
had betrayed the ideals of the AP in order to obtain seats and personal gains (Bilgiç 
2002, 274; Bozbeyli 1976, 164–165; Demokratik Parti 1971, 120–121). Moreover, 
they criticized the AP chair for violating the principle of intraparty democracy in 
order to sustain a single man rule62.  
It was only after their expulsion from the party that the dissidents started to 
voice different criticisms. Prior to the formation of the new party, Demirel was 
criticized for not effectively dealing with the economic difficulties and the 
communist threat (Demokratik Parti 1971, 30). For the expelled dissidents, the 
taxation law proposed by the new Demirel cabinet would bring an extra burden on 
small and medium-scaled entrepreneurs and would deteriorate the living conditions 
of the low income groups (Demokratik Parti 1971, 62). Besides, it was a clear 
violation of private property rights (Demokratik Parti 1971, 60). These criticisms 
would be repeated after the formation of the DkP (Bilgiç 2002, 224–228; Bozbeyli 
                                                 
 
62 For the letter of resignations and criticisms about the lack of intraparty democracy, see 
Demokratik Parti (1971).  
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1976, 163; Demokratik Parti 1971, 130–131). However, as stated before, these 
criticisms were voiced after the departure of the dissidents.  
The way that the AP chair perceived the conflict might provide clues about 
the nature of the disagreement. Demirel believed that the conflict in the AP was 
about the distribution of selective benefits. Accordingly, the dissidents considered 
Demirel’s chairmanship as illegitimate since they lost the intraparty elections for 
the ruling offices (Demirel 1973, 181). Proportional representation and the 
compulsory primary elections had encouraged personal vote seeking behavior and 
had intensified personal conflicts in the party on the ground (Demirel 1972, 4; 1973, 
177; 1974, 31). He was of the idea that the main targets of the dissidents were to 
remove him from the AP and to hold the control of the cabinet so that they could 
rule the country as they wished (Gürkan 1973, 241–242). However, Demirel noted 
that this was illegitimate since the AP delegates had democratically elected him 
(Demirel 1972, 18; 1973, 180). In this sense, the AP leader believed that the conflict 
was not about ideologies and policies; rather leadership struggles and conflicts the 
distribution of selective benefits lied at the hearth of the conflict. 
In short, the dissent during the intraparty conflict phase was about the 
distribution of cabinet posts and ruling positions in party organization. Compared 
to a conflict over party’s ideology, this source of conflict could be more easily 
accommodated. Yet, since the dissidents rejected the legitimacy of the AP chair’s 
rule and since the AP leader rejected to accommodate their demands, the conflict 
could not be managed. 
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5.3.3.2. Relative Power of Each Faction within Different Faces of Party 
Organization 
Since his election as party chair till the party split, Demirel gradually 
extended control over the party’s main ruling office, the GAC. Although only 9 
candidates nominated by the AP chair could be elected to the GAC at the second 
General Congress, this number increased to 23 and decreased to 18 in the third and 
the fourth congresses. On the other hand, although 11 members from the list 
proposed by Bilgiç were elected to the council at the second General Congress, this 
number decreased to 10 and 8 in the third and fourth congresses, including 
candidates nominated by both factions (Bilgiç 2002, 170; Cebeci 1975, 120; Kuru 
1996, 60–64). On the other hand, the support of provincial chairs to chair Demirel 
at the Central Representatives Council meeting on the 21st of February, 1970 reveals 
the support of the party on the ground to Demirel (Uraz 1970, 487–490). In this 
sense, the dissidents were in minority in the extraparliamentary party, which held 
the upper hand in ruling the party. 
Demirel and the Yeminliler also constituted the majority in the 
parliamentary party. During the elections for the National Assembly Group 
Executive Board after 1969 elections, the candidates nominated by the Bilgiççiler 
received 84 votes whereas the candidates of the Yeminliler won the elections with 
the votes of 156 deputies (Güler 2003, 75; Toker 1993, 182; Uraz 1970, 116). The 
abstention of 146 deputies and senators during the debates on the second Demirel 
government program at the AP joint group meeting might be interpreted as 
discontent with the new cabinet (Ahmad and Ahmad 1976, 378). However, the 
support for the Bilgiççiler gradually eroded as the conflict between the party leader 
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and the Bilgiççiler intensified. Although 72 deputies and senators had signed the 
memorandum, only 41 deputies voted against the government budget proposal, 
whereas 26 voted in favor (Demokratik Parti 1971, 89–90). It was due to the power 
of Demirel and the Yeminliler over all layers of party organization that they could 
easily neglect the demands of the dissident Bilgiççiler.  
Finally, the predominant party system helped the AP chair to neglect the 
demands of the dissidents. Although the votes of the AP decreased slightly in the 
1969 elections, the party won 256 of 450 seats, thanks to an amendment of the 
electoral law in 1968. It was due to re-introduction of the D’Hondt system that the 
parliamentary fragmentation index and effective number of parliamentary parties 
had decreased slightly (See Table 10). Hence, the predominant party system that 
started with the 1965 elections (Sayarı 1978, 44) made it easy for Demirel to neglect 
the demands of the dissidents.  
5.3.3.3.Leadership Autonomy 
Similar to the other parties, the AP bylaw stipulated that the party leader 
would be elected by Congress delegates with an absolute majority. Additionally the 
victory of the AP under Demirel’s chairmanship in the 1965 and the 1969 elections 
led Demirel to retain additional legitimacy. Hence, the party leader could legitimize 
his decisions by pointing out that he was democratically elected by not only the 
Congress delegates but also by the majority of the voters as demonstrated by the 
1965 and re-confirmed with the 1969 elections.  
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5.3.4. Departure: Formation of the Democratic Party 
Once they were purged from the AP, 26 members of the Bilgiççiler faction 
first waited to see the effects of their act over the party. In order to provoke further 
dissent against chair Demirel, Bilgiç held a press meeting and declared that they 
would form a party before the fifth General Congress convened (Bozdağ 1975, 102; 
Demokratik Parti 1971, 57). However, the Congress ended with the re-election of 
Demirel with 1425 votes of 1500 delegates. Once Demirel secured his leadership at 
the fifth congress, the dissidents formed the Democrat Party without negotiations 
with any other existing parties on the 18th of December, 1970.  
5.4.Conclusions 
The analysis of the splits in the governing and the main opposition parties 
in the second half of the 1960s reveals that the lower entry costs and the perceived 
viability of new parties have played an important role in shaping the decisions of 
the dissident factions in both parties. With the introduction of the proportional 
representation, the disproportionality and the RRP index decreased significantly. 
Additionally, the decrease in turnout rates and the high levels of volatility which 
was primarily a consequence of the ban over the DP signaled to the dissidents of 
each party that it was the right time for strategic entry. However, given the fact that 
party fissions disappeared after the 1973 elections despite a permissive institutional 
context and despite the deterioration of economic conditions, the influence of the 
exogenous factors should not be overestimated. Indeed, after the 1973 elections, the 
dissident Bilgiççiler returned back to the AP, whereas the dissidents in the CHP 
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refrained from splitting though the party was prone to factionalism and the party 
had displayed poor economic performance. In this sense, the strategic entrance of 
the dissidents to the political market cannot be explained solely with reference to 
exogenous factors. 
This brings us to the importance of endogenous factors once again. In the 
case of the CHP, the party change initiated by the party leader and the New 
Movement alienated the conservatives who opposed the party’s move towards the 
left. While such an ideological conflict was absent in the case  of the AP, the 
dissident Bilgiççiler were of the idea that they were the real representative of the 
‘1946 spirit’ and that the AP chair was violating this spirit by his attempts to exclude 
the ‘devotees of the AP’ from the selective benefits. Secondly, although the 
conservatives in the CHP had dominated the parliamentary party, they were far 
from receiving the support of the extraparliamentary party. Given the fact that the 
PPL had designated the extraparliamentary party as the upper party branch, the 
numerical superiority of the dissidents in the CHP parliamentary party could easily 
be overridden by the CHP leader. On the other hand, the dissidents of the AP lacked 
the support of both the parliamentary and extraparliamentary party. Additionally, 
the predominant party system made it easier for the AP leader to neglect the 
demands of the dissidents. However, unlike the previous case of the DP in which 
the seats held by the dissidents had no significance for termination of the 
government, the dissidents of the AP held enough seats to threaten the AP leader 
with government termination in case of defection. Despite this, the AP leader did 
not retreat from expelling the dissidents as the 1969 elections and the results of the 
1970 General Congress confirmed the legitimacy of the party leader. In a similar 
179 
vein, although the CHP had performed poorly in the 1965 elections, the 
inclusiveness of the delegate selection method and the charisma of the party leader 
made it easy for the CHP chair İnönü to legitimize his decision to expel the 
dissidents. In this sense, similar to the case of the DP, the cases of the splits within 
the CHP and the AP confirm that the endogenous factors play a highly important 
role in explaining party splits. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 PARTY SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION AND PARTY SPLITS 
IN THE 1990s 
The evolution of the Turkish party system was interrupted with the military 
intervention on 12th of September, 1980. The military incumbents introduced a 
number of measures that significantly changed the rules of the game before 
transition to democracy. The new constitution abolished the Senate of Republic, 
increased the power of the executive vis-à-vis the legislature, excluded the Marxist, 
ethnic and religious parties from the political market and purged the pre-
intervention politicians from politics for some time (Hale 1988, 169–170). The 
designers of the new political system, who prioritized governmental stability over 
representativeness introduced a new electoral law and political parties’ law, which 
were expected to deter new comers (Hale 2008, 235; Turan 1988, 69). Moreover, 
the military vetoed the successors of the outlawed established parties and promoted 
the formation of two parties at the center-right and center-left, namely the Populist 
Party (Halkçı Parti-HP) and the Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi 
Demokrasi Partisi-MDP) (Ahmad 1984, 7–8; Özbudun 2000, 113–114). However, 
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the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP), the only genuinely new party 
formed by the civilians and permitted to participate in the initial elections in 1983 
won the majority of seats (Ergüder and Hofferbert 1988, 97).  
Table 13: Successors, Genuinely New Parties and Mergers in the 1980s 
Year Successor  Genuinely New  Mergers 
1983 DYP; RP; MP (MÇP/MHP); SODEP ANAP; MDP; HP - 
1984  IDP (MP)  
1985  DSP SODEP-HP (SHP) 
1988  Socialist Party  
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Kaynar et al. (2007). Abbreviations in parentheses indicate 
the name changes. 
 
Artificial parties promoted by the military incumbents disappeared from the 
political scene within the next three years (Table 13). On the right, the deputies 
elected from the MDP list switched to ANAP and the True Path Party (Doğru Yol 
Partisi-DYP), the successor of the outlawed AP63. After the dissolution of the party 
in 1986, the MDP deputies remained independent or joined the Free Democrat Party 
(Hür Demokrat Parti-HDP) formed by Mehmet Yazar, a former DYP member who 
ran as a candidate for the DYP chairmanship (Akay 2008, 42). Yet, the HDP merged 
with the ANAP after the 1986 by-elections. On the other hand, the Welfare Party 
(Refah Partisi-RP) and the Conservative Party (Muhafazakâr Parti) took their 
places at the right of political spectrum as the successor of the outlawed National 
                                                 
 
63 Followers of Demirel first formed the Great Turkey Party (Büyük Türkiye Partisi-BTP) before 
the 1983 elections. However, the party was dissolved by the military government on the ground that 
it was the continuation of the outlawed Justice Party. Hence, the True Path Party was formed. The 
BTP was revitalized during the conflict within the DYP. For more on the formation and dissolution 
of the Great Turkey Party, see Akay (2008, 66–71); Çavuşoğlu (2009, 7–15) 
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Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP) and the Nationalist Action Party 
(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP)64. Finally, the Reformist Democracy Party 
(Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi-IDP) rose at the right to attract the votes of 
conservative-nationalist voters65.  
While the center-right was fragmented into two main parties, there were two 
main competitors for the center-left as well. The Social Democracy Party (Sosyal 
Demokrasi Partisi-SODEP), the left-wing party formed by the former CHP 
members merged with the military-promoted left-wing HP and the latter’s name 
was changed to the Social Democrat Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti-
SHP) in 1985 (Turan 1988, 78). However, Bülent Ecevit chose to invest on a new 
party, called the Democratic Left Party (Demokrat Sol Parti-DSP) together with his 
wife Rahşan Ecevit (Bila 2001, 120–122). Finally, with the repeal of the ban over 
the purged politicians with the constitutional referendum in 1987, the depurged 
leaders, namely Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and 
Alparslan Türkeş, were elected as the chairs of the successor parties. Hence, 
although the military intended to promote a moderate two-party system, the 
                                                 
 
64 In 1985, the name of the Conservative Party was changed to Nationalist Working Party (Milliyetçi 
Çalışma Partisi-MÇP) in 1985. Once the pre-intervention parties were re-opened in 1992, the former 
MHP merged into the MÇP and the name of the MÇP was changed to MHP.  
65 Following the repeal of the ban on outlawed parties, the Nation Party (Millet Partisi-MP) was re-
opened in 1992. The party decided to merge with the IDP and the latter changed its name to MP.  
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consequence of the intervention was the fragmentation of the center-left and center-
right. 
Table 14: Splits, Mergers, Genuinely New, Splinter and Successor Parties (1990-2002) 
Year Successor  Splinter  Genuinely New  Mergers 
1990  HEP   
1992 CHP*; DP (2)*; 
İP** 
 YDP AP-DYP*;  MHP-
MÇP*; IDP-MP* 
1993 SİP (TKP) BBP; YP   
1994 HADEP**  YDH; LDP 
 
 
1995    SHP-CHP 
1996   ÖDP; DBP; BP; EMEK  
1997 FP**; DEHAP**; 
EMEP** 
DTP  YP-DP (2); YDH-BP 
1998  DEPAR; ATP   
2001 SP** AK Parti BTP  
2002  YTP (2) Yurt Partisi; Genç Parti Genç Parti-YDP 
 
*Parties formed after the repeal of the ban over the parties outlawed by the military. 
**Parties formed as successor of the parties outlawed by the Constitutional Court. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Kaynar et al. (2007); TBMM (2010); TÜİK (2008). 
Abbreviations in parentheses indicate name changes. Numbers in parentheses are used to distinguish 
parties from the former parties with same names. Parties that did not enter in any general elections 
are excluded. 
 
The 1990s was characterized by the overpopulation of the party system with 
new parties (Table 14). With the repeal of the ban over the outlawed parties in 1992, 
the CHP was re-established by the dissidents of the SHP whereas the former 
members of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) re-opened their parties 
(Duran 2012, 41–42)66. Additionally, the leadership succession crisis in the ANAP, 
DYP, DSP and the MHP ended up with the formation of the New Party (Yeni Parti-
YP), Democrat Turkey Party (Demokrat Türkiye Partisi-DTP), New Turkey Party 
                                                 
 
66 Although the AP was re-opened in 1992, the AP congress decided for the merge of the AP with 
the DYP.  
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(Yeni Türkiye Partisi-YTP) and the Bright Turkey Party (Aydınlık Türkiye Partisi-
ATP). Finally, the genuinely new parties of the Liberal Democrat Party (Liberal 
Demokrat Parti-LDP), Rebirth Party (Yeniden Doğuş Partisi-YDP), Young Party 
(Genç Parti)67 and the Homeland Party (Yurt Partisi) on the right and the New 
Democracy Movement (Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi-YDH), Peace Party (Barış 
Partisi-BP), and the Democracy and Peace Party (Demokrasi ve Barış Partisi-DBP) 
on the left were founded as alternatives to the established right and left parties 
(Duran 2012, 40–41; Kaynar et al. 2007). 
The political spectrum was further populated with the rise of the socialist 
and ethnic parties during the 1990s. The Socialist Party (Sosyalist Parti-SP), 
Socialist Rule Party (Sosyalist Iktidar Partisi-SİP), Labor’s Party (Emeğin Partisi-
EMEP) and the Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi-
ÖDP) were formed as socialist alternatives. Moreover, the salience of ethnic 
demands resulted in the exit of SHP members to form the People’s Labor Party 
(Halkin Emek Partisi-HEP) in 1990 (Ciddi 2009, 78; Dağistanlı 1998, 172; Duran 
2012, 40–41). 
Religious demands had been traditionally represented by the RP, which was 
succeeded by the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP) after the dissolution of the RP in 
1998. Once the FP was outlawed by the Constitutional Court in 2001, the conflict 
                                                 
 
67 In order to appear on the ballot, the Genç Parti merged with the YDP and the YDP’s name was 
changed to the Genç Parti.  
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between the moderates and the conservatives ended with the formation of two new 
parties, namely the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AK 
Parti) and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) (Hale and Özbudun 2010, 5). On 
the other hand, the conflict over the issue of secularism in the nationalist-
conservative MHP paved the way for the rise of the Great Union Party (Büyük Birlik 
Partisi-BBP) (Duran 2012, 39; Landau 2002, 158). Finally, the Independent Turkey 
Party (Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi-BTP) was formed to receive the support of voters 
with religious concerns (Kaynar et al. 2007, 338). 
Table 15: Mergers, Splits and Genuinely New Parties after the 2002 Elections 
Year Successor  Splits Genuinely 
New 
Mergers 
2004    YTP (2)-CHP 
2005 DTP**  HYP DP (1)-ANAP 
2007   DYP (2)  
2008 BDP**  HEPAR HÜRPARTİ-HYP 
2009    ANAP-DP (2) 
2010  SP-HASPARTI MMP ATP-MHP 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Kaynar et al. (2007) and various newspapers for post-2005 
period. Numbers in parentheses are used to distinguish parties from the former parties with the same 
names. Parties that did not enter in any general elections have been excluded. 
 
The fissiparous tendencies disappeared after the 2002 elections (Table 15). 
The YTP merged with the CHP whereas the DTP, which changed its name to 
Freedom and Change Party (Hürriyet ve Değişim Partisi-HÜRPARTİ) merged with 
the People’s Ascendance Party (Halkın Yükselişi Partisi-HYP) (Milliyet, January 1, 
2008). The DYP changed its name to Democrat Party in 2007 and the ANAP 
merged with the DP in 2009 (Sabah, November 1, 2009). The only minor splits 
took place in the Islamist SP, and the post-Islamist AK Parti (Sabah, November 2, 
2010; Sabah, May 26, 2009). The People’s Voice Party (Halkin Sesi Partisi- Has 
Parti) that was formed by the dissidents of the SP entered the 2011 elections 
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whereas the leader of Turkey Party (Türkiye Partisi-TP) Abdüllatif Şener, a former 
minister and member of the AK Parti, ran as independent candidate in the 2011 
elections. Later, in 2012, the Has Parti merged with the AK Parti, whereas the TP 
was dissolved in the same year (Agos, September 19, 2012; CNN Türk, August 27, 
2012).  
This chapter deals with the splits in two mainstream parties, namely the 
DYP and the DSP, which resulted in the formation of the DTP and the YTP. The 
chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, the exogenous factors are analyzed in detail. 
Secondly, a detailed analysis of the stages of party splits and the role of endogenous 
factors in explaining splits within the cases are presented. This part starts with the 
presentation of the reasons of the dissent within the DYP and continues with the 
analysis of the strategies and preferences of the competing factions and the role of 
endogenous factors in shaping these preferences. Next, the split within the DSP is 
analyzed in the same order. Since the dissidents of the DSP did not engage in 
conflict with the party leadership, the reasons of this unique phenomenon are 
discussed in detail.  
6.1.Exogenous Factors of Party Splits 
The frequency of party splits in the 1990s was unanticipated by the military, 
which introduced measures to curb party system fragmentation in order to maintain 
stable governments (Ergüder and Hofferbert 1988). These measures included the 
removal of state subsidies, limitations on terms of the party officers, ban on party 
switching, compulsory primary elections, reduction of the parliament’s size, the 
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increase in the duration of legislative term and in the spatial requirements and the 
introduction of the 10% national threshold (Turan 1988). However, these measures 
were far from discouraging party system fragmentation. 
Most of these institutional barriers on party splits and new party entrance 
were removed following the transition to democracy. The ban on party switching 
was removed with the amendment of the constitution in 199568. State subsidies were 
re-introduced in 1984. Compulsory primary elections69 and limitations on terms of 
party officers70 were repealed in 1986 and 1990, respectively. The size of 
Parliament was increased to 450 in 1987 and to 550 in 1995. The spatial 
requirements were first increased in 1986 and then decreased to their previous level 
in 1988 (Tuncer 2003, 46). In this sense, only the spatial requirements and the 
D’Hondt system with a 10% national threshold were intact previous to the splits 
                                                 
 
68 The 84th article of the 1982 constitution stipulated that the membership of deputies who switched 
to another party or who accepted ministerial appointment in a cabinet that is not supported by his or 
her party would be terminated. Such deputies would be denied the privilege of being nominated by 
central organs of any party in the coming elections. In order to overcome the limitations on party 
switching, individual deputies first formed ‘pretended marriage’ (Hülle) parties and then merged 
these parties with the target parties (Turan, İba, and Zarakol 2005, 8).  
69 Originally, the 37th article of the PPL stipulated that candidates would be determined by primary 
elections. The party in central office was granted the right to nominate 5% of the candidates. This 
practice, which had been inherited from the previous Law on Political Parties (Law No. 648, dated 
July 13, 1965), was repealed with the Law No. 3270 (dated March 28, 1986). With the amendment, 
candidate nomination process was left to the discretion of the political parties.  
70 The 15th article of the PPL stipulated that party chairs could serve for no longer than six 
consecutive terms of two years. On the other hand, the provincial and the sub-provincial leaders 
could serve for five consecutive terms. The limitations, which were introduced to assure leadership 
circulation, were amended in 1986 with the Law No. 3270 (dated March 28, 1986) and were repealed 
in 1990 with the Law No. 3648 (dated May 17, 1990).  
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that took place after 1995. Below, the analysis of the institutional design on new 
party entrance that was in force after the 1995 elections is presented. 
6.1.1. Entry Costs 
The new Political Parties’ Law (PPL) (Law No 2820, dated April 22, 1983) 
ordered no petition or monetary requirements for political parties to appear on the 
ballot. However, compared to the previous PPL (Law No. 648, dated, July 13, 
1965), the new PPL increased spatial requirements significantly. According to the 
37th article of the PPL, political parties should hold their provisional congresses and 
complete their organization in at least half of Turkey’s provinces and one-third of 
the districts within these provinces at least six months before the elections in order 
to appear on the ballot in coming elections. Parties with parliamentary groups had 
been exempted from the spatial requirement. Yet, the 95th article of the 1982 
constitution increased the number of seats required to form parliamentary groups 
from 10 to 20. This increased the burden on dissident factions to access the 
privileges provided for parties with parliamentary groups. 
The original PPL introduced by the military incumbents removed the 
practice of annual government grants to political parties. Public funding for parties 
that had passed the 10% national threshold was re-instated in 1984 with Law No. 
3032 dated June 27, 1984 (Turan 1988, 72). The PPL was amended in 1987 and 
1988 in order to provide public funding for parties with parliamentary groups or 
those received at least 7% of the total eligible votes in previous elections (Aydın 
2005, 251). With the incorporation of the provisional article 16 to the PPL in 1992, 
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political parties with at least three seats in Parliament were eligible to receive state 
funding provided that they had fulfilled spatial requirements to appear on the ballot 
(Gençkaya 2002, 12). Hence, from 1992 to 2005, nearly all splinter parties could 
benefit from state subsidies (Gençkaya 2002, 10)71. It was only the YTP that could 
not receive state funding since the Supreme Board of Elections decided that the 
party did not organize in at least 41 provinces six months before the elections 
(Sabah, September 19, 2002). 
The 52nd article of the Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter 
Registers (Law No. 298, dated April 26, 1961) stipulated that all political parties 
that are eligible to appear on the ballot have the right to use the state radio and 
television for electioneering activities. However, developments in communication 
technologies hindered the importance of state media in accessing voters. After the 
abolishment of the state monopoly over the radio and television, political parties 
could use private television and radio channels. But more important than this was 
the role played by the media in shaping the political fortunes of leaders and hence 
the established parties. For example, the support of the mainstream media to Çiller 
played an important role in her election as the new DYP chair (Erel and Bilge 1994, 
130). Else, the news on the allegation of corruption seems to have played an 
                                                 
 
71 The provisional article was repealed in 2005. Since then, only parties that received at least 7% of 
votes in previous elections are eligible for public subsidies. 
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important role in the alienation of voters from the center-right parties72. But, the 
most striking example is the role played by the media in the fall of the DYP-RP 
coalition73.  
Table 16: Electoral System (1983-2002) 
 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 
Term (Years) 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Number of 
Seats 
400 450 450 550 550 550 
Electoral 
formula 
D’Hondt  D’Hondt   + 
Contingency 
mandate 
D’Hondt  + 
Contingency 
mandate 
D’Hondt  D’Hondt  D’Hondt  
District 
Magnitude 
4.82 4.33 4.21 6.63 6.55 6.47 
Number of 
Constituencies 
83 104 107 83 84 85 
Ballot structure Closed 
list 
Closed list Preferential 
Vote 
Closed 
list 
Closed 
list 
Closed 
list 
National 
Threshold 
10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
District 
Threshold 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Compulsory 
primary 
Election 
Yes No No No No No 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Colomer (2004); Hale (2008); Kalaycıoğlu (2002); Tuncer 
(2003). 
 
The new electoral system reflected the military’s intentions to promote 
governmental stability at the expense of representativeness (Hale 2008, 235; 
Kalaycıoğlu 1999, 47). Until the amendment of the electoral law in 1995, five 
important measures were brought forward to promote governmental stability that 
                                                 
 
72 A number of books on the allegation of corruption about the DYP leader Tansu Çiller have been 
written by the journalists. See  Bildirici (1998); Erel and Bilge (1994) 
73 For examples to the works on the attitude of the media towards the Refahyol coalition, see Hongur 
(2006); Soncan (2006). For a critical evaluation of the issue, see TBMM (2012).  
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also increased disproportionality (Table 16). Firstly, the Senate of Republic was 
abolished and the number of seats in the assembly was decreased from 450 to 400. 
Secondly, the district magnitude was lowered74. Thirdly, the contingency mandate 
was introduced in 198675. Fourthly, parties were required to receive at least 10% of 
total eligible votes. Finally, parties were required to pass the constituency threshold, 
which was calculated by the simple proportion of the valid votes to the 
parliamentary seats per district (Kalaycıoğlu 2002, 61). 
Table 17: Disproportionality, Fragmentation and the RRP Index (1983-2011) 
Year Parliamentary 
Fragmentation 
Effective 
Number of 
Electoral 
Parties 
Effective 
Number of 
Parliamentary 
Parties 
Disproportionality 
Index 
Relative 
Reduction 
in Party 
Index 
1983 0.605 2.85 2.53 7.78 11.23 
1987 0.513 4.11 2.05 28.59 50.12 
1991 0.721 4.67 3.58 14.11 23.34 
1995 0.773 6.16 4.4 17.07 28.57 
1999 0.795 6.79 4.87 18.65 28.28 
2002 0.460 5.43 1.85 45.25 65.93 
2007 0.557 3.5 2.26 15.40 35.43 
2011 0.577 3.5 2.36 9.62 32.57 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from TÜİK (2008). Only the parties that have participated in general 
elections for the first time are included. Parties that have changed their names and that have merged 
with the other parties are excluded. Effective number of electoral parties and the effective number 
of parliamentary parties are calculated by the author by using formula proposed by Siaroff (2000). 
Relative reduction in party index is calculated by the author by the formula proposed by Boucek 
(2002). 
 
                                                 
 
74 According to the fourth article of the Law on Election of Deputies, no constituencies could return 
more than seven deputies and larger provinces had to be subdivided into two or more separate 
electoral districts. With the Law No. 3377 (dated March 25, 1987), the upper limit for the number 
of seats per constituency was decreased to six in 1987 (Tuncer 2003, 140–141).  
75 In districts with more than three seats, one of the seats was allocated using plurality and the other 
seats allocated using proportional representation (Colomer 2004, 461). For more on the contingency 
mandate, see Tuncer 2003, (122–123).  
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Most of these institutional obstacles for representation of minor parties were 
removed prior to the 1995 elections. Firstly, the size of Parliament was increased 
from 450 to 550. Secondly, the district magnitude was increased76. Finally, the 
contingency mandate and the district threshold were abolished (Hale 2008, 236; 
Tuncer 1996, 5–7). Despite these, the electoral system continued to produce 
disproportional vote-to-seat allocation due to the presence of the 10% national 
threshold (Table 17). Interestingly, despite the highly disproportional vote-to-seat 
conversion, the party system was further fragmented from 1995 to 2002. This was 
closely related with the decreasing support for the existing parties and the increase 
in the number of new parties. Hence, unanticipated by not only the military but the 
model proposed in this work, dissidents of the established parties chose to invest on 
new parties despite the high levels of disproportionality and the RRP indexes.    
6.1.2. Viability of New and Established Parties 
The splits within the established parties and the frequent entrance of 
genuinely new or splinter parties in the 1990s were more a consequence of the 
perceived viability of new and established parties. In addition to voter turnout and 
                                                 
 
76 Fourth article of the Law on Election of Deputies was amended with the Law No. 4125 (dated 
October 27, 1995). With the new amendments, the upper limit for district magnitude was increased 
to 18. Provinces that were allocated seats between 19 and 35 were divided into two constituencies 
and those having seats with 36 and more were divided into three constituencies.    
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volatility rates, political entrepreneurs in the 1990s could extensively use the public 
polling results for strategic entry.  
Table 18: Indicators of the Viability of the New and the Established Parties (1983-2011) 
Year Turnout Rate (%) Invalid Votes (%) Total Volatility 
1983 92.30 4.80 - 
1987 93.30 2.60 38.5 
1991 83.90 2.90 20.3 
1995 85.20 3.40 22.5 
1999 87.10 4.50 22.3 
2002 79.10 3.90 56.85 
2007 84.25 2.80 24.75 
2011 83.16 2.24 12.11 
 
Source: Compiled and calculated by the author by using data obtained from Çarkoğlu (2011); TÜİK 
(2008).  
 
Turnout rates in the post-1980 period had been relatively higher compared 
to the pre-intervention period (Table 18). This is partly a result of the introduction 
of compulsory voting (Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu 2007, 72; Hürriyet, December 27, 
2001). Yet, disillusioned voters had overcome this legal barrier by invalid vote 
casting. Due to this, the number of invalid vote casts increased slightly during the 
times that the voters were dissatisfied with the existing parties.  
A more valid indicator for voters’ disillusionment with the established 
parties was extracted from public polls. Various surveys pointed to a growing rate 
of protest votes starting in 1996 (Erder, 1996; 1999; cited in Hazama 2007, 22). 
Surveys conducted from 2000 to 2002 elections showed that the percentage of 
undecided voters ranged between 10% and 20% (Hürriyet, August 6, 2002; ANAR 
2001, 24; 2002, 27). During the same period, the number of voters stating that they 
would not vote for any of the established parties ranged between 14.5% and 31.1% 
(Hürriyet, January 2, 2001; March 4, 2001; October 5, 2002; ANAR 2001, 25; 
2002, 29). Parallel to the findings of the opinion polls, turnout rates decreased 
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significantly in the 2002 elections. Hence, although compulsory voting forced the 
voters to vote for any of the parties, opinion polls signaled to political entrepreneurs 
that it was the right time for strategic entry for receiving the support of the 
disenchanted voters. 
High levels of volatility prepared the fertile ground for frequent splits and 
the mergers in the 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000s. Electoral volatility 
during the post-1980 period stemmed from the fragmentation of the center-left and 
center-right due to the artificial barriers put by the military, frequent party closures, 
absence of close relations between the political parties and civil society 
organizations and the inability of the center-right and center-left parties to cope with 
economic problems (Kalaycıoğlu and Çarkoğlu 2007, 35; Özbudun 2000, 78). 
Firstly, the decisions of the military regarding the political entrepreneurs of the pre-
intervention period increased the number of free-floating voters. Dissolution of all 
pre-intervention parties and purge of their leaders resulted in the disruption of 
political socialization (Kalaycıoğlu 2008, 299) and party-cleavage linkages 
(Hazama 2007, 93). Moreover, the repeal of the ban on political activities of former 
party leaders with the referendum in 1987 (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 33) and 
the re-establishment of some of the outlawed parties in 1992 increased both the 
party system fragmentation and the volatility levels.  
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Figure 15: Economic Indicators (1981-2002) 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from TÜİK (2009). Economic growth indicates the yearly change 
in Gross National Product (GNP). Inflation indicates the yearly change in the GNP Deflator. 
Averages for each legislative term are taken.  
 
In addition to artificial barriers, the economic performances of coalition 
governments in the 1990s played a major role in the high levels of electoral 
volatility during the 1990s. The 1990s, named by the OECD as a ‘lost decade’, was 
characterized by volatile GDP growth, skyrocketing inflation, considerable 
unemployment problems and years of economic crises that were followed by 
recoveries (McLaren 2008, 85; Pamuk 2008, 290) (Figure 15). Frequent economic 
crises during the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium shook the 
confidence of voters towards established parties. Scholarly works on the 
relationship between economic performance and voting for incumbents confirms 
the retrospective voting hypothesis, which asserts that voters tended to punish the 
incumbents with poor economic performance (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and 
Şenatalar 2004, 310, 2005, 558; Çarkoğlu 2002, 34; Hazama 2007, 127; Özbudun 
2000, 79; Waterbury 1992, 132) and reward parties that are perceived to manage 
the economy successfully (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2009, 388; 
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Kalaycıoğlu 2008, 308–309)77. Given the fact that all center-right and center-left 
parties participated in the coalition governments of the 1990s, their poor economic 
performance provided fertile ground for high electoral volatility (Hazama 2007, 
127), and hence new party entrance.  
It was not only the mounting economic problems that decreased the voters’ 
confidence in established parties but also corruption scandals. According to the 
Transparency International, Turkey, which ranked the 29th among 41 countries in 
1995, scored the 64th among 102 countries in 200278. The allegation of corruption 
damaged the public image of mainly the leaders of the center-right parties (Lowry 
2000, 32)79. Surveys conducted between 1997 and 2002 showed that the 
participants demanded clean politics (Hürriyet, July 7 1997). However, they were 
not sure about the capabilities of the politicians to solve the problem of corruption 
(Hürriyet, March 4, 2001). This was due to equation of the politicians with 
corruptions (Hürriyet, December 14, 2002). Indeed, various surveys showed that 
political parties were the least trusted political institutions80. The lack of public trust 
                                                 
 
77 For examples to the public polls on the relationship between economic performance and 
incumbent popularity published in Hürriyet, see Hürriyet, March 4, 2001; Hürriyet, October 21, 
2002. See also ANAR (2001, 79).  
78 For corruption scores and ranks of Turkey, see Transparency International, available at: 
http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/previous_cpi 
79 For examples to the public polls on public images of the party leaders, see Hürriyet, December 
1, 1998; Hürriyet, January 7, 1998; Hürriyet, November 19, 1999.  
80 For these opinion polls, see Hürriyet, November 29, 1997; Hürriyet, December 1, 1998; Hürriyet, 
November 28, 1998; Hürriyet, March 6, 2001.   
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for existing politicians increased the viability of political entrepreneurs with no 
relations with the alleged corruption and frauds.   
Finally, the demand size of the electoral market was further populated with 
the salience of religious and ethnic demands to be represented either by the 
established parties or by new parties. The rise of support for the RP and the HADEP 
led scholars to conclude that secularism versus Islamic fundamentalism and Turkish 
versus Kurdish nationalism became new sources of political divide in the 1990s 
(Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2004, 310; Ciddi 2009, 89–91; Çarkoğlu 
2002, 35; Çelebi, Toros, and Aras 1996, 26–27; Hale and Özbudun 2010, 13; 
Kalaycıoğlu 1994, 421, 1999, 62, 2008, 300–301; Özbudun 2000, 78). Hence, with 
the rise of new demands, it was natural for electoral volatility and party system 
fragmentation to increase (Kalaycıoğlu 1999, 74)81.  
In short, although the entry costs were high in the 1990s, the perceived 
viability of new parties contributed to the fragmentation of party system and 
prepared the ground for the entrance of splitter parties. Nevertheless, the picture 
will be deficient without taking the inner dynamics of the party splits into account. 
                                                 
 
81 Some of the scholars argued that these cleavages overlap with the center-periphery cleavage and 
that the secularist-religious cleavages reinforce rather than cross-cut the center-periphery cleavages. 
For these studies, see Çarkoğlu (2002, 35); Hale and Özbudun (2010, 34); Kalaycıoğlu (1994, 421). 
On the other hand, some of the scholars relate the rise of the new cleavages to the influences of 
globalization. See Öniş (1997).  
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Below, we provide the details of the intraparty conflict in the DYP and the DSP, 
which ended with the formation of the DTP and the YTP, respectively. 
6.2.Fragmenting the Center-Right to Unite the Center-Right: Split within the 
True Path Party and Formation of the Democrat Turkey Party, 1997 
The DYP was formed in 1983 as the successor of the outlawed AP82. During 
the period that former AP leader Süleyman Demirel was outlawed, the DYP was 
ruled by caretakers, namely Ahmet Nusret Tuna, Yıldırım Avcı and Hüsamettin 
Cindoruk. When the ban on former politicians was lifted in 1987, the party congress 
elected Süleyman Demirel as the chair. From the 1987 to the 1991 elections, the 
party constantly increased its votes to 19.1% and 27.0 % respectively. Following 
the 1991 elections, the DYP formed a coalition government with the SHP. After the 
sudden death of President Turgut Özal, Demirel was elected as the new President 
with the support of the SHP. 
The DYP was primarily the party of Demirel and his close associates. 
Although the party was built through the mobilization of the traditional clientele of 
the AP, competition with ANAP in a new political context that was characterized 
by the trends of ‘Americanization of political competition’ and ‘effective 
governance’ ended up with searches for changes in the ideology and leadership 
                                                 
 
82 For more on the founding of the DYP, see Çavuşoğlu (2009, 18–48). For more on the 
developments in the DYP until 1987, see Acar (1991).  
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practices of the DYP (Cizre 1996, 144–145, 2002a, 83–85). In order to change its 
image as the ‘rural party’ and in order to appeal to the new urban middles class, 
which placed more emphasis on individualism and economic liberalism and which 
had grown in size in the 1980s, the DYP leadership incorporated new young and 
dynamic faces to the party that could appeal to the new voters (Bildirici 1998, 158; 
Cizre 2002a, 86; Erel and Bilge 1994, 23; Süter 2002, 12). It was within this new 
context of political competition that Tansu Çiller, a professor of economics that had 
no prior relation with the DYP, was elected as member to the DYP General 
Administrative Council (Cizre 2002b, 1999; Süter 2002, 20).   
Once Demirel left and was elected as the new President, the leadership of 
the DYP became a matter of question. At first, Hüsamettin Cindoruk, the Speaker 
of the TBMM and the former chair of the DYP, was expected to stand for the DYP 
chairmanship (Güven 2008, 8). However, President Demirel demanded him to 
remain as TBMM speaker (Cizre 2002b, 202) and stated that he would not support 
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any candidates (Heper and Çınar 1996, 499)83. In the end, Tansu Çiller was elected 
as the new DYP chair at the second extraordinary congress convened in 199384.  
Figure 16: Analytical Narrative of Split within the DYP 
 
 
During her leadership, Çiller purged the old guard from the ruling seats. This 
in turn, led to the alienation of the old guard from the party chair. Simultaneously, 
                                                 
 
83 Cindoruk’s candidacy was demanded by 110 DYP deputies. After the meeting with President 
Demirel, Cindoruk declared that he would not register for the elections (Erel and Bilge 1994, 118). 
According to Çavuşoğlu (2009, 148), the support of Cindoruk to Saadettin Bilgiç during the split of 
the AP was the prime reason behind Demirel’s dislike of Cindoruk. For Cizre (2002b, 202), 
Demirel’s reluctance to endorse Cindoruk stemmed from his concern of creating a strong rival for 
himself in the DYP. For Deva (2000, 224), Demirel was at odds with Cindoruk due to the latter’s 
opposition to the merge of the AP with the DYP. In his interview with Turgut Yılmaz Güven (2008, 
39–45), Cindoruk stated Demirel demanded him to remain as the speaker of the TBMM so that the 
DYP could hold all important seats. In another interview with Deva (2000, 233–234), Cindoruk 
rejected the argument that Demirel was at odds with him due to the latter’s intentions to be elected 
as the new President. Here it should be recalled that ANAP demanded Cindoruk to be nominated as 
President.  
84 The three candidates, namely Tansu Çiller, Ismet Sezgin and Köksal Toptan, received 574, 320 
and 212 votes, respectively. Sezgin and Toptan declared that they would not participate in the second 
round. Çiller received 933 votes at the second round and was elected as the DYP chair (Güven 2008, 
31–32). Çiller was supported by President Demirel’s close associates as well as the provincial chairs 
and the deputies who believed that the ANAP’s new leader Mesut Yılmaz could be countered with 
a new political talent (Erel and Bilge 1994, 125). Besides, Çiller also received the support of The 
Union of Chamber and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, the largest businessmen association in 
Turkey (Çavuşoğlu 2009, 152).  
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the rise of the RP as a powerful competitor for the votes of the center-right increased 
the pressures over the two center-right parties for a coalition. The dissidents used 
these demands to challenge the DYP chairwoman. However, Çiller’s co-optation 
and divide-and-rule tactics constantly challenged the unity of the dissidents. Once 
the DYP leader decided to form a coalition with the Islamist RP, dissent rose again 
(Figure 16).  
After they resigned from the DYP, the dissidents waited for the 
developments in the DYP and the ANAP with the hope that their project for a new 
party could attract the remaining dissidents in the DYP and the disappointed 
members of the ANAP. However, the longevity of the new party formation 
undermined the basis of the anti-Çiller coalition. In the end, the old guard of the 
DYP formed the DTP at the beginning of 1997.  
The following part will deal with the reasons of discontent that ended up 
with party split. That will be followed by the analytical narrative of the intraparty 
conflict phase and analysis of the reasons behind party split. Finally, the departure 
phase will be discussed in detail.  
6.2.1. Dissent 
Conflict within the DYP revolved around two issues: exclusion of the old 
guards from the cabinet and the demands for cooperation between the two center-
right parties.  
202 
6.2.1.1.Exclusion of the Old Guard from the Selective Benefits 
Discontent in the DYP was not much related to the election of Çiller as the 
new DYP chair; it was more about the way the party chair treated the prominent 
members of the DYP who had dedicated their lives to first the AP and then the 
DYP. Following her election as the new chair, Çiller attempted to consolidate her 
control over the party. The removal of the associates of Demirel from the first Çiller 
cabinet was followed by the dissolution of the provincial executive boards prior to 
the fourth congress (Çavuşoğlu 2009, 157)85. The pace of Çiller’s attempt to 
maintain the control of the party led to the dissatisfaction of the old guard. They 
demanded Cindoruk to run as candidate for the DYP chair at the coming congress 
in 1993 but the latter rejected their demands (Milliyet, November 15, 1993). Hence, 
the dissidents started to negotiate with the party leader for securing their seats at the 
General Administrative Council (GAC)86, the highest decision-making mechanism 
of the DYP after the General Congress (Milliyet, October 21, 1993)87. Given the 
absence of any significant competitors, Çiller was easily re-elected. But more 
                                                 
 
85 Among the close associates of Demirel, Çiller assigned seats in the cabinet to only Necmettin 
Cevheri and Mehmet Gölhan (Erel and Bilge 1994, 140). During the debate on the first Çiller cabinet 
at the DYP group, nearly half of the DYP deputies voted against the new cabinet (Çavuşoğlu 2009, 
157). In order to protest the new cabinet, three DYP deputies resigned.  
86 For the details of the developments prior to the congress, see Şamil Tayyar, “DYP’de Kongreye 
Doğru”, Milliyet, November 14-18, 1993. 
87 The DYP bylaw stipulated that the General Administrative Council, which was composed of 40 
members elected at the General Congress, was responsible for taking all decisions with the exception 
of dissolution of the party and making changes in party bylaws and program. The Council had the 
right to determine the nominations, decide on termination and formation of governments, elect the 
deputy-chairs, and pardon those punished by disciplinary boards (Doğru Yol Partisi 1990 Article 
50).  
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important than her election was the approval of the list that Çiller had proposed for 
the GAC by the Congress delegates (Milliyet, November 22, 1993) 88. Hence, within 
six months, Çiller gained the control of the extraparliamentary party.  
Once she consolidated her power over the extraparliamentary party, Çiller 
ruled the cabinet and the party without any input from the associates of Demirel. 
She legitimized the exclusion of the old guard from selective benefits with reference 
to her attempts to create a new, urban, modern and young image for the party (Cizre 
2002b, 203). However, this directed the criticisms of the old guard against Çiller. 
In 1994, the dissidents who were excluded from the administration of the party 
started to gather around Cindoruk once again. Cindoruk and the dissidents 
complained about Çiller’s attempts to purge the ‘devotees of the 1946 spirit’ and to 
fill the party with her supporters which were defined by Cindoruk as the ‘fools and 
the yes-men’ (Milliyet, May 5, 1995). In another case, Cindoruk stated that the 
masses would not only vote for political window dressing (Milliyet, May 13, 1995). 
Cindoruk also warned that it was the old guard who had paved the way for Çiller’s 
chairwomanship and stated that they could remove her if they wanted (Milliyet, 
August 12, 1995). Yet, the DYP leadership insisted in her attempts to renew the 
DYP cadres and responded to the criticisms of the old guard by stating that the DYP 
                                                 
 
88 In addition to the 16 members who could secure their seats in the GAC, 24 new members were 
elected by the Congress delegates (Milliyet, November 22, 1993). Against the claims that the 
associates of Demirel were excluded from the GAC, Çiller stated that the GAC list had been prepared 
by the provincial chairs and added that the will of Congress had to be respected (Milliyet, November 
22, 1993). It should be also noted that prior to Congress, 39 provincial chairs had declared their 
support to Çiller (Milliyet, November 8, 1993).  
204 
was not the war veterans associations, a highly insulting criticism (Milliyet, August 
29, 1995). In this sense, the conflict over the distribution of selective benefits 
characterized the early years of Çiller’s rule.  
6.2.1.2.Coalition Formation Attempts and Demands for the Merge of Center 
Right 
The fragmentation of the center-right and the inability of the two center-
right parties to cooperate in order to overcome the country’s mounting problems 
had been a matter of complaint in the 1990s. Developments in the SHP augmented 
demands for the unification or the coalition of the two center-right parties89. More 
importantly, the victory of the RP in the 1994 municipal elections led the 
businessmen, the army and the press to ask for cooperation between, and if possible 
merge, of the two main center-right parties in order to avoid a further increase in 
the support of the parties which were considered as a potential threat to the regime 
(Zürcher 2004, 295). 
As early as 1993, DYP deputies had started to demand the replacement of 
the DYP-SHP coalition with a DYP-ANAP coalition (Milliyet, November 2, 1993). 
Just a few days after the 1994 municipal elections, the demands for the DYP-ANAP 
                                                 
 
89 In 1993, the SHP leader Erdal Inonu retired and was succeeded by Murat Karayalçın. When the 
country was hit by an economic crisis in 1994, disagreements among the coalition partners came to 
the fore. For more on the conflict among the coalition partners during the chairmanship of 
Karayalçın to the SHP, see Çavuşoğlu (2009, 162–170) 
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coalition were voiced by the businessmen and 60 DYP deputies (Milliyet, April 1, 
1994). Next, in response to the decreasing support to the DYP-SHP coalition, 37 
DYP deputies demanded the termination of the coalition in October, 1994 (Güven 
2008, 70–72). Despite these, the DYP leader decided to form a minority 
government. This raised the discontent of those demanding a center-right coalition 
(Milliyet, September 27, 1995)90. Being aware of the potential dissatisfaction with 
the minority government, Çiller coopted some of her ardent critics by including her 
opponents to the cabinet of the minority government and by nominating Ismet 
Sezgin, a close associate of Demirel and a highly influential challenger, as candidate 
for the TBMM Speaker (Cizre 2002a, 95). Besides, Çiller expelled Cindoruk and 
the dissident deputies who had abstained from voting for the government (Milliyet, 
October 17, 1995)91.  
The dissenting deputies assumed that President Demirel would designate 
Hüsamettin Cindoruk as the prime minister once the minority government of the 
DYP fell (Milliyet, October 6, 1995). However, the designation of Çiller as prime 
minister and the formation of DYP-CHP coalition was a shock for the dissidents, 
who were dreaming of uniting the center-right around the re-opened Democrat 
                                                 
 
90 In the interview with Deva (2000, 237), Cindoruk stated that he and his associates opposed the 
formation of a minority government since minority governments did not have the capacity to 
legislate and implement policies to solve the problems of the country.  
91 Prior to the voting, four deputies resigned from the DYP (Milliyet, October 13, 1995). During the 
voting of the minority government’s program, seven DYP deputies voted against, whereas six of 
them abstained from voting (Milliyet, October 16, 1995).  
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Party (Milliyet, October 14, 1995; Zaman, September 10, 1995). When their plans 
to remove Çiller failed, the expelled dissidents ran as candidates from the ANAP 
list, whereas Cindoruk remained independent to wait for the developments in the 
DYP after the elections (Milliyet, December 19, 1995; Zaman, October 20, 1995).  
The DYP came the third and received 19.13% of the votes and 135 seats at 
the 1995 elections. More importantly, the RP rose as the winner of the elections. 
During the negotiations between the ANAP and the RP for coalition formation, the 
military, press and the businessmen pressed for the coalition of the two center-right 
parties (Gökmen 1999, 57–59)92. This demand was shared by most of the DYP and 
the ANAP provincial chairs as well as the old guard (Milliyet, January 2, 1996). In 
the end, the Motherland (Anayol) coalition was formed (Milliyet, 07.03.1996). 
However, the coalition collapsed when ANAP supported the RP’s motions calling 
for Çiller’s investigation about the TEDAŞ and the TOFAŞ corporations that had 
been allegedly sold for less than their real value (Meyer 1999, 491–492). This 
proved that the merge of the center-right parties was impossible until their leaders 
stepped down.  
                                                 
 
92 The intervention of the military in negotiations for coalition formation would later be subject to 
the so-called trials of 28 February. Besides, a parliamentary investigation committee was formed to 
investigate the military interventions and the memorandums. The commission reported that the 
Chief of General Staff Ismail Hakkı Karadayı got into contact with the TBMM Speaker Mustafa 
Kalemli and demanded Kalemli to prevent the formation of the ANAP-RP coalition (TBMM 2012, 
946). The pressure over the two parties exerted by the military is noted by various journalists who 
had witnessed the period. For examples to similar statements, see Çalmuk (2000, 167–189); Gökmen 
(1999, 128–131).  
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The termination of the Anayol coalition also showed that no stable 
government could be formed without the support of the winner of the 1995 elections 
(Zürcher 2004, 299). The DYP leadership negotiated with the RP and the latter 
offered the DYP chair to suspend the parliamentary investigations into her financial 
dealings in exchange for her support for a coalition between these two parties (Pope 
and Pope 1997, 321). In the end the DYP and the RP agreed on the coalition 
(Özdalga 2002, 134). It was after this agreement that the dissidents fled away from 
the DYP. 
6.2.2. Intraparty Conflict 
Intraparty conflict, which was postponed with Çiller’s call for early 
elections gained pace at the beginning of 1996. After the formation of the Anayol 
coalition, the old guard first tried to challenge the DYP chair through the meeting 
of the extraordinary congress (Zaman, April 7, 1996). They utilized the allegation 
of corruption about Çiller in their struggle against the DYP chair (Milliyet, April, 
29, 1996). Once their plan to remove Çiller through the extraordinary congress 
failed due to the decision of the County Election Board, they demanded the 
resignation of the DYP deputies to protest Çiller (Zaman, May 21, 1996).  
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Table 19: Chronology of Events (1995-1996) 
19 September 1995 The DYP-CHP coalition was terminated. 
13 October 1995 The DYP minority government could not receive vote of confidence 
16 October 1995 Cindoruk and nine DYP deputies were expelled from the DYP. 
30 October 1995 The DYP-CHP coalition was formed 
24 December 1995 1995 General elections. The DYP came the third. 
6 March 1996 The ANAP-DYP coalition was formed.  
22 April 1996 30 ANAP deputies declared that they would vote in favor of the RP’s 
request about Çiller. Çiller declared that the DYP was ready for a 
coalition with the RP. 
24 May 1996 The DYP General Administrative Council decided to withdraw from the 
government. 
6 June 1996 The Constitutional Court decided that the vote of confidence for the 
ANAP-DYP coalition was void. Prime Minister Yilmaz resigned.  
15 June 1996 The BTP was re-opened.  
21 June 1996 Four members of the DYP General Administrative Council resigned to 
protest negotiations for a coalition with the RP.  
28 June 1996 The RP-DYP coalition was declared 
8 July 1996 The RP-DYP coalition won vote of confidence. 278 deputies voted in 
favor of the coalition whereas 265 deputies voted against.  
16 July 1996 Eight DYP deputies who had voted against the coalition resigned from 
the DYP 
21 July 1996 The 5th DYP Congress. Çiller won 1095 of 1208 votes of delegates.  
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Milliyet and Zaman. 
 
The dissidents exploited the dissatisfaction that stemmed from the party’s 
decision to form a coalition government with an anti-system party in the summer 
of 1996. Those disappointed with Çiller’s decision showed their dissatisfaction in 
the form of either exit or voice. Prior to the voting of the first Erbakan’s government 
programme, the founders of the DYP issued a communique calling for the DYP 
deputies to vote against the Refahyol coalition (Çavuşoğlu 2009, 208). Besides, 
eight deputies resigned from the DYP, five of them switching to ANAP (Milliyet, 
2 July 1996). The old guard also rejuvenated the Great Turkey Party (Büyük Türkiye 
Partisi-BTP) in order to attract the support of the disappointed deputies in not only 
the DYP but also ANAP and RP (Milliyet, 08 June 1996; Milliyet, 11 June 1996; 
Milliyet, 12 June 1996). Despite the attempts of the dissidents, the party leader did 
not retreat from forming a coalition with RP. Next, the dissidents of the DYP voted 
against the government programme. However, the Refahyol was approved by a 
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close majority, thanks to the support of the BBP (Milliyet, July 9, 1996). Following 
the approval of the coalition by Parliament, eight of the fourteen DYP deputies who 
voted against or abstained from the voting resigned from the DYP (Milliyet, July 
17, 1996). With the resignations, the number of the DYP seats at the parliament 
decreased to 120 (Milliyet, 17 July 1996). 
6.2.3. Endogenous Factors of Party Split 
The political context within which the intraparty conflict in the DYP 
occurred was relatively favorable for the entrance of splinter parties compared to 
the pre-1995 period. With the amendments prior to the 1995 elections, the barriers 
on the entrance of new parties had decreased even though the disproportionality and 
the RRP values were relatively high due to the 10% national threshold. More 
importantly, public polls and the decrease in the votes of the two main parties 
signaled the disappointment of voters with the established parties. On the other 
hand, the fragmentation of the party system increased the bargaining of the minor 
parties in case of coalition formation. Since the Refahyol coalition was approved 
with a close majority, a new party could receive the support of the DYP deputies 
who were dissatisfied with the party chair and who were in a demand to benefit 
from the state resources if the new party became a part of an alternative coalition. 
In this sense, the new party could bargain for disproportional distribution of 
ministerial position under the fragmented party system. Finally, the political future 
of the DYP leader was far from certain. Given the pressures over the Refahyol 
coalition exerted by business, the military and the mainstream media and given the 
proposals for parliamentary investigations on the allegation of corruption and 
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misconduct about the DYP chair, the dissidents believed that they could attract the 
remaining dissidents in the DYP in case they formed a new party. In this sense, the 
uncertainty about the future of the coalition and the DYP facilitated the party split.   
On the other hand, the DYP leader did not accommodate the demands of the 
dissidents due to three reasons: the questioning of the legitimacy of the party leader 
made accommodation impossible, the dissidents were weak in all layers of the party 
organization and the leader had established autonomy from the factions prior to the 
1995 elections.   
6.2.3.1.The Nature of Disagreement 
The reason of dissent within the DYP was twofold: exclusion of the 
associates of Demirel from selective benefits, and the pressures over the party chair 
for the Anayol coalition. The first source of conflict was more easily resolved 
compared to the demands for the merge of the two parties. During the fourth 
congress in 1993, Çiller co-opted some of her ardent critics by nominating them 
from her list for the General Administrative Council (GAC). Besides, Çiller also 
rewarded her potential challengers with ministerial positions in the minority 
government. Such measures by the leadership divided the dissidents who were 
primarily concerned with the distribution of selective benefits and who were far 
from agreeing on the leadership to their movement. However, the dissidents who 
later founded the DTP believed that the DYP had turned to be a vehicle for personal 
gains of its leader and that the allegation of corruption had damaged the image of 
the DYP (Demokrat Türkiye Partisi 1997, 7). In this sense, although the dissidents 
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and the DYP leadership did not significantly differ in terms of their policy goals, 
the former were of the idea that the DYP leader had betrayed the original ideals of 
the party. The rejection of the legitimacy of the party leader prevented the 
accommodation of the conflict over the distribution of selective benefits.  
The merge of the two center-right parties was a hard mission. Scholars that 
compared these two parties found that they had differences in terms of their social 
bases (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2004) and policy goals (Cizre 1996; 
Çavuşoğlu 2010). But the general idea is that the two center-right parties did not 
significantly differ in ideological terms (Öniş 1997, 751). The impossibility of the 
merge of the two center-right parties was the result of two reasons. Firstly, the DYP 
members were of the idea that ANAP was the product of the military intervention. 
This perception stemmed from the fact that ANAP and the military had tried to 
prevent the DYP from revitalizing itself and from mobilizing its traditional clientele 
(Cizre 1996, 144, 2002a, 85). ANAP’s attitude during the referendum for the repeal 
of bans on outlawed politicians, the amendment of the electoral law before the 1987 
elections in order to provide more seats for ANAP, and the election of Turgut Özal 
as President despite the declining votes of the ANAP in the 1989 local elections had 
been contested by the DYP leadership. Hence, ANAP was portrayed as “the 
emanation of the coup using the political influence of the military for furthering its 
political fortunes” (Cizre 2002a, 88). Moreover, the DYP became dependent on 
negating some unsavory aspects of the neo-liberal discourse of ANAP, such as 
social welfare, civilization and democratization, rather than crystalizing its own 
ideological commitments (Cizre 1996, 146). Given the enmity between the two 
parties, the merge of the center-right was an uneasy mission to be accomplished.  
212 
Doubts about ANAP’s intentions was another factor making the merge of 
the DYP and ANAP a difficult mission during the reign of Çiller. It was true that 
the gap between the two parties in terms of economic policies had decreased with 
the advent of Çiller’s leadership (Cizre 2002a, 89). This time, personal 
disagreements and distrust between the leaders of DYP and ANAP made the merge 
impossible (Pope and Pope 1997, 314). The DYP leadership was of the idea that 
the ANAP leader was in an attempt to rule out the DYP leader by various ways, 
including supporting the prime ministry of Hüsamettin Cindoruk, negotiating with 
the dissidents of the DYP, and using the corruption inquires. Hence, the demands 
of the dissidents could not be easily accommodated by the DYP leader.  
6.2.3.2.Relative Power of Competing Factions across Different Layers of Party 
Organization 
The dissidents of the DYP were in a minority in all layers of the party 
organization both prior to and after the 1995 elections. The DYP Congresses held 
in 1993 and 1996 had proven that the DYP leader had the support of the delegates, 
and hence the party on the ground. Dissenting party members, who later exited the 
party held 12 out of 40 seats of the General Administrative Council in the 1993 
Congress. Besides, Çiller received 1045 votes out of 1215 Congress delegates. 
Moreover, both in 1993 and 1996 Congresses, the candidates for GAC nominated 
by the party leader were approved by Congress. Çiller was re-elected in the 1996 
Congress by obtaining 1095 out of 1208 votes. These Congresses indicated that 
Çiller could control the ruling party offices. In addition to these, the dissidents 
lacked the support of the parliamentary party. Only 13 and 14 deputies voted against 
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the DYP minority group and the Refahyol coalition, respectively. Besides, 33 out 
of 135 DYP deputies switched to the DTP. This made it easy for the DYP leader to 
neglect the demands of the dissidents without leading to the termination of the 
coalition with the CHP and the RP.  
6.2.3.3.Leadership Autonomy 
The autonomy of the party leader in the DYP stemmed from the Political 
Parties Law that ordered the election of party leader by the congress delegates and 
the DYP bylaw that gave the GAC the right to dissolve local executive boards. 
According to the 14th article of the PPL, party leaders, members of Central 
Decision-making and Administration Council and members of the Central 
Disciplinary Board were elected by Congress delegates who were elected by 
provincial congresses. On the other hand, the 37th article of the DYP bylaw (1990) 
stipulated that the GAC had the right to dissolve the provincial and sub-provincial 
branches. With this right, Çiller who had succeeded in achieving the control of the 
GAC in 1993 Congress could dissolve the provincial executive boards in order to 
control the selection of Congress delegates. In addition to the determination of the 
selectorate, the DYP leader could use the benefits of being in government in order 
to increase her autonomy from the factions. That is, the DYP chair could weaken 
intraparty opposition by controlling the distribution of cabinet posts. The 
consequence was a highly autonomous party leader who could retain the legitimacy 
of her decisions simply by pointing out the leadership selection methods. 
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6.2.4. Departure: Conflict among the Dissidents and Formation of the 
Democratic Turkey Party 
Following their resignations, the opponents of Çiller started to work on a 
new party without any expectations from the coming DYP congress that would 
convene on 21st of July, 1996 (Milliyet, July 11, 1996). This was due to the fact that 
the supporters of Çiller had already won the provincial congresses (Milliyet, May 
31, 1996). Hence, during the meeting on the 16th of June 1996, eight of the 
dissidents in the DYP started to resign, whereas two of them remained in the party 
(Milliyet, June 17, 1996)93.   
For Çiller’s opponents, a new party that would rejuvenate the ‘1946 spirit’ 
and unite the fragmented center-right in line with the demands of the voters had to 
be formed (Milliyet, 11 July 1996; Milliyet, July 17, 1996)94. According to their 
estimation, a new center-right party would receive around 25% of the votes 
(Milliyet, September 12, 1996). Additionally, the dissidents believed that a new 
party would also attract deputies from ANAP and force the DYP and ANAP leaders 
to joint action (Milliyet, June 16, 1996; Milliyet, June 20, 1996). Hence, the 
dissidents waited for the results of the ANAP Congress that would convene in 
August 1996 (Milliyet, July 25, 1996). While deciding on their strategy, they also 
                                                 
 
93 These deputies were Gencay Gürün, Ayseli Göksoy. (Milliyet, 17 June 1996).   
94 Public opinion conducted by the dissidents found that 55% of the participants demanded the 
opponents to continue with the DYP, whereas 43.9% demanded them to form a new party (Milliyet, 
20 July, 1996).  
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got into contact with the leaders of minor right-wing parties such as the BBP and 
the YDP (Zaman, November 20, 1996). They were expecting that the coalition with 
the Islamist party would trigger further resignations from the DYP (Milliyet, July 
23, 1996). However, none of their expectations came true.  
During the wait-and-see period, the disagreements among the dissidents 
came to the fore. For some of the resigned deputies that had gathered around Köksal 
Toptan, a new nationalist, conservative and modern party that would rejuvenate the 
‘1946 spirit’ and the AP tradition would become the focal point of attraction for the 
voters and the deputies who were disappointed with the leaders of the center-right 
parties (Milliyet, July 20, 1996). Besides, Toptan believed that it was impossible for 
the DYP leader to terminate the Refahyol coalition since the RP could effectively 
use the allegation of corruption against the DYP chair (Milliyet, July 20, 1996). 
Hence, Toptan demanded the formation of a genuinely new party that was located 
at the center of the political spectrum (Milliyet, July 29, 1996).  Against this, 
Cindoruk and the old guard believed that the success of a new party depended on 
its ability to transfer more dissatisfied voters from the DYP (Milliyet, September 
16, 1996). This, for Toptan, would erode the viability of the new party and turn it 
into a movement of the resentful (Milliyet, 16 September 1996).  
Additionally, the dissidents came into conflict about the leadership of the 
new formation (Zaman, September 24, 1996). In order to overcome this, Ismet 
Sezgin was pointed as the third alternative (Milliyet, October 7, 1996). Additionally, 
the supporters of Cindoruk set the termination of the Refahyol government as their 
first goal and called for early elections in order to trigger discontent within the DYP 
(Milliyet, October 16, 1996). This led Toptan and Çağlar to withdraw their support 
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from the new formation on the ground that Cindoruk and his followers were far 
from proposing an alternative to the existing center-right parties (Milliyet, 
December 12, 1996). In the end, the Democrat Turkey Party was formed by 33 DYP 
deputies but without the support of the younger dissidents on the 7th of January 
1997, the anniversary of the formation of the Democrat Party.  
6.3. Exit without Voice: Breakdown of the Democratic Left Party and 
Formation of the New Turkey Party, 2002. 
The DSP was a genuinely new party that was formed by the Ecevits in 1985. 
Despite the demands of the former CHP members for the support of Ecevit to 
SODEP, Mr. Ecevit refused to form a party during the liberalization period (Bila 
2001, 21). In fact, Ecevit’s experiences during the period he was CHP chair led him 
to conclude that no cohesive party could be formed together with the political 
entrepreneurs of the CHP (Akar 2002, 88). The following words of Ecevit are worth 
quoting in order to understand the reasons behind the formation of a genuinely new 
party rather than cooperation with the existing SHP (Bila 2001, 204–205): 
I hit the pavement not to divide the social democrats but to rescue 
them from the separatism of the factions. Both I and the DSP aim to 
unite the social democrats and to bring them to the government under 
a more consistent and modern direction, under a more steady 
organization and by rescuing them from the shadow of those at more 
left. I cannot be a guarantor for an organization that carries the flaws 
of the past. If the CHP had not been outlawed, we would try to 
remedy the flaws within the CHP…. This party considers itself as 
responsible for reaching millions of social democrats who have been 
trapped under rightist parties due to the mistakes and repulsiveness 
of some of the leftists in the past… Leaving aside those who have not 
escaped from the habit of factionalism, those who look down on 
masses, and those who call them to be leftist while cooperating with 
the dominant forces, I am calling for the unification of social 
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democrats around the masses rather than around an organization that 
is prone to split due to ideological struggles.  
 
Ecevit was highly disturbed by the elitist outlook of the CHP (Akar 2002, 
35) and the definition of etatism proposed by the party (Bila 2001, 206). For Ecevit, 
as long as the elitist attitude of the CHP prevailed, the party would not attract the 
votes of the masses that had a dislike for the term left (Arcayürek 2006, 241)95. In 
short, the DSP was formed in response to the factionalism of the CHP and the 
radical leftists who, the Ecevits believed, had led to the alienation of the masses 
from the left.  
From its foundation, the party was run by the Ecevits. Before forming the 
new party, they carefully reviewed and selected the founders of the new party 
among nonprofessional politicians (Akar 2002, 34; Bila 2001, 123–128). As the 
party grew in size, the Ecevits were accompanied by third figures but they always 
retained the control of the party in their hands (Akar 2002, 38). The party gradually 
increased its electoral strength in consecutive elections and became a relevant party 
in formation or termination of the coalitions. Following the demise of the Refahyol 
coalition, the DSP took part in the second Yılmaz cabinet. This was followed by 
the minority government formed by the DSP. In the 1999 elections, the DSP came 
the first and formed a coalition government with ANAP and MHP. When Ecevit’s 
                                                 
 
95 For the statements of the Ecevits regarding the ideological differences between the SODEP/SHP 
and the DSP, see Bila (2001, 136–152); Yağız (2002, 67–69). For Ecevit’s ideas on the intellectuals 
and the CHP, see Arcayürek (2006, 236–245) 
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health condition deteriorated, Ecevit was accompanied by Hüsamettin Özkan in 
cabinet affairs (Bildirici 2000, 171; Derviş, Asker, and Işık 2006, 94; Dündar 2008, 
244). However, the deterioration of the relations between Özkan and Mrs. Ecevit 
ended up with the resignation of Özkan from the DSP. 
Figure 17: Analytical Narrative of the Breakdown of the DSP 
 
 
After the resignation of Özkan, the party suddenly broke down. Among the 
party splits analyzed in this work; the split of the DSP was unique due to the absence 
of any identifiable factions and due to the decision of the dissidents to exit without 
voicing their demands within the party platforms. This was closely related with the 
fact that the DSP was primarily the party of its leader and that the party’s 
charismatic leader had constantly excluded any dissenting party member from the 
DSP. While the exclusionary strategies pulled the dissidents out of the DSP, 
economic problems, dissatisfaction of voters with the established parties and the 
demands of business for leadership turnover, which in the case of the DSP was 
impossible, constituted the opportunity push. Hence, within the day after their 
resignation, dissident deputies that primarily relied on the personal images of two 
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successful ministers, Ismail Cem and Kemal Derviş worked on the formation of a 
new party. In the end, the YTP was founded only within a few weeks (Figure 17).  
6.3.1. Dissent 
The breakdown of the DSP was closely related with the dependence of the 
party to the image of party leader which had ceased after the 1999 earth quake, 2001 
economic crises, and the uncertainties created by the deterioration of the DSP’s 
charismatic leader’s health conditions. Additionally, the fact that the party was run 
by the Ecevit family had led to dissatisfaction of DSP members.  
6.3.1.1.The Rahşan Ecevit Factor  
Dissent within the DSP mainly stemmed from the close control of the 
Ecevits over the party organization. Since the foundation of the DSP, Rahşan Ecevit 
has always been highly influential over the extraparliamentary party. During its 
foundation years, Rahşan Ecevit formed the party with reliable party members who, 
the Ecevits supposed, would not engage in factional games (Akar 2002, 36). Once 
Bülent Ecevit was elected as the party chair, Rahşan Ecevit formally or informally 
continued to exert influence over the administration of the party (Akar 2002, 92). 
Indeed, although the party’s secretary-generals were responsible for the 
extraparliamentary party affairs, it was Mrs. Ecevit who was the de facto ruler of 
the extraparliamentary party (Kınıklıoğlu 2002, 5). It was primarily Mrs. Ecevit’s 
authoritarianism, one interviewee said, that was the reason behind the breakdown 
of the party in 2002 (Interview with Ali Günay, June 15, 2013).  
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6.3.1.2.Leadership Succession Crisis 
More important than the Rahşan factor was the uncertainty about the future 
of the party due to the party chair’s health conditions. The DSP primarily relied on 
the personal charisma and public image of Bülent Ecevit for electoral success. In 
the minds of the voters, Ecevit was the savior of Cyprus as well as the honest, 
dependable and humble politician who had captured Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of 
the separatist Kurdish Workers’ Party (Ciddi 2009, 100; Lowry 2000, 30). Although 
the personal image of the DSP leader was an asset for the party in 1999 elections, 
it turned to be a liability after the deterioration of Mr. Ecevit’s health condition. 
Once Ecevit was taken to hospital, doubts about the future of the party increased. 
Ecevit’s health condition also increased doubts about the future of the 
coalition. The businessmen, the press and the military were mainly concerned with 
the future of the coalition in which Ecevit’s personality acted as a unifying bone 
among coalition partners with conflicting goals and interests. For the businessmen, 
strict obedience to economic reforms and enactment of the political reforms 
required for the country’s accession to the EU depended on the harmony between 
the partners of the coalition, which had been maintained under the prime ministry 
of Ecevit. In 2001, it was Ecevit who could convince the MHP leader for a 
constitutional amendment in order to restrict the death penalty to crimes committed 
in cases of war, or the imminent threat of war and terror crimes (Bildirici 2000, 32–
33; Özbudun 2007, 186). The MHP leader’s opposition to the third reform package, 
which included new reforms such as the abolition of the death penalty, the use of 
local languages other than Turkish in radio and television broadcasting and the 
instruction of local languages in private language courses (Özbudun 2007, 184), 
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was well-known (Bila 2004, 102–103). It was also clear that the MHP leader would 
break up the coalition if any person other than Ecevit was appointed as prime 
minister. Within this context of political uncertainty and the pressing problems of 
the country, the businessmen started to search for alternatives. Replacement of the 
DSP leader with a new political talent was one of those alternatives spoken indoors 
and sometimes voiced outdoors. 
Once the military, press and the businessmen demanded the replacement of 
Ecevit with a new political talent, the Ecevits started to believe that Özkan was 
taking part in the plot against them. Although Özkan rejected the claim that he had 
intentions of being the new prime minister (Milliyet, November 9, 2001), he could 
not convince the Ecevits, especially Mrs. Ecevit (Bila 2004, 28–30). 
Simultaneously, Cengiz Çandar wrote an article stating that Saddam Husain of Iraq 
would not be toppled by the USA unless Ecevit resigned (Yeni Şafak, November 
30, 2001). This led the Ecevits to conclude that they were in the middle of an 
international plot to remove the Ecevits96. Nevertheless, the conflict was postponed 
until the Prime Minister was taken to the hospital in May 2002.  
                                                 
 
96 In our interviews, both the dissidents and the supporters of Ecevit agreed on the idea that the 
USA was behind the plot against Ecevit. Ali Günay stated that the USA was demanding Ismail 
Cem’s prime ministry since they were in the idea that they could convince Cem for realization of 
the demands of the USA before attacking Iraq. Günay also added that representatives of the USA 
embassy visited Cem and that Cem rejected their demands. For Günay, it was after this visit that the 
support for the YTP decreased (Interview with Ali Günay, June 15, 2013). In a similar vein, Zeki 
Sezer, the successor of Ecevit after the latter’s resignation in 2002, stated that it was the external 
forces that triggered conflict in the DSP in order to maintain the prime ministry of a new politician 
that would realize the USA’s demands (Interview with Zeki Sezer, July 18, 2013). These arguments 
were shared by journalists such as Yağız (2002) and Bila (2004), who had witnessed the period.  
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The Prime Minister was taken to hospital at the beginning of May, 2002. 
During the period that Ecevit was in hospital, Derviş stated his demand for early 
elections as a solution for political uncertainty (Derviş, Asker, and Işık 2006, 165). 
However, for the DSP leadership, Derviş’s words were the evidence of the plot 
against the Ecevits and of the participation of Derviş, Cem and Özkan to this plot 
(Bila 2004, 71). For Rahşan Ecevit, Hüsamettin Özkan was planning to be the new 
Prime Minister with the help of internal and external forces (Bila 2004, 88). 
Although Özkan rejected these claims and accused some of the DSP members 
around the Ecevits for misguiding Mrs. Ecevit, (Bila 2004, 89), Bülent Ecevit 
started to believe in the scenarios. In reaction to Derviş, Ecevit stated that he would 
not resign since it could provoke another economic crisis. Besides, Ecevit noted 
that the designation of a successor would be an undemocratic practice as the DSP 
delegates would democratically elect the new DSP chair once stability was 
maintained (Bila 2004, 71)97.  
                                                 
 
97 In our interview, Zeki Sezer stated that even though Ecevit had resigned, it was highly likely for 
Ecevit to designate Sezer as his successor (Interview with Zeki Sezer, July 18, 2013).  Actually, just 
after the 2002 elections, the Ecevits pointed out Sezer as their successor and the latter was elected 
as the new DSP chair. Hence, it was unlikely for Özkan to become the chair to the DSP.  
223 
6.3.1.3.Decreasing Value of the Party’s Brand Name: The 1999 Earthquake 
and the 2001 Economic Crisis  
Two events decreased the value of the DSP for political entrepreneurs who 
intended to guarantee their re-election: the earthquake on the 17th of August, 1999 
and the economic crisis in 2001. The earthquake, which hit the Marmara region, 
was devastating for Turkey’s industrial heartland. The political effect of the 
earthquake was discontent with the incompetence of state institutions and the 
government, which failed to manage the disaster effectively (Jalali 2002, 126; 
Kubicek 2001, 38). However, more devastating for the public image of the DSP 
was the 2001 economic crisis. Following a heated argument between the President 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the Prime Minister Ecevit at the National Security Council 
meeting in February 2001, Turkey experienced its worst economic crisis (Ciddi 
2009, 100; Kınıklıoğlu 2002, 7). The economic crisis led the voters to blame Ecevit 
and the DSP for the economic crisis (Hürriyet, 21.10.2002). The DSP lost its 
electoral viability so did the DSP deputies their re-election prospects.   
6.3.2. Departure: Exit without Voice 
The series of events that ended with the departure of the DSP deputies to 
form the YTP started at the meeting of the coalition partners on the 4th of July 2002. 
During the meeting, Derviş restated his demand for early elections on the ground 
that the disagreements between coalition partners would prevent constitutional 
changes that were required Turkey’s accession to the European Union (Hürriyet, 
October 15, 2002). The silence of Hüsamettin Özkan to the critiques voiced at the 
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meeting led the party leader to conclude that Özkan had taken side with the 
domestic and international forces behind the plot for discharging Ecevit from 
politics (Hürriyet, July 8, 2002). On the 5th of July 2002, Ecevit held a meeting with 
DSP leaders to discuss the recent press campaign against him. Following the 
meeting, a press meeting was held and Özkan was accused of taking side with the 
forces trying to remove Ecevit (Bila 2004, 119). Next, while Özkan was away from 
the capital city, Ecevit declared that he had split up with Özkan98. In reaction, Özkan 
resigned from the DSP together with 19 deputies and three ministers on the next 
day (Bila 2004, 132). On the same day, the MHP leader announced that early 
elections would be held (Hürriyet, September 28, 2002). The number of DSP seats 
in the parliament decreased from 128 on the 8 July to 69 on the 16th of July, 2002 
(Ayın Tarihi, June 16, 2002).  
The day after Ecevit’s statements, Özkan met with Ismail Cem, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs (Bila 2004, 42). Cem first waited for Ecevit’s move, but when 
the DSP chair appointed Şükrü Sina Gürel to the place of Özkan, Cem resigned 
(Bila 2004, 133; Dündar 2008, 246). On the same day, Özkan met with his followers 
and told them that they would form a new party together with Ismail Cem and 
Kemal Derviş (Hürriyet, July 11, 2002). Simultaneously nine deputies who had 
                                                 
 
98 For Rahşan Ecevit, the external forces were trying to purge her husband through medical report 
to be received from the hospital that Ecevit was taken to. Rahşan Ecevit later convinced her husband 
for changing his doctors (Bila 2004, 136). This argument was later repeated in the so-called 
Ergenekon trials. The Doctor of Bülent Ecevit was charged for taking part in the plot against the 
government (T24, February 2, 2011).  
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previously demanded the DSP leader to designate a new leader for the DSP met 
with Derviş and demanded him not to take part with the dissidents until they asked 
the DSP leader for the convention of the extraordinary congress (Bila 2004, 137). 
Derviş met with the DSP leader and stated his resignation but the latter and the 
President demanded him to retreat from his decision (Derviş, Asker, and Işık 2006, 
176). Although Derviş had previously told Cem and Özkan about his intentions for 
a unified left, they held a press meeting on the 12th of July 2002 and declared that 
they would form a new party together with Derviş (Bila 2004, 141). The press 
meeting accelerated the resignations in the DSP. The number of resigned deputies 
increased from 18 on 8th of July to 63 on 22nd of July, 2002, at the day the YTP was 
formed.  
Table 20: Chronology of Events (2002) 
4 May  Ecevit’s health problems 
10 May  Derviş stated that early elections could be held to end political uncertainty 
4 July Derviş called for early elections.  
5 July The DSP issued a communique criticizing deputy prime minister Özkan for taking 
part in the plot to remove Ecevit.  
7 July MHP leader and deputy prime minister Bahçeli stated that the TBMM should 
convene and decide for early elections to be held in 3 September.  
8 July Hüsamettin Özkan and 19 DSP deputies resigned.  
9 July Two ministers resigned. Derviş met with Cem.  
10 July Two more deputies resigned. The seats of the DSP decreased to 93. Derviş met with 
Özkan for a new party.  
11 July Ismail Cem resigned.  
12 July Formation of a new party was declared 
15 July The seats of the DSP group decreased to 75. Coalition partners agreed to hold early 
elections on the 3rd of November, 2002.  
16 July  6 DSP deputies resigned. The number of the resigned deputies reached to 59. DSP 
seats decreased to 69. 
17 July Derviş met with CHP leader Baykal.  
21 July Ecevit argued that the developments in the DSP was a consequence of a conspiracy 
of foreigners and their partners in Turkey 
22 July The YTP was formed.  
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Hürriyet and Ayın Tarihi. 
 
During the formation of the new party, the founders of the YTP expected 
that Derviş would take side with them, even though the latter had stated his demand 
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for the unification of the center-left. For Derviş, as long as the center-left remained 
divided, neither the CHP nor the YTP could pass the 10% national threshold 
(Derviş, Asker, and Işık 2006, 187). This could end up with the domination of the 
AK Parti in Parliament. Hence, Derviş searched for the unification of, or at least an 
electoral coalition of the center-left parties (Derviş, Asker, and Işık 2006, 181–182). 
However, once his efforts for electoral coalition among the center-left parties failed, 
Derviş joined the CHP. This was shocking for the founders of the YTP who 
believed that Derviş’s betrayal had made the YTP ‘stillborn’ (Dündar 2008, 248)99. 
The YTP first searched for coalition with the DTP. Next, the party supported the 
attempts to postpone the elections. In 2002 elections, the party received 1.2% of the 
votes. 
6.3.3. Endogenous Factors of Party Split 
Formation of the YTP without any attempts of the dissidents to voice their 
demands within the party platforms was related with the uncertainty about the 
future of the DSP due to the party’s highly autonomous but aging leader who 
considered the dissidents as a serious threat to his leadership and the weakness of 
the dissidents in the extraparliamentary party.  
                                                 
 
99 This perception stemmed from the fact that Kemal Derviş was considered as the second most 
popular alternative to the existing party leaders after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The opinion polls 
conducted by ANAR (2002, 91) revealed that the voters demanded Kemal Derviş to be the leader 
of the left.  
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6.3.3.1.The Nature of Disagreement 
The comparison of the YTP and the DSP electoral manifestos reveals that 
the DSP put more emphasis over national interests, whereas the YTP presented 
itself as the agent of reform and change (Demokrat Sol Parti 2002; Yeni Türkiye 
Partisi 2002). However, it was not the dissatisfaction of the dissident deputies with 
the DSP’s policies that resulted in their departure. Rather, they were primarily 
dissatisfied with the way the DSP was administrated. Yet, even if the only reason 
of discontent was the enormous control of the Ecevits over the party, this demand 
could not be managed given the fact that the DSP was unthinkable without the 
Ecevits (Akar 2002, 239).  
The perception of the Ecevits is more important than the complaints of the 
resigned deputies for understanding why the dissent could not be managed. For the 
Ecevits, the intraparty opposition led by Özkan was in an attempt to remove them 
from the DSP. They also believed that external forces were trying to put an end to 
the coalition government since the DSP and the MHP leaders were challenges on 
the way to their interests (Yağız 2002, 11). This argument was spread to the party 
organization around country on the 22nd of July 2002 (Yağız 2002, 12–13) and was 
recalled in the 2002 electoral program100. Hence, given the doubts of the Ecevits 
                                                 
 
100 In its electoral programme, the reason of the party split was related to domestic and international 
forces who were disturbed by the new economic system on the allocation of resources (Demokrat 
Sol Parti 2002, 12). When they failed to remove Bülent Ecevit from party chairmanship, the 
argument goes on, these forces encouraged the dissidents to split from the DSP so that they could 
remove Ecevit from Prime Ministry (Demokrat Sol Parti 2002, 13). 
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about the intentions of the ‘troika movement’, it is implausible to expect that the 
Ecevits would accommodate the dissents’ demands, which were never voiced in 
detail. 
6.3.3.2.Relative Power of Competing Faction across Different Layers of Party 
Organization 
The split in the DSP was an exception since there was no identifiable faction 
in the party. With the exception of the criticisms of individual deputies, there was 
no sign of factional dissatisfaction. Indeed, although Bülent Ecevit’s chairmanship 
was challenged at the fifth General Congress for the first time in the history of the 
DSP, the dissident deputies that would later form the YTP refrained from 
supporting Sema Pişkinsüt’s candidacy101. Nevertheless, Ecevit received 963 out of 
1049 votes in 2001 Congress.  
The absence of any identifiable faction stemmed from the strategies 
developed by the Ecevits who were known for their dislike of factionalism. From 
the election as the CHP chair in 1972 to the military intervention, the CHP was a 
highly factionalized party102. Factionalism within the CHP reached its peak in the 
mid-1970s (Bila 2009, 252–289). Partly, in reaction to his prior experiences, Ecevit 
                                                 
 
101 In order to protest the attacks on Pişkinsüt at the Congress, two deputies resigned from the DSP 
(Hürriyet, May 1, 2001).  
102 For details on factional conflict in the CHP in the 1970s, see Bila (2009); (Dağistanlı 1998).  
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refused to join the SODEP and decided to form a highly centralized genuinely new 
party, which would be formed by ordinary members rather than influential political 
entrepreneurs with conflicting goals, which could pose a threat by engaging in 
factional games (Ciddi 2009, 75; Yağız 2002, 50). 
Once the DSP was formed, the Ecevits employed a number of measures, 
including minimization of the functions of the party organization, establishment of 
direct relation with the voters, limitation of the number of party members in order 
to control selection of delegates, controlling approval of membership registration 
and restriction of intraparty elections in order to centralize the power in the hands 
of the party leader (Akar 2002, 91; Ayata and Ayata 2007, 228; Kınıklıoğlu 2000, 
12–13)103. In addition to these, provincial executive boards were constantly 
abolished in order to prevent the rise of locally powerful bosses (Akar 2002, 90)104. 
Hence, as one DSP member stated, the limited membership approach led to 
unlimited support to the Ecevits (Ciddi 2009, 111). The consequence of the absence 
of any local or ideological factions based on townsmanship, ethnic origins or 
                                                 
 
103 Kınıklıoğlu (2000, 13) and Ciddi (2009, 111) state that the DSP leader consciously limited the 
maximum number of party members in any district organization with the number of 149 since the 
political parties law required delegate selections for the provincial congresses in case the number of 
members in a party exceeded 150. By limiting elections in district congresses, the Ecevits could 
appoint the loyal party members as delegates to the provincial congresses.   
104 In our interview with Ali Günay, Günay stated that Rahşan Ecevit, the DSP secretary general, 
was continuously dissolving provincial executive boards so that deputies did not know who the 
provincial chair was. In a similar vein, in an interview, the YTP leader Ismail Cem noted that the 
provincial chairs refrained from establishing close relations with the deputies of the province in 
order to avoid taking attention of Rahşan Ecevit (Dündar 2008, 195).   
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ideologies (Akar 2002, 242–244)105. Indeed, the DSP lacked a cadre (Akar 2002, 
261). Naturally, the dissident deputies lacked the support of the party on the ground 
and the party in central office. The dissident members held 6 out of 40 Party 
Assembly seats. Under such circumstances, it was obvious that dissenting deputies 
could not use the party as a platform to realize his or her demands.  
Another consequence of the management strategies of the Ecevits was the 
absence of the intraparty conflict phase in the case of the split in the DSP. Since the 
Ecevits consciously prevented the rise of powerful competitors that could challenge 
their authority, the deputies were far from developing loyalty to the party (Akar 
2002, 91). Constant suppression of any intraparty opposition resulted in high levels 
of political inefficacy. Actually, the dissidents within the DSP complained that they 
did not know whether they were party member or not (Akar 2002, 99). In this sense, 
the fear of the Ecevits from factionalism hindered the institutionalization of the 
party and prevented the rise of a party identity.  
                                                 
 
105 Oppression of the intraparty opposition does not mean that the DSP had never been prone to 
intraparty conflict. Although Rahşan Ecevit had carefully picked up the founders that numbered 612, 
233 of them rebelled against the party leader in 1986. In return, Rahşan Ecevit suspended the 
membership of these founders (Akar 2002, 113–128). A decade later, a movement known as the 
Çile Çiçekleri called for extraordinary congress and demanded the recognition of their membership 
rights by the party in central office (Akar 2002, 144–149). In return, they were expelled from the 
party. In addition to these organized intraparty opposition movements, dissent was manifested in the 
form of individual resignations. In 1997, the DSP expelled seven deputies, namely Veli Aksoy, 
Yüksel Aksu, Hilmi Develi, Bülent Tanla, Bekir Yurdakul, Cevdet Selvi and Gökhan Çapoğlu. With 
the exception of Çapoğlu, all deputies joined the ranks of the CHP whereas Çapoğlu formed the 
Changing Turkey’s Party in order to unite the center-left (Dağistanlı 1998, 340–342). In addition to 
them, Mümtaz Sosyal who was one of the important figures of social democrats resigned from the 
DSP due to rapprochement between Ecevit and the leader of an influential Islamic sect, Fethullah 
Gülen (Dağistanlı 1998, 338). Following the 1999 elections, the criticisms of Sema Pişkinsüt and 
Ridvan Budak ended up with their expulsion.  
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Personal attachment to the Ecevits rather than the party turned into a liability 
when the health condition of the party leader deteriorated. The voters voted for the 
DSP leader than the party. However, the value of the personal image of Ecevit 
diminished after the earthquake and the economic crisis. Moreover, given that the 
party depended on the image of Ecevit for its success, the future of the party in case 
Ecevit resigned due to health problems was far from certain. The decreasing brand 
value of Ecevit signaled to dissident deputies that they would lose their seats in the 
coming elections in case they remained loyal to the party leader. In this sense, the 
personalization of the party brought its demise and break down once the 
uncertainties about the future of the party leader increased. Due to the inability of 
the dissidents to compete in the party platforms and the decreasing brand value of 
Ecevit, 65 deputies chose to follow the rising political talents rather than voicing 
within the party.  
6.3.3.3.Leadership Autonomy  
Similar to all post-1980 political parties, the General Congress was the 
highest decision mechanism that was authorized to elect the party leader (Demokrat 
Sol Parti 1991, 17). However, what increased the leadership autonomy in the DSP 
was not only the leadership selection method but the leadership’s control over 
membership registrations in order to limit membership to extremely trusted 
members (Kınıklıoğlu 2000, 13). As stated above, the leadership’s dominance over 
the party was reinforced by the continuous dissolution of the provincial executive 
boards in order to avoid the development of local bosses. This type of management 
of the party resulted in a highly autonomous leader. The leader’s autonomy and 
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legitimacy was further reinforced with the 1999 electoral results in which the DSP 
became the first party. Hence the party leader could find it easy to legitimize his 
decisions regarding the dissident party members.  
6.4.Conclusion 
The cases analyzed in this chapter invalidate the expectation that the 
dissidents would choose to remain within the party if the disproportionality and the 
spatial requirements were low. However, the disappointment of voters with the 
existing parties in the 1990s encouraged the dissidents to invest on new parties. 
Although the turnout rate is not a proper indicator to assess voter’s discontent with 
the existing parties due to the introduction of compulsory voting, opinion polls were 
effectively used by the dissidents to measure the viability of potential and the 
existing political parties. Additionally, the high levels of volatility signaled to 
dissidents of both the DYP and the DSP that it was the right time for strategic entry 
to catch the votes of free-floating voters. Finally, given that the multiparty system 
increased the power of minor parties in coalition formation, the benefits of splinter 
party formation increased.  
The cases of the splits within the DYP and the DSP reveal the importance 
of endogenous factors in shaping the factional conflict. In the case of the DYP, the 
conflict revolved around the distribution of selective benefits. The exclusion of the 
old guard from office and the electoral payoffs led to their alienation from the party. 
However, since the DYP leader needed their support for forming coalitions, she 
employed co-optation and divide-and-rule strategies. This postponed the departure 
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of the dissidents who were dissatisfied with the performance of the DYP chair. 
When doubts about the future of the DYP and its leader increased after the 1995 
elections, the dissidents chose to invest on a new party with the hope that they could 
attract the support of center-right deputies from other parties. In addition to these, 
the leadership’s relative autonomy from the old guards and the weakness of the 
dissidents in the party enabled the party chair to refuse to accommodate the 
dissidents’ demands when they challenged the legitimacy of the party leaders’ rule.  
The case of the DSP is unique due to the absence of any identifiable factions 
and due to the fact that the dissidents chose to exit in silence. This was related with 
the suppression of any possible opposition by the Ecevits and the decreasing value 
of the party. The absence of any attachment to the party and the association of the 
party with the Ecevits led to the breakdown of the party when the uncertainties over 
the future of the party leader increased. Additionally, the doubts of the Ecevit about 
the intentions of the dissidents signaled the later that they would be purged. Given 
their weakness in the party and the high degree of leadership autonomy, the party 
leader could easily neglect their demands even though they held important number 
of seats in the parliament.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study attempted to give answer to two crucial questions: why did the 
leaders of the Turkish center-right parties refrain from accommodating the demands 
of the dissenting factions even if it would lead to a party split; and why did the 
dissident factions insist on their cause even if it would lead to their expulsions? In 
order to provide an answer to these crucial questions, it dealt with the paths to party 
split, reasons of dissatisfaction and strategies employed by competing factions and 
tested nine hypotheses over five cases of party split.  
The model proposed in this dissertation started with the sources of 
dissatisfaction. The possible reasons of dissent have been grouped under three 
headings. With the exception of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti-
DSP), all parties suffered from complaints about the party change. For the 
dissidents of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP), party 
change was the prime reason behind the party’s defeat in 1965 elections. On the 
other hand, disproportional distribution of office payoffs was a salient reason of 
conflict in the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) and the True Path Party (Doğru Yol 
Partisi-DYP). Yet, the dissident members of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-
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DP) and the CHP, the dissidents criticized those who held secondary positions. The 
issue of leadership succession intensified the conflict over the distribution of 
selective benefits. Conflicts revolved around the attempts of the new party leaders 
to reward their followers in the AP and the DYP, whereas the uncertainty about the 
future party leadership triggered intra-party conflict in the CHP and the DSP. 
Finally, intra-party conflict revolved around the coalition with the pro-Islamist 
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi- RP) in the DYP. Besides, doubts about the future of 
the coalition government seem to trigger conflict in the DSP.  
With the exception of the DSP, dissident factions of other parties preferred 
to use various strategies before leaving their parties. Congress motions, attempts to 
hold extraordinary congresses, competition to control the ruling offices or debates 
at the ruling party offices were among the means used by dissident party members. 
Besides, dissident deputies used the parliamentary group in order to voice their 
dissatisfaction. They either called for group debate or competed for controlling the 
group executive boards. Dissenting members of especially CHP and AP used the 
local branches to increase their hold over the party. However, the result of the 
factional conflicts depended on the distribution of power in the party in central 
office.  
Dissenting deputies also used Parliament to voice their dissatisfaction. They 
abstained from voting, proposed bills contrary to party line, voted against party bills 
or used the vote of no confidence to challenge party leadership. Besides, they aired 
grievance through memorandums or press releases. Finally, when their demands 
were not met, dissenting deputies resigned from their parties.  
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Here, the DSP constituted an exception. Dissident deputies of the DSP 
resigned from their parties without using the voice option. This was closely related 
with the inefficiency of dissent diffusion mechanisms for the DSP. Dissident DSP 
members were unable to influence the decisions of the provincial congresses since 
the DSP leaders deliberately limited the number of party members in order to 
appoint congress delegates. Moreover, suppression of any potential challengers by 
the Ecevits made any attempt to voice demands impossible. Hence, the inefficiency 
of the party organs for voicing dissent rendered the voice option meaningless.  
The case of the DSP also reveals the importance of a sense of party identity 
to understand the party’s exceptionalism. In all cases, the parties had separate 
identities, which were shared by the dissidents. The dissidents of the DP, AP and 
the DYP considered themselves as the devotees of the ‘1946 spirit’ or ‘genuine 
democrats. The dissidents of the CHP considered themselves as Kemalists. It was 
after they reached the conclusion that the party leaders had betrayed these ideals 
that the dissidents chose to depart. However, in the case of the DSP, personal 
attachment to the party leader acted as a unifying bond. When doubts about the 
future of party leader increased, dissidents did not complain about anything, but 
simply left the party in order to form a new one. This exceptionalism shows that the 
strategies to be employed by dissenting members depend on their loyalty to the 
party identity than the party leader. Therefore, we might conclude that parties, 
which fail to develop separate party identities may be more likely to split within a 
short time. Verification of this expectation depends upon comparison of splits in 
policy-oriented parties and personal parties. Therefore, further research should be 
conducted in order to evaluate the impact of party identity over party splits.  
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This study found that the entry costs did not constitute a barrier for the party 
splits whereas the belief in the demand for a new party and the endogenous factors, 
namely, the nature of disagreement, weakness of dissenting faction in the ruling 
party face, and leadership autonomy, encouraged party splits. Firstly, all splinter 
parties were exempted from spatial requirements due to their followers in 
Parliament. Due to this, spatial requirements did not constitute a barrier for party 
splits. Secondly, although there was correlation between party splits and 
disproportionality in the 1960s, the occurrence of splits in the 1950s and the 1990s 
despite disproportional vote to seat conversion shows that the electoral systems did 
not constitute an obstacle for party splits. Therefore, contrary to the findings of 
inter-variation studies, this research found that the entry costs may not deter splinter 
parties. It may be true that higher entry costs may constitute an obstacle for 
politicians to secure their re-election goals. However, the case of the expelled 
factions is different. Once they are purged, the best option seems to be investing on 
a new party. In this sense, the difference between genuinely new and splinter 
parties, which is neglected by the studies on new party formation, should be taken 
into consideration.  
Perceived demand for a new party seems to trigger splinter party formation 
in the 1960s and the 1990s. Decreasing turnout rates were associated with party 
splits in the 1960s whereas the electoral volatility was associated with party splits 
in the 1960s and the 1990s. Moreover, pre-election surveys, which indicated 
disappointment with the existing parties seem to trigger party splits in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. However, DP split despite the high turnout and low volatility levels 
in 1954 elections. Although the DP case constitutes an exception, perceived demand 
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for a new party may provide clues for understanding the decreasing trend of party 
splits after the 2002 elections. During the period, disproportionality decreased from 
45.25 in 2002 to 15.40 and 9.62 in 2007 and 2011 elections, respectively (See Table 
17). This implies a fertile ground for splinter party entrance. However, turnout rates 
increased from 79.10% in 2002 to 84.25% and 83.16% in 2007 and 2011 elections. 
Besides, total volatility, which was 56.85 in 2002 decreased to 24.75 in 2007, and 
12.11 in 2011 elections (See Table 18). These imply that voters tend to vote for the 
established parties. In fact, the votes for the two main parties, namely the Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP) and the CHP, increased 
from 53.7% in 2002 to 67.5% in 2007 and 75.9% in 2011 elections. In other words, 
support for the third parties gradually declined. Consequently, the electoral market 
was not favorable for new parties, including the splinter parties, between 2002 and 
2011.  
 The findings of this study also imply that the analysis of the endogenous 
factors determine the absence of accommodative strategies developed by the party 
leader. First of all, the nature of disagreement played an important role in the neglect 
of the dissidents’ demands by the party chair. With the exception of the DSP, 
perceived party change, which led to ideological disagreements over the parties’ 
fundamental aims, made the peaceful resolution of intra-party conflict a hard task. 
Besides, rejection of the legitimacy of party leaders prevented a compromise 
between conflicting factions. Since the Bilgiççiler in the AP and the old guard in 
the DYP did not consider the leaders of the party as a legitimate leadership and 
since both of the factions used the allegation of corruptions to challenge the party 
leader, the leaders of the AP and the DYP hesitated to accommodate the demands 
239 
of the dissidents. Finally, in the case of the DSP, although the dissidents avoided 
criticizing the Ecevits, their distaste for Rahşan Ecevit and the doubts of the Ecevits 
about the intentions of the dissidents prevented the accommodation, and actually 
the manifestation of the conflict, within the party platforms. 
Secondly, weaknesses of dissident factions in the ruling party faces 
encouraged party leaders to opt for exclusionary measures. In all cases, the 
extraparliamentary party, in which the dissidents remained minority, held the upper 
hand in determining party policies and strategies, disciplining party members and 
nominating candidates. Such an organizational structure enabled the party leader to 
neglect their demands and rely on disciplinary measures when the faction 
supporting the party leader was in power.  
Two things deserve to be mentioned at this point. Firstly, party leaders did 
not always opt for exclusionary measures. For example, until they maintained their 
control over the party organization, the AP and DYP leaders refrained from 
exclusionary measures. Additionally, the DP leader agreed to accommodate 
dissidents’ demands after a second wave of intra-party conflict. Secondly, although 
dissenting deputies expected to be accompanied by a significant number of deputies 
in their attempt to form a new party, the strategies of the party leaders or 
disagreements among the dissidents about the strategies towards their parties 
eroded the unity of the dissidents. For example, Menderes’s promise for 
accommodation of the demands of the dissidents of the DP and Ciller’s co-optation 
strategies prevented the remaining dissidents from joining the resigned dissidents. 
Additionally, disagreements among the dissidents about the strategies to be 
employed towards the leaders eroded the unity of the dissidents. This was the case 
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for the AP before the voting of the government and the DYP after the departure of 
the dissidents. These points imply that party split is not a simple outcome, but a 
dynamic process of intraparty conflict. The dissidents might step back and wait for 
a more suitable time to rebel or the party leader might step back or employ different 
measures to keep party unity. Hence, factional conflict does not always end up with 
party disunity. 
These points also imply that the authoritarian nature of Turkish party leaders 
do not always result with exclusionary measures. The conventional wisdom is that 
Turkish party leaders are authoritarian in nature and that this tendency leads to the 
expulsion of dissenting factions, which in turn, triggers party splits. The findings of 
this thesis do not explain why the party leaders of Turkish parties are authoritarian 
in their nature. Rather, it shows that Turkish party leaders may use factional 
conflicts in order to protect their positions by either expelling the dissidents or 
accommodating their demands. Events in the DP, AP and DYP show that the party 
leaders may opt for accommodative strategies until the party leaders consolidate 
their control over the party organization. In this sense, authoritarian party leaders 
cannot always opt for exclusionary measures; rather power dispersion within the 
party organization influences their strategies.  
Additionally, in cases where the parent organization was in government, the 
predominant party system paved the way for the expulsion of the dissidents. In the 
case of the DP, the dissidents were far from threatening the party government until 
the second wave of dissent. In the examples of the AP, the predominant party 
system was associated with the exclusionary strategies of Demirel after the 1969 
elections.  
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In addition to the power dispersion within the party organization, leadership 
autonomy made it easier for the party leaders to legitimize their decisions to expel 
the dissidents. Delegation system employed by Turkish political parties enabled the 
party leaders to curb the supporters of dissident factions in the party on the ground. 
This organizational structure, which made party leaders free from factional 
pressures, provided legitimacy to their decisions. Moreover, the electoral victories 
of the DP, AP and DSP provided additional legitimacy to the leadership of the party 
chair. Consequently, party leaders could demand obedience to their rule by pointing 
out their democratic election methods, the inclusiveness of the selectorate, and in 
some cases the previous election results.  
Although this study did not deal with the split in the National View 
Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi), the findings of this study may provide insight to 
the split, which ended with the formation of the Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP). When the RP and its charismatic leader 
Necmettin Erbakan were outlawed, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP) was 
formed as a successor party. Conflicting political projects of competing factions, 
namely the Reformists (Yenilikçiler) and the Traditionalists (Gelenekçiler) 
regarding the future of the FP as well as the opposition of Erbakan to the demands 
of party change proposed by the Reformists, paved the ground for party split. The 
split was facilitated by the viability of a new party, weakness of the dissidents in 
the ruling party face and leadership autonomy. Pre-election surveys during the early 
2000s showed potential support for a new party to be formed by the leaders of the 
dissidents, namely Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül. Besides, the 1999 
earthquake and the inability of the coalition partners to deal with the mounting 
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economic difficulties decreased the viability of the existing parties. Although the 
Reformists competed with the Traditionalists for the leadership to the FP, they lost 
the control of the new party, thanks to the support of outlawed Erbakan to the 
Traditionalists. Moreover, the inclusiveness of selectorate increased party leader 
Recai Kutan’s autonomy. Hence, when the party was outlawed in 2001, the 
Reformists decided to form a new party whereas the traditionalists joined the 
successor Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP).  
The findings of this study are limited to the Turkish   mainstream political 
parties with decentralized organizational structures, in which the 
extraparliamentary party controls the parliamentary party. The major limitation of 
this study is the absence of variations in the dependent variable, namely party splits. 
This is a consequence of the case selection design. Since this dissertation has used 
Mill’s most different design, the dependent and the independent variables do not 
vary (Gerring, 2007: 141). For this reason, further research comparing splits of 
parties with different organizational structures may be conducted in order to find 
the extent to which the findings of this study can be explanatory for other splits. 
Besides, this study undermines the importance of the loyalty option for explaining 
the behaviors of deputies in times of intra-party conflict. Due to this, further 
research on organizational commitment of the party members and deputies may be 
conducted.  
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